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Abstract
Identifying perpetrators via watermarking technology has proven of value in media copyright
infringements. To enable tracing back unauthorizedly re-distributed media copies that were
manipulated by a collusion attack, collusion secure fingerprinting codes are embedded into the
copies via watermarking technology. Fingerprinting codes are mathematical codes designed to
resist collusion attacks by means of probabilistically generated codewords and suitable tracing
algorithms.
However, embedding fingerprinting codes as watermark messages is challenging. This is be-
cause of its enormous code length in realistic parameter settings such as small error rates and
resistance against large collusions, while the watermarking payload provided by the media
copies is very limited. Therefore, to first enable the use of fingerprinting codes in practice, a
suitable compromise regarding the fingerprinting parameters must be identified. As the differ-
ent media fields come with varying requirements on the fingerprinting codes, it is impossible to
rely on one specific fingerprinting scheme. Instead, for each of the different media application
scenarios separately, the suitable parameter setting is to be identified. With it, conceptuation
and design of specifically tailored fingerprinting solutions for the different requirements is first
possible.
This thesis takes on these challenges to design and optimize various fingerprinting codes each
matching a certain application scenario and thereby finally enabling the application of finger-
printing codes for those scenarios in need of collusion security. Hence, we identify a number of
application scenarios that are potentially subject to collusion attacks. We give definitions of the
different types of fingerprinting schemes, its parameters and properties as well as collusion at-
tacks. The general structure of modern fingerprinting schemes is derived and explained with the
example of the Tardos codes. With respect to these definitions, the different application scenar-
ios are analyzed in order to identify the individual requirements. With it we are able to postulate
what types of fingerprinting schemes with which parameter settings suffice these requirements.
To that effect, various fingerprinting codes are proposed. We developed fingerprinting codes
designed to resist very small collusions, while providing shortest code lengths at comparably
low error rates. Moreover, different approaches are given, optimizing the generation of the fin-
gerprinting codes with respect to practical applications and appropriate parameter settings. To
that, we also developed the corresponding tracing strategies, imposing improvements regarding
error rates, code length, complexity and that are independent of the attacks. Besides, we also
showed how fingerprinting codes can be realized in hashtable database scenarios thus enabling
collusion security also for this scenario. The proposed approaches all have their specific advan-
tages, for which each is the most appropriate for a specific application scenario and use case.
This allows to apply fingerprinting codes in practice and provides collusion security for various
media scenarios.
II
Abstract (Deutschsprachige Version)
Das Identifizieren von Verrätern mittels Wasserzeichen-Technologie ist eine bewährte Methode,
um Urheberrechtsverletzungen in Multimedia zu verfolgen. Um auch diejenigen der unbefugt
weiterverteilten Kopien zurück verfolgen zu können, welche einem Koalitionsangriff unterla-
gen, werden koalitionsresistente Fingerprinting-Codes mittels Wasserzeichen-Technologie in
die Kopien eingebettet. Fingerprinting-Codes sind mathematische Codes mit der Eigenschaft
auch Koalitionsangriffe überstehen zu können. Sie bestehen aus wahrscheinlichkeitstheo-
retisch generierten Codewörtern und entsprechend geeigneten Tracing-Algorithmen. Das Ein-
betten von Fingerprinting-Codes als Wasserzeichen-Nachrichten stellt jedoch eine große Her-
ausforderung dar. Der Grund dafür ist die enorme Codelänge der Fingerprints bei realistis-
chen Parametereinstellungen, etwa eine geringe Fehlerrate bei gleichzeitiger Resistenz gegen
große Koalitionen, verglichen mit der stark begrenzten Wasserzeichen-Nutzlast der Multimedia-
Trägerdateien. Daher muss erst ein geeigneter Kompromiss bezüglich der Fingerprinting-
Parameter gefunden werden, um die Verwendung von Fingerprinting-Codes in der Praxis über-
haupt zu gewährleisten.
Da die verschiedenen Multimedia-Bereiche unterschiedliche Anforderungen an die
Fingerprinting-Codes stellen, ist es nicht möglich, nur auf ein einziges Fingerprinting-System
zurück zu greifen. Stattdessen muss erst für jedes der verschiedenen Multimedia-Bereiche
eine geeignete Parametereinstellung gefunden werden. Damit erst sind Konzeptuation und
Gestaltung von individuell zugeschnittenen Fingerprinting-Lösungen für die unterschiedlichen
Anforderungen möglich.
Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit diesen Herausforderungen, um diverse Fingerprinting-Codes
zu entwickeln und zu optimieren. Diese sollen die unterschiedlichen Anwendungsfälle ab-
decken und somit erst die Anwendung von Fingerprinting-Codes in ausgesuchten Szenarien er-
möglichen. Dafür identifizieren wir eine Reihe von Anwendungsszenarien, die potentielle Ziele
von Koalitionsangriffen sind. Wir geben Definitionen, Parameterbeschreibungen und Eigen-
schaften der verschiedenen Fingerprinting-Schemata sowie Koalitionsangriffe. Das allgemeine
Schema moderner Fingerprinting-Systeme wird anhand der Tardos Codes hergeleited und er-
läutert. Im Hinblick auf diese Definitionen werden die verschiedenen Anwendungsszenarien
analysiert, um die individuellen Anforderungen zu identifizieren. Damit sind wir in der Lage
zu postulieren, welche Fingerprinting-Systeme mit welchen Parametereinstellungen diesen An-
forderungen genügen. Zu diesem Zweck werden verschiedene Fingerprinting-Codes vorgestellt.
Wir entwickeln Fingerprint-Codes mit signifikant kurzen Codelängen bei vergleichsweise niedri-
gen Fehlerraten, um speziell gegen sehr kleine Koalitionen resistent zu sein. Darüber hinaus
werden verschiedene Ansätze vorgestellt, welche die Generierung der Fingerprinting-Codes im
Hinblick auf praktische Anwendungen und entsprechende Parametereinstellungen optimieren.
Passend dazu entwickeln wir auch die entsprechenden Tracing-Algorithmen, die Verbesserungen
in Bezug auf Fehlerquoten, Codelänge und Komplexität herbei führen und auch solche, die un-
abhängig von den geführten Koalitionsangriffen sind. Außerdem zeigen wir, wie Fingerprinting-
Codes in Hashtable-Datenbank Szenarien realisiert werden können und somit auch für dieses
Gebiet Koalitionssicherheit ermöglichen. Jeder der vorgestellten Ansätze für sich hat gewisse
Vorteile, so dass jeder für ein bestimmtes Szenario und einen bestimmten Anwendungsfall am
besten geeignet ist. Dies ermöglicht die Verwendung von Fingerprinting-Codes in der Praxis
und bietet Koalitionssicherheit für diverse Szenarien.
III
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Course of action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Security mechanisms for media 6
2.1 Objectives for watermarking and fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Security components for media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Transactional watermarking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5 Collusion attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.6 Security components against collusion attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 Application scenarios for fingerprinting codes 15
3.1 General classification of the application scenarios for fingerprinting codes . . . . . 15
3.2 Selection criteria for the considered scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.3 Promotion and pre-release application scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4 Online shop application scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.5 Digital cinema application scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.6 Boxed video game application scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.7 Database/hashtable application scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4 Collusion secure fingerprinting codes: Concepts and properties 26
4.1 The general fingerprinting scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.2 Types of fingerprinting schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.3 Fingerprinting parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.4 Marking assumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.5 Symmetric Tardos scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.5.1 Tardos fingerprint generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.5.2 Fingerprint generation with discrete bias distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.5.3 Symmetric Tardos tracing algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.6 Sophisticated fingerprinting attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.6.1 Stateless attack strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.6.2 Stateful attack strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5 Requirement analysis of fingerprinting codes in the considered application scenar-
ios 44
5.1 Fingerprinting codes for promotional and pre-release purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.2 Fingerprinting codes for online shops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.3 Fingerprinting codes for digital cinema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.4 Fingerprinting codes for video games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.5 Fingerprinting codes for databases/hashtables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
IV
6 Short fingerprinting codes against small collusions 56
6.1 2-Secure fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.1.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
6.1.2 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.1.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
6.2 3-Secure Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.2.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
6.2.2 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6.2.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.3 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
7 Optimized fingerprinting codes against medium sized collusions 70
7.1 Efficient tracing by filtering suspects: Ranking search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.1.1 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
7.1.2 Explanation of the algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
7.1.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
7.2 Optimized fingerprint generation for the continuous distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.2.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
7.2.2 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
7.2.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7.3 Adapted fingerprint generation for discrete bias distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
7.3.1 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
7.3.2 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.4 Dynamic threshold computation for the interleaving score function . . . . . . . . . 85
7.4.1 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.4.2 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
8 Short and efficient fingerprinting codes 91
8.1 Efficient joint decoding tracing algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
8.1.1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
8.1.2 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
8.1.3 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
8.2 Optimized fingerprint generation for continuous distributions II . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.2.1 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.2.2 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
8.3 Universal threshold calculation for large collusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8.3.1 Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8.3.2 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
9 Fingerprinting codes for database tracing 108
9.1 Construction of a collusion secure hash table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
9.2 Detection and tracing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
9.3 Attack models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
9.4 Evaluation and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
9.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
V
10 Application scenarios supporting fingerprinting codes 114
10.1 Fingerprinting codes for promotional application scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
10.2 Fingerprinting codes for online shops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
10.3 Fingerprinting solution for digital cinema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
10.4 Fingerprinting solution for boxed video games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
10.5 Fingerprinting solution for hash table databases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
11 Open challenges and opportunities 122
11.1 Toolbox containing all recent and state of the art fingerprinting codes . . . . . . . . 122
11.2 Higher alphabets for watermarking basis and fingerprinting codes . . . . . . . . . . 122
11.3 Sophisticated collaboration of watermarking and fingerprinting technologies . . . 124
11.4 Additional application scenarios for fingerprinting codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
11.5 Combination of other security mechanisms and fingerprinting codes . . . . . . . . . 125
12 Summary and conclusions for future work 127
A Optimal parameter selection for the symmetric Tardos scheme 139
B Regarding the stateful attack strategies 143
C Regarding the 2-secure fingerprinting scheme 146
C.1 The false positive error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
C.2 The false negative error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
C.3 Error probabilities for collusions larger than two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
D Regarding the 3-secure fingerprinting scheme 153
E Regarding the fingerprint matrix generation 155
F Regarding the discrete distribution 158
F.1 Continuing explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
F.2 Continuing evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
G Regarding the dynamic threshold 162
H Regarding the joint decoding approach 165
I Regarding the correlative column generation II 167
J Regarding the universal threshold calculation 173
J.1 Derivations of the parameter calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
J.2 Test setup for the fitting of mixture models and backup threshold if the fitting fails 176
J.3 Tests for the minority and majority vote attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
J.4 Combination of correlated matrix generation and GMM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
VI
List of Figures
1 Boxed video game components to be watermarked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2 Tardos probability density function and score functions g1 and g0, according to
[88] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 Comparison of the code length parameter for continuous and discrete distributions 37
4 Normalized distribution of the accusation scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5 Different watermarking layers in the life-cycle of a video game . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6 The probability density function f’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7 Majority tracing strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8 Minority tracing strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
9 Example for creation of the ranking vector V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
10 Example for creation of the ranking matrix R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
11 Histogramm of the accusation sums at Tardos’ and our matrix generation . . . . . . 79
12 Comparison of results for discrete distribution [65] and our adaption . . . . . . . . 83
13 Different attacks on the dynamic threshold calculation [88] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
14 Example of a two-component mixture model consisting of two normal distributions.101
15 Hashtable Individualization Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
16 Leakage detection without access to the hash database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
17 Minimal code length parameter dm for "1 = "2 and "1 = 10−8,"2 = 1/2 . . . . . . . 141
18 Example for a disadvantageous constellation of 2-secure fingerprints, for which
an innocent-fingerprint looks very similar to the manipulated fingerprint y . . . . 146
19 Box plot of the error rates for minority vote minimal mutual information attack . . 155
20 Squared distance of the probability values pi from the center 0.5 in comparison
to the error rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
21 Comparison of false positive for discrete distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
22 Empirically measured false positive rate and approximated Gaussian model . . . . 160
23 Error rates for symmetric and interleaving score function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
24 FP error for symmetric and interleaving score function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
25 Percentage of colluder fingerprints caught in different attack scenarios . . . . . . . 165
26 Analysis of the correlation coefficients: arithmetic mean and empirical variance . 170
27 Analysis of the correlation coefficients: skewness and excess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
28 Interleaving attacks on correlated fingerprinting codes: error rates . . . . . . . . . . 171
29 Interleaving attacks on correlated fingerprinting codes: standard deviation . . . . 172
VII
List of Tables
1 Attacks that minimize the mutual information between y and colluders . . . . . . . 41
2 Classification of the parameters payload, number of users and maximal expected
collusion size in the promotional application scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3 Classification of the parameters payload M , number of users n and maximal ex-
pected collusion size c0 in the Online shop application scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Identified requirements on the fingerprinting codes for the different application
scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5 2-secure fingerprinting approach: Comparison of code length and errors to [79] . 61
6 3-secure fingerprinting approach: Probability of a FP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
7 3-secure fingerprinting approach: Comparison to [82] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8 Ranking search approach: Results for c0 = 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
9 Ranking search: Results for c0 = 6 after the first step . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
10 Adapted fingerprint generation for discrete distributions: Comparison to random
generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
11 Dynamic threshold approach and adapted fingerprint generation: Comparison of
code lengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
12 Joint tracing approach: Comparison of code lengths with single tracing approach
of [121] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
13 Joint tracing approach: Results for different attack strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
14 Correlated fingerprint generation: Comparison to uncorrelated generated finger-
prints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
15 Universal threshold calculation: Comparison of different score functions in vari-
ous settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
16 Hashtable fingerprinting: Comparison of different code lengths and attacks . . . . 112
17 Fingerprinting solutions for the promotional application scenario . . . . . . . . . . . 115
18 Fingerprinting codes for the online shop application scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
19 Fingerprinting codes for the digital cinema application scenario . . . . . . . . . . . 118
20 Fingerprinting codes for the boxed video game application scenario . . . . . . . . . 120
21 Optimal parameter settings according to [64] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
22 2-secure fingerprinting: False negative error in different settings II . . . . . . . . . . 150
23 2-secure fingerprinting: False negative error in different settings I . . . . . . . . . . 151
24 3-secure fingerprinting approach: Comparison of different attacks . . . . . . . . . . 153
25 Fingerprint generation: Parameter selection according to [64] . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
26 Adapted fingerprint generation: Correlation between error rate and statistical
properties of fingerprint matrix X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
27 Joint tracing approach: Comparison for small c0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
28 Joint tracing approach: Results for c0 = 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
29 Universal threshold calculation: Comparison for threshold calculations and dif-
ferent score functions after minority vote attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
30 Universal threshold calculation: Comparison for threshold calculations and dif-
ferent score functions after majority vote attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
31 Universal threshold calculation and correlated fingerprint generation: Compar-
ison to uncorrelated fingerprint generation and threshold calculation according
to [121] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
VIII
1 Introduction
This thesis concerns itself with collusion secure fingerprinting codes for digital watermarking
applications. In the process new fingerprinting schemes are presented that allow sophisticated
security models for watermarking schemes. The fingerprinting algorithms are special tailored
for different watermarking applications and varying requirements that are caused by diverse
media application scenarios.
1.1 Motivation
Digital transaction watermarking is a technique to protect copyright after the loss of control of
digital media once they are published, i.e. to counter unauthorized copying and redistributing
of media over the Internet. Using digital watermarking algorithms one is able to imperceptibly
hide information in digital media. In a digital distribution scenario, watermarking is used to
embed individual information into digital copies of the same content in order to distinguish be-
tween these copies. Referring to the transaction ID of a customer who purchases a digital copy of
content, this information is called transaction watermark message. It allows to clearly associate
a customer to his purchased copy. Thereby a method is provided to trace back unauthorizedly
redistributed copies to the responsible customer(s).
First approaches to protect digital media via transaction watermarking methods are ascribed to
the middle of the 1990s, though broad industrial interest came up in the first years of the 21st
century. Nowadays, the mechanisms and techniques of digital watermarking achieve a security
level that makes it hard for attackers to destroy or manipulate the watermark without strong
degradation of the cover media. However, by means of collusion attacks potential perpetrators
are given a method to create a high quality media copy for which the watermark is massively
counterfeited. This is done by comparing two or more copies of the same content in order to
detect the differences induced by the individual transaction watermark messages. Manipulating
only at these positions a copy of the content can be created that provides equal quality but the
transaction watermark is strongly tampered. For this reason, collusion attacks still form a huge
issue for the industry and protection against collusion attacks is of denotative interest.
A solution against collusion attacks is provided by collusion secure fingerprinting codes or sim-
ply fingerprinting codes. These are mathematical codes, for simplicity denoted as fingerprints,
that can be embedded as transaction watermarks via transaction watermarking algorithms in
order to correctly identify the traitors of a manipulated watermark even after a collusion attack.
Hence, a fingerprint acts as a codeword that is generated to serve as a clear identifier for a user
or source. A detailed description of collusion secure fingerprinting codes is given in chapter 4.
Reducing the length of collusion secure fingerprinting codes is the primary concern in related
research. This is because the watermarking application that applies fingerprinting codes is
strongly limited by the number of information that can be embedded into the cover media file.
Multimedia of limited payload such as short audio tracks or images provide payload of only a
few bits, whereas proper fingerprinting codes typically demand thousands of bits.
Consequently, for the media industry the application of the existing fingerprinting codes is chal-
lenging.
In addition, most research focuses on the information theoretic aspects of collusion secure fin-
gerprinting codes. Ironically, this means optimizing the code lengths for asymptotically large
parameters (i.e. number of attackers tends to infinity), whereas the industry requires shortest
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code lengths for realistically small parameters. However, as will be shown in this thesis, the
asymptotically optimal code does not automatically represent the best choice for the applica-
tion in practice. Therefore, rethinking the encoders and creators of fingerprinting codes with
a more practical perspective, i.e. fingerprinting codes adjusted to the real world requirements,
could significantly improve the situation for the media industry.
Moreover, the resistance against collusion attacks, namely the collusion security, for finger-
printing algorithms in general as well as the approaches presented in this thesis are based on
probabilistic error rates. This means the output of the fingerprinting tracing algorithm is math-
ematically proven correct within the limits of the afore chosen error bounds. This implies that
there is always a probability that the algorithms fail. Therefore, before court, watermarking and
fingerprinting schemes are not accepted as confident proof techniques, but as instruments pro-
viding reliable indications. Thus, to serve as proper indications the error rates of fingerprinting
codes need to be as small as possible.
However, due to the mathematical nature of fingerprinting codes, reducing the error rates has
impact on many other parameters, e.g. the fingerprinting code length. In general, a reduction
of the error rates attributes to an increment of code length. Thus, for parameters chosen in
an information theoretic sense as well as for parameters matching practical applications, opti-
mizing fingerprinting codes is consistent with improving one parameter while the others do not
deteriorate.
In this thesis we present several collusion secure fingerprinting algorithms that can be applied
by transaction watermarking applications. With it, a method is provided to protect copyright
and detect leakage. However, the presented fingerprinting algorithms are based on the security
of the underlying watermarking application. If the watermarking detection algorithm provided
fraudulent watermark information, the fingerprinting tracing algorithm that acts based on this
fraudulent information would possibly not emit the correct fingerprint. Thus, the sovereignty of
the underlying watermarking application is essential. However, the watermarking technology
per se lies beyond the scope of this thesis. Watermarking only provides the platform for the
application of the proposed fingerprinting algorithms.
Regardless of the strong dependency on the watermarking basis and also of the oppositional
requirements regarding practical code lengths and acceptable error probabilities, fingerprint-
ing codes have the potential for successful application in practical scenarios that are prone to
collusion attacks.
1.2 History
The term fingerprinting in the context of digital data identification already occurred in the
1980s, e.g. Wagner [125] and Blakley et al. [20]. These early approaches are not based on media
watermarking applications and collusion security is achieved simply by enormous fingerprint
lengths.
An early approach for modern collusion secure fingerprinting codes in watermarking application
scenarios is ascribed to Boneh and Shaw [23]. The significance of this scheme is based on the
required code length that is for the first time polynomial in the number of colluding attackers.
They also formulated the so called marking assumption, that is the attackers only manipulate
at the positions where their individually watermarked copies differ from each other, in order
to generate a high quality copy that is no longer traceable, see chapter 4. The fingerprinting
algorithms proposed in this thesis rely on this assumption regarding all possible attack models.
2
A milestone approach, the name-giving Tardos Codes, was published by Tardos in 2003 [114]. In
this approach the optimal bound on the code length is proven to be quadratical in the number
of colluding attackers, a result that still holds for current schemes. The Tardos Codes form
the basis of much constructive research until now and is also the basis of most solutions that
are presented in this thesis. Therefore a more detailed description of the algorithm and its
properties is given in chapter 4.
Important improvements of the Tados Codes are published by Škori´c et al. in [124] and [121],
decoupling the error rates and introducing a symmetric scoring function, respectively. Another
approach of value was given by Blayer and Tassa in [21]. They tightened some inequalities
within the proof schemes and thereby achieved further reductions in the code length.
A different approach that provides the shortest code lengths for larger collusion sizes when
starting this thesis was published by Nuida et al. in 2009 [84]. They used a discrete probability
function for the generation of the fingerprints.
We will come back to these approaches in chapters 4, 7 and 8.
For small collusion sizes, the state of the art for the time our work started is marked by Nuida
et al., [83], [84] and [82]. We will give a more detailed description of these codes in chapter 6.
Approaches that are strongly oriented to coding theory, i.e. approaches that discuss the infor-
mation theoretic optimal rate for fingerprinting codes are published among others by Huang
and Moulin [50], [51], [52] and Amiri and Tardos [7]. These works consider the asymptotic be-
havior of the fingerprinting codes, i.e. the optimal code while the collusion size tends to infinity.
Due to the restrictions inflicted by the multimedia application scenarios, these codes only play
a minor role in the process of this thesis.
A detailed carrying out of the related work of fingerprinting codes is shifted to chapter 4.
1.3 Goals
Collusion secure fingerprinting codes are a much discussed research topic but until now found
hardly their way into praxis. This is last but not least because the majority of watermarking
application providers have only minor knowledge of mathematical fingerprinting codes. The
goal of this thesis thus is to describe the different approaches of fingerprinting codes that we
developed and to analyze the manifold application scenarios for which existing security vul-
nerabilities can be shut by means of fingerprinting codes. In order to do so, the different
watermarking application scenarios have to be identified and classified according to their es-
pecial security and performance requirements. The application scenarios that form the basis
are chosen in order to cover the broadest spectrum of types of fingerprinting codes that can be
applied in practice.
Based upon this we determine the requirements on the fingerprinting codes and sort them
to their potential media application scenario. Given that, it will be illustrated what type of
fingerprinting codes finally prove suitable to which of the varying media application scenarios.
Connected to this is the general challenge of reducing the code length of fingerprinting codes.
The shorter the code length, the more application scenarios match or the higher will be the
achieved security level. However, the fingerprinting parameters, in particular length and secu-
rity, are strongly connected. More precisely, the code length can be seen as a function depending
on the fingerprinting parameters. This means reducing the length of a fingerprinting code can
be generalized to optimizing the interaction of the parameters.
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Especial attention is spent to the enhancement on the well known Tardos Codes [114], which in
many scenarios can be seen as the basic tool for the fingerprinting schemes to be applied and
already was reason for much research. The uniqueness is reasoned in the targeted applicability
in praxis. In contrast to recent information theoretic research by other authors, our focus is to
expand or modify the fingerprinting codes according to their actual watermarking application
in praxis. Therefore, for this work several fingerprinting codes evolved that are outstanding
regarding their simplicity and performance.
In addition, a fundamental new approach is our 2-secure, i.e. resistant against two colluders,
fingerprinting code [94], that provides a zero false positive error not only in empirical tests
but also mathematically proven. Hereby we intend to expand the applicability also to the legal
perspective. An algorithm providing a zero false positive rate is even harder to doubt before
court than a false positive probability whatever small it is.
A new application scenario that was recently brought to life within our research group is the
scenario of video game watermarking [12]. This scenario by the different nature of video games
requires a new kind of fingerprinting approach, as there is no longer a single file to protect by
watermarking technology, but sets of files of different media components.
As far as we know, a further novelty is our approach to enlarge the typical application fields
for fingerprinting codes by introducing a concept to apply fingerprinting codes in the field of
hashtable tracing [14].
Although this work focuses on practical fingerprinting codes for watermarking applications, for
lack of space there will not be a deeper introduction into media watermarking algorithms. We
will refer to the corresponding algorithm whenever deeper knowledge is required. This work is
written with the intention to provide fingerprinting knowledge in a way that is understandable
also for readers that are not experts in multimedia and watermarking.
1.4 Course of action
This work describes innovations, optimizations, extensions and adaptations of collusion secure
fingerprinting codes with respect to various application scenarios.
In chapter 2 we give an introduction into media security mechanisms. We shortly describe ob-
jectives for watermarking and fingerprinting and list other security mechanisms familiar with
or sometimes entangled with watermarking or fingerprinting. Besides, we briefly explain au-
thenticity principals and transaction watermarking. Finally, we introduce collusion attacks and
methods to counter these.
Chapter 3 identifies the different application scenarios appropriate and in need of collusion
secure fingerprinting codes. We investigate a general classification of the scenarios and reason
the selection criteria for the scenarios considered in the further proceeding. The rest of this
chapter is devoted to describing these scenarios in more detail.
In chapter 4 we present general concepts and properties of collusion secure fingerprinting codes.
We define the general fingerprinting scheme and its different types as well as classical finger-
printing parameters. Next we discuss the so called marking assumption and its consequences for
the further proceeding of this work. Moreover, we describe in more detail the concept of finger-
printing codes – and with it the state of the art of fingerprint generation and fingerprint tracing
– by means of the well known Tardos codes. The chapter closes posting various sophisticated
collusion attacks.
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In chapter 5 we sum up the findings of chapter 2 trough 4 and analyze the requirements regard-
ing new approaches or modifications, in order to allow implementation of fingerprinting codes.
We determine which fingerprinting scheme to apply at which application scenario.
The chapters 6 through 8 we present the approaches we developed in order to satisfy the differ-
ent requirements for the identified application scenarios. We state the characteristics that allow
satisfying those requirements and give explanations and evaluations.
Chapter 9 presents a concept to expand the topic of collusion secure fingerprints apart from
media watermarking. We explain our approach to individualize hash table databases using
fingerprinting codes.
In chapter 10 we consider our concepts, for which the requirements of the application scenarios
identified in chapter 3 are satisfied by the approaches described afore. For each approach we
show how it enables collusion security for a distinct application scenario.
As we could not solve all challenges in the research of fingerprinting codes and collusion se-
curity, more research is to be done in different areas. Chapter 11 reflects open challenges and
shows corresponding opportunities.
We close this work with a summary of the work elaborated in this thesis in chapter 12.
The appendix covers different test results and proofs as well as further concepts and explana-
tions that confirm the characteristics of our approaches. Details in digital watermarking are not
explicated here, therefore we refer to e.g. [100], [31] and [32].
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2 Security mechanisms for media
The roots of digital watermarking are entangled with steganography and have a long term
history. Steganography was already applied in ancient Greece [56]. In the medieval times
watermarking was applied to paper e.g. for letters or paper money. The latter is a famous
example for watermarking that is still in use today [105]. Digital watermarking in the current
context exists since the 1990s. First approaches that already make use of perceptual models
were published in 1996 by Boney et al. [24] for audio and Cox et al. [28] for audio, images and
video respectively.
Collusion secure fingerprinting codes are mathematical codes that can be applied as water-
mark messages and thereby expand the security provided by digital watermarking. In order to
correctly classify fingerprinting codes as watermark messages in comparison to other media se-
curity mechanisms, the following sections introduce several terms, definitions and mechanisms
established in the media industry.
2.1 Objectives for watermarking and fingerprinting
Information hiding techniques are divided mainly into steganography and watermarking.
Whereas steganography is about the secrecy of information transmitted within a cover medium,
in watermarking the primary purpose is authenticity or integrity of the cover medium itself by
means of the secret information. More general goals also concern access protection, confiden-
tiality, traceability and nonrepudiation.
The most known approaches of digital watermarking deal with copyright protection of digital
media. The primal application scenarios were about the copyright protection of still images,
shortly afterwards also about audio and video data. At first, these mechanisms were deviated
from already in use steganographic techniques, but with the emerge of the digital era water-
marking became a field of its own, providing information hiding techniques special tailored for
its copyright protection purposes [34]. Note that digital watermarking is a technique that is
also applied for purposes other than security. For example, emerging topics are the application
of watermarking for broadcast monitoring or so called second screen applications [78].
In broadcast monitoring watermarking is used e.g. as a counter mechanism to control if an
advertisement is aired by TV stations and to count the number of times it is aired. To this effect
the watermarks are embedded in the corresponding TV advertisement and can be detected by
its advertisers to control what is played and when. A second screen application is provided
e.g. by watermarks that are embedded in video or audio signals of the TV program and can
be detected by private second screen devices such as tablet or smartphone. These devices then
connect to the corresponding pages of the Internet to provide more information, advertisement
or direct buy opportunities about what is currently playing on TV.
However, these application scenarios are not prone to collusion attacks. Thus, there is no need
for collusion secure fingerprinting codes, and therefore these scenarios are no longer considered
in this thesis.
In order to accurately value the scenarios described in the coming chapters and correctly classify
the proposed fingerprinting solutions, this chapter proceeds determining several mechanisms
and definitions used in media security applications.
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2.2 Security components for media
The possibility to solidly connecting information with a medium that is given by watermarking
techniques, provides a sequence of applications regarding media security. More precisely, the
security is based on a secret key principle. The secret key is required for the embedding and
detection of information, may it be known to one person or party only, or to several parties, e.g.
one for embedding, the other for detecting. In the latter case the security must not rely on the
secret key only, the use of further security components is inevitable.
In general, the security components can be classified into active mechanisms and passive mech-
anisms. Active mechanisms try to progressively prevent violation of the security object and try
to give notice whenever a violation has occurred. Passive mechanisms only serve as control
mechanisms, e.g. to ascertain a violation or to ascertain that no violation occurred.
In the following is listed a short description of security components that can be combined with
digital watermarking. For a more detailed description see e.g. [25].
• Encryption: Encryption mechanisms are divided into symmetric (or secret) key and
asymmetric (or public) key mechanisms. Symmetric key algorithms use the same secret
key for encryption and decryption. A well known example for block cipher encryption
is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-algorithm certified by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). A common drawback of symmetric encryption schemes
is that the key has to be somehow transmitted and thereby is prone to attacks. This
limits the application to scenarios where transmission is secure and/or not needed at all.
Asymmetric encryption schemes use different keys for encryption and decryption and are
therefore more secure regarding the transmission of the key. However, this increment in
security goes hand in hand with a massive increment of computational effort. This limits
its application scenarios to small amount of data to be encrypted. A compromise that is
widely applied is given by so called hybrid mechanisms, where the advantages of both
symmetric and asymmetric encryption schemes are combined.
• Checksums: Checksums are mathematical mechanisms to verify if data is original or if
it has been changed. Therefore, a short trigger value is somehow computed over a long
bit sequence. To detect an error or if the data has changed, e.g. during transmission,
the equivalent computation is conducted to receive the same trigger value again. If the
resulting value differs, there must be some errors. Regarding watermarking applications,
a commonly used checksum is represented by the Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) [113].
It is based on polynomial division, more precisely a polynomial generator divides one
polynomial by another, the remainder term is added to the data. Thereby one can control
if the data has changed, e.g. during transmission, by simply computing the same operation
again. If the remainder term is the same, the transmission was sound (up to a certain error
probability). Obviously, the polynomial generator has to be known to both parties of the
transmission.
• Hashing: Cryptographic hashing functions are more complex but also more secure than
checksums. To prove the integrity of a medium, a hashing function, e.g. MD5 or SHA [97],
computes a hash value of fixed length from the medium. The hash value is also known
as fingerprint, however, to avoid confusion, we prevent from this nomenclature during
the further process of this thesis. Important properties hashing functions are subjected
to are efficiency, collision-prevention and one-way property. The hash values ought to be
efficiently computed no matter what the medium is about nor what size it is. It has to be
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very unlikely that two media are allocated to the same hash value. This event is referred
to as collision (not to be mistaken by the word collusion that plays a major role throughout
this thesis). In addition, it has to be extremely unlikely to find the medium by its hash
value. Due to its functionality in only one direction, this property is referred to as one-way
function.
• Robust hashing: Robust hashing algorithms are applied in scenarios where crypto-
graphic hashing functions fail to work properly. Cryptographic hashing functions have
the property that for example, dealing with multimedia, a cryptographic hash of an im-
age is useless after common image processing operations, as even small imperceptible
changes within the image will result in a complete different hash. A robust hash is built
to resist common operations on the media file up to a certain degree. The overall goal for
robust hashing algorithms is to output the correct hash as long as the perceptual content
of the corresponding medium is still distinguishable [38], [5]. However, this high level
of robustness leads to an enormous increment of computational cost compared to cryp-
tographic hashes. Application scenarios for robust hashes are among others Blacklisting
and Whitelisting of sensible databases. For example, using robust hashing one is able to
quickly scan through digital storage verifying if child-pornographic material is present or
not. Using robust hashes suspicious material can be identified no matter of the operations
conducted to the multimedia files [108].
• Error correction codes: Error correction codes (ECC) are meant to detect, and if possible
resolve, errors that can occur during transmission. Therefore, similar to CRC, redundancy
bits are added to the data. One distinguishes between automatic repeat request (ARQ) and
forward error correction (FEC). The main difference is that ARQ requests the fraudulent
data until the message is complete and correct, whereas FEC recognizes and corrects the
fraudulent message by means of the redundancy bits. With regards to watermarking, FEC
is used to correct errors that arise during transmission or are aroused by media operations
and attacks. Two examples for forward error correction are Convolutional Code and Turbo
Code [9]. Most FEC are able to completely correct up to three transmission errors. For
common watermark messages this stands for almost 10% of its lengths at cost of only few
added redundancy bits.
2.3 Authenticity
The objective for media regarding security is manifold. In general the primary goal is authen-
ticity and integrity [105], yet authenticity is also the objective for fingerprinting application
scenarios, and thus for this thesis. Apart from authenticity and integrity there is also ac-
cess protection, confidentiality, traceability and nonrepudiation defined as security aspects in
multimedia [111]. Due to its employment, this thesis restricts itself of defining the aspect of
authenticity.
In general, authenticity describes the reliability and originality of a medium. Note that this
is not restricted to the digital world, also persons, tools, objects in the digital as well as the
analogue world are treat as authentic or not. The so called authentication validates if a medium
is authentic.
Regarding the media application scenarios of this thesis, we have to distinguish between au-
thorship authentication and customer authentication.
• Authorship authentication means that there is some kind of connection to the origina-
tor of a medium, e.g. some special feature that clearly identifies its source. Thereby a
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medium can be copyright protected, as the originator can be identified. Furthermore, it
can emphasize the trust appliers have to the medium, as they trust its source.
• Customer authentication is needed to connect a customer with the purchased medium.
In case of misuse, the responsible customer can be identified via customer authentication.
The neat example for customer authentication regarding this thesis is to individualize the
medium according to its customer. This is done via transactional watermarking methods,
see the upcoming section 2.4. Thereby, in case of misuse, the individualization feature
can be compared to all other individualization features in the originators database, and
the responsible customer is uniquely identified.
For both, authorship authentication and customer authentication, digital watermarking can
serve as proper features. However, this thesis restricts itself to customer authentication via
transaction watermarking methods. The corresponding individualization feature is provided by
the collusion secure fingerprinting codes.
2.4 Transactional watermarking
Digital data, such as digital multimedia, are easily manageable and editable. Especially dupli-
cating of media content does not pose any challenge even to inexperienced persons. Besides the
obvious advantages for the average user, also malicious users benefit from this. The loss caused
by unauthorized redistribution and copyright infringement plays an important role in the digital
media industry. This has led to the development of copyright protection mechanisms, such as
transactional watermarking.
In general, when speaking about digital watermarking during this thesis, we speak about digital
imperceptible watermarking. Though, there exists no determinate definition for digital water-
marking, the following description generalizes its character:
Using watermarking algorithms one is able to imperceptibly hide secret information in cover-media,
as well as to reliably detect and read out this information again.
A typical watermarking scheme can be divided into three stages, the watermark embedding
process, the transmission channel, and the watermark detection process. Whether or not the
original copy is needed for the detection process one speaks of non blind or blind watermarking.
As the fingerprinting codes proposed in this thesis do not depend on the basis watermarking
layer, they are capable of both types. However, as our research group solely deals with blind
watermarking schemes, the proposed fingerprinting codes have only been applied onto these in
praxis. The following depicts a blind or oblivious transaction watermarking scheme.
Embedding The watermark embedding process requires a copy of the original medium, the
watermark message to be embedded and the secret key. The watermark messages applied
in Fraunhofer SIT are binary codes. The secret key dictates the positions of the cover
media and in which order these are taken for embedding. With this input the watermark
embedder generates the watermarked copy.
Transmission The transmission stage concerns the phase in which the watermarked copy has
been sold and lies in the hands of the corresponding customer. In this phase the water-
marked copy is thus potentially prone to conversions, compressions and attacks. There-
fore, the transmission phase is also referred to as attack channel.
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Detection With the same secret key as used for embedding, the detector is able to read out
the watermark message from a watermarked copy. This process is applied in case an
unauthorizedly redistributed copy is found.
Note that, no matter of its application, a watermark is part of the media. Technically, a water-
mark is a slight modification of the cover media. The embedding algorithm alters some parts of
the cover in a way that it stays imperceptible for human perception, but the detection algorithm
is able to detect the watermark again. The positions to be altered are dictated by the secret
key. Without the knowledge of this key it should not be possible to detect the message, thereby
referring to Kerckhoff’s principle of cryptographic security [58].
With regards to the transactional watermarking scenario this means, that individual customer
information can be integrated into the media copy, thereby uniquely interrelating the media
copy with the corresponding customer. Furthermore, during the further procedure of the media,
the information can be detected and read out again in order to identify the copy or customer.
The embedded information represents the watermark message or simply the watermark.
Mirrored to the customer authentication as described in the afore section 2.3, this method is ap-
plied as a copy protection mechanism. Anticipating one of the scenarios that will be explained
in chapter 3, the vendor or distributor that owns the intellectual property right of some media
content applies transaction watermarking techniques in order to embed a customer-individual
watermark message into every copy sold. In case one of his customers that legitimately pur-
chased such an individually watermarked media copy unauthorizedly redistributes his copy, e.g.
on the Internet, and this copy is found, the distributor is able to detect and read out the water-
mark message again and by this means identifies the responsible customer. As the watermark is
part of the media, (to some extend) this also holds after digital to analog conversion and back
(DA/AD conversion), for example the process of re-recording over the air, e.g. re-recording a
movie screened in the cinema via sneaked in camcorder. As this process of screening and re-
recording is no longer restricted to a digital data transfer and thus digital control mechanisms
cannot effectuate protection, this is called the analog gap. Note that this is not restricted to cin-
ema applications. Besides movie re-recording the analog gap also includes music recording, e.g.
from radio, photographic shooting of still images, re-writing of written text (whether in digital
or physical form), etc. Consequently, this is a distinct challenge for the multimedia industry.
Robust watermarking technologies appear to be the only solution capable to resist the analog
gap.
In order to do so, the embedded watermark has to survive various processing operations such as
common transmission procedures or ordinary conversion operations as well as rigorous attacks
that aim to render the watermark useless. This means, each type of watermark is subjected to
certain properties which the corresponding watermarking algorithm must provide. The various
application scenarios require different settings regarding the particular watermarking proper-
ties. Dittmann in [32] and Cox et al. in [30] agree upon the most important ones. Therefore,
these are briefly introduced in the following.
Transparency A watermark message is called transparent or imperceptible, if an average hu-
man perception is not able to perceive the difference between the original and the wa-
termarked data. It is not eligible, that the embedded watermark message generates an
acoustic or visual perceptible difference to the original for an average hearing or vision.
It is called transparent if there can not be recognized any difference between the original
and the watermarked copy.
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Robustness A watermark message is called robust, if it can be detected reliably even if the data
has been modified but not completely destroyed. With these modifications is meant for
example image or sound processing, e.g. amplification, mp3, JPEG, and contrast enhance-
ment. It is not meant modifications in terms of attacks, based on the knowledge of the
processes of the watermarking algorithm (therefore see item Security). The robustness
defines the probability of a successful embedding for the one who embeds the watermark.
Capacity To quantify how much information is embedded into the original and how many
watermark messages are allowed parallel in the data, is referred to as capacity. According
to this, a watermark message should consist of so few bits that it is possible to embed it
several times. This is necessary to ensure that the output of the detection process is the
proper watermark message, and there is not by chance read out something wrong.
Security In terms of intentional attacks on the watermark, it is called secure, if the embedded
watermark message can not be destroyed, detected or falsified, even if the attacker knows
the watermarking algorithm and possesses at least one watermarked copy, but does not
know the secret key. Note that the distinction between robustness and security changes
according to the different application, throughout this thesis the intention of the operation
is the crucial part. In case the intention of the operation done to the media targeted
to manipulate the watermark per se, this is allocated to security. For example in the
video game scenario, a conversion or compression operation is an untypical operation
one usually would not conduct. This is seen as an ordinary attack and thus belongs
to the security property, whereas the same operations done to e.g. images typically are
considered as robustness challenges.
Complexity The complexity determines if the original is needed for the detection process as
well as it describes the effort to embed and detect the watermark message. This is mainly
dedicated to real-time applications.
Verification This declares, whether only a specific person or group, for example the distributor,
can detect the watermark message, because he knows the secret key. Or if the watermark
can be detected publicly because the algorithm and the key needed for the detection
process is publicly available.
Invertibility One speaks of invertibility, if it is possible to remove the watermark message off
the data, to reconstruct the original. The removal can be conducted after the detecting
process as well as in between.
Apart from the security property, all listed properties are taken for granted for the further
procedure of the thesis. Thus, collusion secure fingerprinting solely is a measure of security.
However, chapter 5 also describes the interaction of the watermarking properties transparency,
robustness, capacity and complexity with regards to collusion security of fingerprinting codes.
Transactional watermarking is sometimes also referred to as active fingerprinting [106], yet to
avoid confusion with the word fingerprinting this thesis obviates from this definition.
Besides the transactional watermarking method that was described in this section, there exists
a variety of different applications for imperceptible watermarking that define the corresponding
type of watermarking method. Some are listed in the following:
Integrity watermarking for instance is used in order to verify if the cover content has been tam-
pered or not. That is, in case the sensitive or fragile watermark that has been embedded
cannot be detected correctly, one assumes the copy has been somehow manipulated and
hence its integrity cannot be verified [42], [116].
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Copyright watermarking is applied if the copyright holder wants to assure the work to be his
intellectual property. Therefore he embeds a distinct watermark message, e.g. a signature,
into the media copy. In case his copyright is distrusted, the copyright holder is able to
prove his copyright by detecting the embedded watermark again [30], [34].
Broadcast watermarking is not a protection mechanism in the same tenor, but rather a control
mechanism. However, the technologies are alike, the watermark is embedded into the
content in order to be detected as a clear sign e.g. if the correct content is aired. With it
broadcasters and content owners, e.g. TV-stations, have the possibility to track where and
when their content is aired and if it is actually aired or not [57], [29].
Second screen watermarking is not a protection mechanism at all. It is a method that allows to
provide further information to users. That is, a watermark is embedded into the content,
when the content is aired on a first screen, e.g. a TV or an image, the user is able to detect
the watermark again by means of a second screen, i.e. a mobile device having Internet
ability such as a smartphone. Having detected the correct watermark, the mobile device
manually or automatically links to the corresponding website, that provides the additional
information. Thus, second screen watermarking somehow can be seen as imperceptible
QR-codes [1].
Thus, in concordance to other media processing operations such as compressions or attacks,
watermarking also is a procedure that slightly alters the content. Therefore, in order to avoid
confusions with the words modification and manipulation, we determine distinct allocations for
them. In the further procedure of this thesis in terms of the watermarking process we speak
of a modification. A modified copy in this manner is thus a copy of the original that has been
watermarked. On the contrary, with a manipulation is always meant a malicious process on a
watermarked copy attempting to attack the watermark. Therefore, a manipulated copy always
stands for the product of an attack, i.e. a copy that has been tampered in order to prevent the
possibility of tracing back.
2.5 Collusion attacks
In general, a transaction watermark has to survive a number of different kinds of media oper-
ations and attacks. As the watermark is part of the media, all operations done to the media
cover also affect the watermark. Format conversions should not harm the reliability of a robust
watermark. Moreover, the watermark should be constructed to survive moderate compression
operations. Routine duties for watermarks include compression operations such as moderate
mp3 for audio or moderate JPEG for images. If the quality is not significantly degraded by the
compression, the watermark must remain detectable.
Nowadays watermarking algorithms are capable to manage these operations and conversions on
a satisfactory level. However, the watermark is also prone to attacks that intend to manipulate
the watermark itself. A secure watermark ought to resist attacks such as mirroring, rotating,
bending and further geometric attacks as well as rerecording via the analog gap. For more
information regarding attacks on digital media watermarks see among others [27], [46].
Providing an individual message embedded in every copy sold, state of the art transaction wa-
termarking can hardly be circumvented by a single attacker. However, in today’s society of
clouds and networks, more complex attacks can be mounted. Consequently, groups of pro-
fessionals have the possibility to apply sophisticated collusion attacks to counter transaction
watermarking.
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To conduct a collusion attack at least two copies of the same content are needed, where each
copy contains individual watermark information. Due to this individual watermark information,
the copies, i.e. some parts, slightly differ from each other. Thus, comparing different copies and
subtracting their content information exposes watermark information. In accordance with this
watermark information, an attacked and manipulated copy could be created providing the same
quality as the responsible watermarked copies. In addition, the manipulated watermarked infor-
mation that the detection algorithm would read out from this manipulated copy is potentially no
longer capable to trace back to the responsible copies. Even worse, the manipulated watermark
has a distinct probability to trace back to a copy that did not partaken in the collusion.
Simple examples of collusion attacks, that are easily conducted are inter alia averaging the
content information or splitting the content and taken parts from every colluding copy. More
sophisticated collusion attacks are explained in chapter 4.6. In case the attackers, in this man-
ner also referred to as colluders, prevent from applying media processing operations that effect
beyond the watermark information, the quality of the resulting media is not degraded. There-
fore, the attack is a pure collusion attack. A general assumption that describes these pure
collusion attacks is the often cited marking assumption introduced by Boneh and Shaw [23].
Following this assumption, for reasons of quality, the colluders only manipulate at exactly the
positions that were detected via comparison as described above. The marking assumption and
its consequences, as well as sophisticated pure collusion attacks are devoted to chapter 4.
2.6 Security components against collusion attacks
Besides the security components for media described in section 2.2, whether they are applied
in conjunction with watermarking techniques or not, they fail to work in a collusion attack
scenario as described in section 2.5. Regarding the scope of this thesis, this section is devoted
to the security components for media that can be applied in case of collusion attacks apart from
collusion secure fingerprinting codes [109].
• Prewarping: Prewarping intends to protect from collusion attacks by decreasing the
perceptual quality of the resulting collusion attacked medium. For this purpose, each copy
of a content to be distributed is individually warped using local geometric distortions, e.g.
imperceptibly stretching and shrinking parts of an image. These distortions are marginal
and therefore do not degrade the quality of the cover media. However, in case two or
more customers of the same warped content conduct a collusion attack, the resulting
copy is strongly distorted. The distortions are typically strong enough to render the copy
useless. One successful example for image prewarping is given by Fenzi et al. [36]. By
means of Markov Random Fields and automated image post-processing the images are
prewarped imperceptibly. On the contrary, the unauthorized image copy resulting from
a collusion attack is strongly blurred and assumed to be of no merit for unauthorized
misuse. In order to increase the protection against collusion attacks, prewarping can
be combined with collusion secure fingerprinting codes. This is necessary in scenarios
where the prewarping strength is required to be low, whereas the number of attackers
are relatively high and the (passive) psychological protection by means of fingerprinting
codes is not supposed to suffice.
• Collusion secure watermarking: Collusion secure watermarking [15] is a technique for
transaction watermarking schemes to resist against collusion attacks at no cost regard-
ing the watermark message length. The difference to common transaction watermarking
schemes is its specific watermark message embedding strategy. Two major differences can
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be exposed. The first is the use of customer dependent keys for embedding, also referred
to as key switching. With it, every transaction watermark message is embedded with an
individual key, so that the (frequency) coefficients for e.g. Patchwork embedding alter
from the coefficients used for the messages of the other customers. This can be seen as a
security feature. In addition it also increases the robustness of the watermark. The second
major difference is that the coefficients for embedding are no longer time- or frequency
band dependent. In common watermark embedding schemes, the bits are embedded in
sequence to e.g. the time axis. In our collusion secure watermarking approach the in-
formation for each bit is spread over the whole content solely depending on the correct
individual key [15]. The result is that a colluded copy probably traces back to all col-
luding customers. This is because for every colluder holds that the correct individual key
will output his individual watermark message, or at least parts of it, and thus framing
innocent customers is (up to a certain extremely low probability) impossible. The huge
disadvantage of this anti collusion technique is its enormous effort for embedding and
detection and moreover the liability caused by the huge number of different keys. Even
worse is its restriction regarding practical applications. The container embedding strategy
by Steinebach et al. e.g. [107] that provides fastest embedding, even embedding on the fly
that is up to 1000 times faster than playback speed [126], does not work using collusion
secure watermarking as published in [15].
2.7 Summary
We gave a short introduction into the objectives that are trailed by watermarking schemes.
Especial focus was laid to authenticity that was defined and subdivided into authorship authen-
tication and customer authentication. The latter objective is of major interest for this thesis.
Therefore, this chapter briefly introduced digital watermarking in general and its applications
as well as common watermarking properties in particular. Hereby, the focus was laid to trans-
actional watermarking due to its prime importance regarding customer authentication. Apart
from that, we described in short several security components for media that whether compete
or can be applied in conjunction with watermarking. Some are generally important regarding
media security, others are additionally required to solve weaknesses in the fingerprinting sce-
narios due to weaknesses of the underlaying watermarking algorithms, e.g. checksums or robust
hashing. We will refer to them if adequate protection solely by watermarking and fingerprinting
is not possible. Last but not least, this chapter gave a first introduction into collusion attacks
and we specified important anti collusion techniques that are used with watermarking. Though
these do not provide the assertiveness and potency than collusion secure fingerprinting codes.
However, if procurable, some scenarios may give the opportunity to combine these techniques
with collusion secure fingerprinting codes.
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3 Application scenarios for fingerprinting codes
The initial point for this thesis is given by different scenarios for the application of collusion
secure fingerprinting codes. This chapter describes these scenarios in short and explains its
relevance in practical applications. Furthermore, the necessity of transactional watermarking
solutions and especial the necessity of collusion secure fingerprinting codes are emphasized.
3.1 General classification of the application scenarios for fingerprinting codes
To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a general classification approach for a rea-
sonable identification of the different application scenarios for fingerprinting codes. Hence, this
thesis introduces a comprehensive distinction of the different application scenarios.
• Promotion: The promotion and pre-release phase of a product describes the phase
between the almost completed creation and development process and the official start of
sale, i.e. release. During this period, the product is valued and rated by external persons
or parties, hence this phase is crucial for the success of the product in the official sale. A
famous example is journalists valuing a new music album.
• Online shop: The online shop represents the classical end-customer authentication sce-
nario. Therefore, the product is transmitted to the customer via download. For a reason-
able authentication a distinct identification method, e.g. by credit card, is necessary. Neat
examples represent online shops for still images or music songs.
• Digital cinema: In the digital cinema scenario the target is no longer a clear end-
customer authentication but the identification and authentication of local cinemas or
movie processing stages. The name giving example thus is a big motion picture group
that distributes their new movie to a magnitude of associated cinemas that ought to be
authenticated.
• Video game: The video game scenario unites the scenarios for Promotion, Online Shop
and in a wider meaning even for Digital Cinema. In addition, there is the early phases for
game development before the distinct Promotion and Pre-release phase. However, it does
not include all fields of the whole video game industry, but is restricted to Boxed Video
Games.
• Hashtable: The hashtable scenario differs from the afore mentioned scenarios mostly
regarding its cover medium. A hashtable is a list of cryptographic hashes. Each hash is
associated to an entry of a large database. Hashtables are used to quickly scan through
large sets of sometimes sensible material in order to find matches. An important example
is Blacklisting, for which the Blacklist of hashtables is used to scan through big data sets
of suspicious data searching for e.g. child-pornographic material directly during a crime
investigation.
All applications for fingerprinting codes by means of transactional watermarking for the purpose
of copyright protection fit into one of these scenarios. However, these are not disjoint, in many
cases the boundaries between these scenarios become blurred and several applications may fit
into two or more.
On the other side, beside these, there exist further application scenarios for fingerprinting codes.
Yet, these do not apply transactional watermarking, some are not even meant as security mech-
anisms. For reasons of completeness they are listed in the following.
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• Medical group testing: Medical group testing is a field in medical science concerning the
identification of a group of virally-infected people within a very large group or population.
By means of blood samples the different persons are identified. As people have contact
to each other, their samples can get mixed. Since the mixing process can be seen as an
equivalent to a collusion attack, group testing makes use of similar tracing strategies as
fingerprinting. Examples determining the analogy are among others [59] and [72].
• Database watermarking: Database watermarking is similar to the hashtable scenario,
though it is more complex. Because the entries of a typical database are subject to cer-
tain rules and properties, robust watermarking of databases is hardly possible. Moreover
the necessity of protection against collusion attacks is not present at all, since the un-
derlaying watermarking applications are far from being robust and secure on their own.
However, chapter 9 concerns about solutions for hashtables, yet provides concepts for a
more general database solution as well.
• Multiple access channel communications: Multiple access channel (MAC) communica-
tion is situated in the fields of coding theory and information communication. Whenever
multiple parties have access to and send messages over a transmission channel, there
likewise occur errors. Whether these errors are typical channel distortions or intentional
attacks, applying collusion secure fingerprinting codes allows to allocate the message to
the correct party. For more information, we refer the reader to [35], [127] and [120]
among others.
• Frameproof codes and IPP codes: Frameproof and IPP codes also belong to coding
theory, yet they can also be seen as some kind of collusion secure fingerprinting codes.
A frameproof code provides protection for an innocent user of being framed by malicious
users. Stronger conditions are required for IPP (identifying parent property) codes. That
is, if a set of collusions outputs a descendant (a codeword), the colluding parties must have
a distinct parent (codeword) that identifies the collusions. More detailed information is
given in e.g. [119], [90], [49]. We will come back to the identifying parent property in
chapter 6.
3.2 Selection criteria for the considered scenarios
The general objectives for transactional watermarking and collusion secure fingerprinting were
examined in chapter 2. Hence, this section regards the scenarios that receive deeper inspection
throughout the following chapters. Note that only a representative selection of potential appli-
cation scenarios is considered. The following criteria served as basis for the chosen scenarios.
• Relevance in praxis: Due to its intention to support real world scenarios, the practical
relevance is of utmost importance. Thus, only scenarios with fingerprinting parameters
required by the actual industry are taken into consideration. Hence, all proposed finger-
printing solutions are capable of being applied in practice.
• Acquisition to watermarking applications: The whole work is relating to the under-
laying transactional watermarking applications and algorithms. As all proposed finger-
printing codes are intended to be applied in practical applications, hence only scenarios
are considered for which the watermarking algorithm allows embedding fingerprinting
codes.
• Broad covering of the security aspects and requirements: We intend to cover all
potential security aspects and requirements for fingerprinting codes that come along with
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the scenarios considered. However, scenarios providing very similar security aspects and
requirements are not considered separately.
• Existing principles: Research in collusion secure fingerprinting already has a long his-
tory. Various different approaches already existed at the beginning of our work. Especially
the proposed fingerprinting codes by Tardos in [114] and based upon that by Škori´c et
al. in [121] served as basic principles. These approaches also provided accepted nota-
tions and definitions. For generalization purposes, they are adopted whenever possible.
However, these approaches do not consider practical application scenarios nor the under-
laying transactional watermarking technology. Thus the scenarios defined in section 3.1
will serve as basis for a broad covering of fingerprinting application scenarios.
The application scenarios as listed in section 3.1 exist in different states of research. Some are
widely studied, but some are at its very beginning. Thus, before designing new fingerprinting
codes for the different scenarios, the state of the art of fingerprinting codes for the correspond-
ing application scenario at the beginning of this thesis had to be elaborated. The rest of this
chapter is devoted to the application scenarios examined for further consideration.
3.3 Promotion and pre-release application scenario
The protection of intellectual property is not restricted to end-customer authentication as de-
scribed in chapter 2.3. Already during development of the product as well as in the promotional
phase where e.g. journalist for music albums or movies, receive pre-versions of the product to
value it, it is necessary to apply protection mechanisms to prevent the product to be spread
unauthorizedly e.g. over the Internet.
In general, the original content is handed out to a certain number of persons. Copies of the
content are individualized by means of transaction watermarks, in order to allow distinction
between each handed out copy. In this scenario the number of persons that receive a wa-
termarked copy typically is known in advance. Knowing how many copies with different
watermarks are required is a huge advantage for the technical implementation, as it is pos-
sible to exhaust the watermarking properties according to the current scenario. We will come
back to this in chapter 5.
In the following some examples are listed that fall into the promotional and pre-release scenario.
• Musical promotion: In order to promote a new music album or single track, the publish-
ers hand it out to journalists and some exclusive persons before the official start of sale.
These journalists and exclusive persons ought to comment and/or write reviews about the
new album or track. Thereby they help to advertise and make rumor about it. In this
scenario it does not make a difference if the access to the new album or track is allocated
via download, stream or physical medium.
• Audio books: Promotion for audio books is not yet that common as promotion of mu-
sic. However, whether in combination with the promotion of the corresponding physical
book or not, there is adequate deployment for audio book promotion, and thus for its
protection. The scenario is similar to musical promotion as the cover medium is as well.
• Ebooks: Ebooks nowadays typically appear in alliance with the corresponding physical
book. As it is easier to copy and distribute the digital medium than the physical book,
promotion is mainly restricted for the physical book. Thus, protection of the Ebook in the
promotional scenario using watermarking methods is hardly applied.
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• Movie/TV promotion: For the same purpose as in musical promotion, transaction water-
marks are also applied in movies and TV productions. The only relevant difference is the
video cover medium. Comparing playing time, video carries much more information than
audio. However, this does not induce more effective payload for watermark embedding.
Though, both media types are contained in movies and TV productions, the video medium
as well as the audio medium, can be used for watermark embedding. More effort on the
characteristics is spent in section 3.5.
• Video game pre-release: The phases just before the official release of a game are es-
pecially sensitive against unauthorized distribution. For the publishers it is of immense
importance to keep the game a secret and make only little information, e.g. trailers or
short game play scenes, public. Their sales policy thus is to increase tense until the official
sale start. In addition, this scenario also includes the whole process of the game devel-
opment. As a magnitude of people and parties have access to at least parts of the game,
leakage detection is essential [12]. Moreover, the process of design, implementation and
testing sometimes amounts several years. Thus, a reliable environment is strongly desired.
The general scenario of video games in the end phase of development and after release is
described in section 3.6.
Digital transaction watermarking for promotional and pre-release purposes has been success-
fully applied for many years for audio and video [33]. Besides the video game medium, which
is a very new field of research, in the promotional scenario we work on solid ground regarding
the underlying watermarking technology and acceptance in commercial applications. Moreover,
the legal perspective for this scenario is quite clear, because the persons that receive transaction
watermarked copies typically have a distinct contract they must sign regarding the restrictions
upon the corresponding watermarked content. Thus, this scenario can be seen as the most
straight.
One famous example of a movie that leaked and by means of transaction watermarking could
be traced back to the responsible is The last Samurai. Carmine Caridi, a member of the jury of
the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences responsible for the Oscar’s awards, handed his
movie copy to a friend who immediately uploaded it on the Internet. Caridi was expelled from
the academy and sued for damages. The fine was the maximum statutory damages of 150K $
[31].
Note that watermark protection holds only if secure transmission can be guaranteed. In case a
malicious third person or party successfully attacks the transmission as a man in the middle and
the medium was transmitted without encryption, the protection is rendered useless. However,
the topic of secure transmission methods and techniques is a huge research field of its own and
consequently far outside the scope of this thesis.
3.4 Online shop application scenario
In the online shop scenario different types of watermarking mechanisms found their way into
praxis. For example, annotation watermarks are applied in order to add annotations to the
cover media, e.g. informational meta data such as title, album or artist. Copyright watermarks
serve as authorship authentication method in the sense to embed a distinct copyright notice
into the medium to be sold. Customer authentication is assured by means of transactional
watermarking, for which an individual identifier is embedded into the medium. As collusion
security is only necessary in applications that base on protection via individualization of each
media copy to be sold, this work will only focus on transactional watermarking.
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The online shop represents the classic end-customer authentication scenario. Digital water-
marking technology is applied in order to assure copyright of the legitimate owner of a work
also after transmission into the system of the publishing company or directly to the customer.
Therefore, the watermark message is embedded into the medium to be sold. The majority of ap-
plications require a transparent or imperceptible message. Note that the watermarking technol-
ogy is restricted to digital data, especially to data that allow modification without immediately
destroying the cover work. One of the most common examples for the use of watermarking
technology via online shop is the distribution of music, for example in (already compressed)
mp3 format.
The transactional watermarking technology that serves this scenario requires similar trans-
parency and robustness properties as the promotional scenario. Most transactional watermark-
ing applications serve this scenario, thus the corresponding watermarking technology has been
expatiated widely. However, the legal perspective is significantly more complex, because of
the non-checkability of the media after transmission over the Internet combined with the like-
wise huge number of customers, who are typically identified by credit card only. Moreover, the
requirements regarding embedding performance are significantly higher in order to be practical.
The following lists important examples addressing the online shop scenario:
• Music distribution: Online shops for music distribution are well known and widely
spread. The customer selects a song or album. As soon as he confirms his choice, an
individual watermarked version is generated and sent to the customer. Thereby the cor-
responding audio format, e.g. WAVE (*.wav), or already compressed mp3, is negligible.
• Audio book distribution: The distribution of audio books in online shops is common
as well and equals the music distribution in most instances. For example, potential cover
media formats are the same. Technically, watermarking audio books is proportionally
harder due to the higher number of sequences containing silence (on average).
• Image distribution: Digital images can be used for various purposes. The copyright
holder, e.g. the artist or photographer, that distributes his images can whether use copy-
right watermarks, transaction watermarks or also signatures as passive protection. There
exist a wide use of image watermarks for almost all available formats. Though the use of
imperceptible watermarks appears more practical, also visible watermarks are relevant for
the industry. However, this is mainly restricted to copyright watermarks, e.g. embedding
a visible logo or sign into the image. However, this thesis only concerns the transactional
application for imperceptible watermarks.
• Video clip distribution: With the distribution of video clips in the online shop appli-
cation scenario is not meant the distribution of video for TV-broadcasting purposes, but
the distribution of short video clips, e.g. for trainee purposes. This commercial selling of
video clips in many ways equals the music distribution in Online shop, and has increased
its importance recently with the new opportunities of mobile Internet. However, in gen-
eral the challenge for embedding watermark information in videos is comparably harder
than embedding watermarks in the same time range of music. Therefore in many applica-
tions, the audio track contained in the video clips are more frequently watermarked than
the video track itself.
• Ebook distribution: The increment of the ebook market goes in analogy to its distri-
bution via online shops. As ebooks form a relatively new kind of media, its sale is solely
construed to online distribution. Common formats are Epub, MOBI and Adobe’s pdf.
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• Streaming media: Beside the distribution forms listed above, there is also the online
shop scenario of streaming media. The vast majority of the amount of streamed media is
reserved to streaming video and streaming audio. The corresponding applications are not
immediately addressing the online shop application scenario, but are listed here because
the model of end-customer authentication and identification also applies for this scenario.
The most prominent applications for audio streaming and video streaming obviously are
radio broadcasting and TV broadcasting, respectively, but also online video rental shops
(Video On Demand VoD). An example for the need to protect the stream e.g. via water-
marking and fingerprinting methods represents the live-transference, audio or video, of
sports events, such as the soccer world cup or the Olympic Games. There, the content
is streamed live via radio or setup-boxes and dishonest users directly upload the stream
again to the Internet.
• Video game distribution: The online distribution of video games is getting more and
more important. Due to the magnitude of its industry and its complex nature regarding
different media types a video game contains coupled with a lack of standards, this scenario
is devoted to a section of its own, see chapter 3.6.
Note that watermarking technology is a passive protection method, i.e. it does not prevent a-
priori misuse, but it helps to detect misuse a-posteriori. Some content providers however, desire
an active prevention of copying and/or unauthorized redistribution. Active protection requires
an environment that is closed up and secured against access from outside. These environments
are referred to as Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems or Enterprise Rights Management
(ERM) systems. However, to our honest opinion, a reasonable application of these systems
in the scenario of an online shop is not possible. Thus, DRM or ERM systems are no longer
considered here.
3.5 Digital cinema application scenario
Copyright violation in digital cinema applications causes the multimedia industry huge losses
every year. The big motion picture studios create a new movie, oftentimes a several million
dollar production, and as soon as it appears in the cinemas it is leaked and uploaded on the
Internet. The market for the newest blockbuster movie is immense. At the same time, the
huge number of persons that have access to it (or to a digital copy) is hardly controllable. A
reliable copyright protection is strongly desired. Once the copies are shipped to the cinemas,
the copyright holders have no longer control over the content. To protect their intellectual
property they can choose between various Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems. These
are typically intrinsically tied to the devices that also carry the movie layer, thereby complicating
unauthorized usage. But these DRM systems are inoperable against the analog gap. Once the
movie is screened in the cinemas, it can be recorded again, e.g. by some unauthorizedly sneaked
in camera.
For the digital cinema scenario, that is the watermark is potentially embedded into both video
track and audio track of the movie, this means that the watermarking solution allows to
trace back an unauthorizedly re-recorded movie to the corresponding cinema where it was
re-recorded. With the knowledge of the setting where the re-recording takes place, the big mo-
tion picture groups can enforce the operators of that cinema to increase their controls upfront
and during the time the movie is screened. The salient feature for the digital cinema applica-
tion scenario is that the watermark message is not embedded in order to identify the source
of unauthorized action, as it is in the promotional and online shop application scenario, but to
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find out the place where this action took place. Into every copy that is shipped to the cinemas
is embedded a unique watermark message that clearly identifies the allocated cinema.
Though robust audio watermarking nowadays has a clear chance to resist the analog gap, for
robust video watermarking this still is challenging. One must be aware that in countries where
the audio track of a movie is likely to get exchanged the protection might be solely restricted to
the video track. Watermarking solely the audio track or solely the video track in many cases is
unfavorable, a combination of both is to be preferred. Since the challenge of the analog gap is a
huge topic of its own, and because this thesis restricts itself to the application of collusion secure
fingerprinting codes, we will not go into further detail here but refer the interested reader to
e.g. [45] and derivatives.
Note that the phase sensible for copyright violation in a life-cycle of a movie already starts
before the movie is shipped to the cinemas. That scenario is devoted to the promotion and
pre-release application scenario already discussed in section 3.3.
The model of digital cinema application scenario is not restricted to movies for cinemas, but can
be expanded to other services as well. Every distribution scenario in which a copyright holder
provides a service to his customers, that themselves provide this service for their own distribu-
tion business, can be somehow classified into the same model as the digital cinema application
scenario. Another example, for instance, is a model in which the providers of geographical
3D maps want to control their customers’ management of their service. That is they want to
know e.g. does the number of applications of this service exceed the number that was originally
scheduled in their license contract. In case they find unauthorized usage of their service, they
want to know the source, i.e. the customer-company, that is responsible for this unauthorized
usage. The same model also applies for the licensing of video game engines. The providers of a
video game engine do not want video game developers to unauthorizedly utilize their engine.
Whether this unauthorized usage is conducted by a licensee or by an opponent party that pirate
outstanding components of the engine for their own business of licensing video game engines. A
watermarking method to protect from the undesired usage described above promises a remedy
for these service providers.
3.6 Boxed video game application scenario
The video game scenario is a relative new scenario for the application of transactional water-
marks and fingerprinting codes. The variety of different kinds of video games, its huge market
and the complex and very differing composition of various multimedia components consisting
in a typical video game make this watermarking scenario a research topic of its own. In fact,
during the time of this thesis there is a doctoral research study in progress concerning this topic.
In [12] we stated that the distribution of video games can be divided into games as a service and
games as a product.
• Games as a Service: Games as a service describes a video game that is continuously
in development and purchased e.g. via a standing order. Contrary to the distribution of
e.g. audio files, it is not a one time bargain, but an actively interchanging relationship
between customers and developers. Typical examples are Massively Multiplayer Online
(MMO) games, such as World of Warcraft (WoW), Browser Games, such as Forge of Empires,
or Social Games as provided on Facebook for instance.
Due to the the Server/Client concept, to the best of our knowledge, content protection via
watermarking techniques is an open challenge for which scientific watermarking has not
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been applied yet. Consequently, collusion security is no issue by now and thus, games as
a service are no longer considered here. We refer the interested reader to other works of
our group, e.g. [12].
• Games as a Product: Games as a product describes the video games that are produced
at once and, besides smaller expansions or updates now and then, are finalized with the
release date. The game is purchased all at once ’in a box’ via over the counter or by down-
load. This makes this branch more similar to the classical multimedia. Typical examples
for games as a product are boxed game titles for PC and console platforms, e.g. The Elder
Scrolls V: Skyrim by Bethesda Softworks, Ubisoft’s Assassins Creed series and each of Rock-
star Games’ Grand Theft Auto offsets. But besides there is also a huge list of Mobile Games
that can be characterized as games as a product even as they are available for free, e.g.
Rovio’s Angry Birds or Imangi Studios’ Temple Run. Certainly, the significant technical ad-
vances regarding power and performance of mobile devices have blurred the boundaries
between boxed games for PC and console and boxed games liable to pay costs for mobile
devices. For example, the games Real Racing 2 by EA or The Walking Dead by Telltale
Games were planned for mobile as well as PC or console games. Moreover, there are also
huge production games that are exclusively manufactured for specific mobile devices. For
example, Ubisoft’s Assassin’s Creed III: Liberation is an exclusive title for Sony’s mobile plat-
form Play Station Vita. This thesis confines itself to games as a product. More precisely,
only classical boxed games for PC and console are considered for further investigation.
This is because the classical low budget productions for mobile games are available for
free, and consequently there is no market for unauthorized redistribution and thus for
copyright protection including collusion security.
The development of a typical boxed video game is a process of sometimes several years. Within
this time a magnitude of in-house capacities as well as professional external testers have access
to the game. Additionally, specialized focus groups are hired for the testing process closely be-
fore the release. All testing participants and everyone that has access have signed non disclosure
agreements, hence unauthorized behavior equals committing a crime and is legally prosecuted.
The watermarking scenario considering unauthorized behavior before the official release is de-
voted to the promotional and pre-release scenario described in section 3.3 and elaborated in
chapter 5.1.
To the best of our knowledge, the scenario of watermarking video games was primary aroused
within our research group, see [12], [118], [13] and [70], in parallel to the work on collu-
sion secure codes for this thesis. There is no state of the art nor practical experiences for the
end-customer authentication via watermarking techniques. On first sight the watermarking de-
ployment appears as obvious. As a video game inter alia consists of different components from
classical multimedia, e.g. audio files and videos, in combination with rather new components
(regarding watermarking) such as 3D models and texture images, deploying watermarks in each
component is possible, see figure 1. Moreover, the magnitude of files of each component, e.g ca.
19000 texture images and about 3000 3D models in the video game The Elder Scrolls: Skyrim,
promises huge payload for embedding. This rises new opportunities regarding the watermark-
ing properties but also induces new technical challenges. One challenge is the watermarking
of new cover media formats, such as Microsoft’s image compression format Direct Draw Surface
(DDS) which is applied in almost every game. Another challenge is the handling of watermark-
ing not only for single files as it is common in other types of multimedia, but for rather huge sets
of the same cover media sometimes containing several thousands files. As the research question
that is addressed for this thesis is restricted and exhausted with collusion secure fingerprinting
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Figure 1: A boxed video game consists of different types of media components that can be wa-
termarked, based on [117]
codes and its application scenarios, the technical basis regarding video game watermarking is
assumed as solid. In this thesis the focus is on the deployment of fingerprinting codes for video
games. For the technical challenges regarding video game watermarking, we refer the inter-
ested reader for instance to the work of [12] and to a dissertation that is elaborated in parallel
to this thesis (but not published yet).
Copyright protection is as common as unpopular in the video game community. As the value
of money of a typical boxed game is significantly higher than of other media goods, the market
of free illegally purchasable versions is immense. The effort and costs in creating strong DRM
protection mechanisms is huge. However, the so called release groups, i.e. organized groups of
hackers that compete against each other in order to be the first to crack the protection, spend
huge effort as well. In most cases, the result is that the protection is broken shortly after re-
lease of the new game. Thus, end-customer authentication realized by watermarking methods
is strongly suggested. With it, cracked versions of a game could be traced back to the respon-
sible persons or parties, i.e. to the release groups. As soon as the cover of one release group
is blown, the others might refrain from unauthorizedly redistributing watermarked content.
Therefore, transactional watermarking technology ought to be applied in all video game com-
ponents possible. Furthermore, the watermark needs to be spread over the whole content in
order to exacerbate braking the protection.
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3.7 Database/hashtable application scenario
The leakage of databases is an important issue wherever databases are exchanged. With the
possibility to detect the leakage, the illegal distribution could be constricted directly at its root
before the content arrives at the hands of numerous end-users. Embedding fingerprinting codes
provides a method to individualize databases and thereby allows to detect a leak. There exists a
variety of different databases. However, this work is reduced to datasets of cryptographic hash
databases.
Collections of cryptographic hashes appear in several application scenarios. In IT-forensics,
cryptographic hashes allow to efficiently scan through big data sets in terms of blacklisting or
whitelisting. Blacklisting describes browsing through big data sets searching for illegal content.
Whitelisting describes the process of filtering legal content out of big data sets.
One example for blacklisting is the generation of hash tables to scan quickly for child-
pornographic material during forensic examinations for a first evaluation of evidence. Large
whitelists for example provide cryptographic hashes of all components from some known soft-
ware.
A useful application scenario could be a company, whose in-house firewall automatically pro-
hibits access to illegal image files with the help of such a list. Furthermore, anti-virus programs
could benefit from these hashes by blocking or deleting illegal data material.
Besides these advantages of cryptographic hashes, there also exists a high risk that these lists
are misused. A person who has access to a blacklist could easily determine whether specific
data is included in this list by computing the hash of the data and using it to scan through
the list. This makes cryptographic hashes a strong tool for misuse, e.g. to efficiently search for
child-pornographic material or for weapon and bomb construction sets. In fact, many Internet-
crawler provide searching for content whose hashes match to the hashes of a blacklist and
thereby potentially access its content. For this reason blacklists are rarely distributed.
Solutions for the hashtable scenario applying information hiding techniques are rare. Though
there exist some approaches in order to watermark databases or approaches that add a salt to
the hashes.
A first well-known database watermarking scheme for watermarking numerical values in re-
lational databases issued by Agrawal and Kiernan [3] is based on the assumption that the
watermarked database can tolerate a small amount of errors. For watermark embedding, a
least significant bit approach is used, where numerical values are changed. The work in [104]
is an extension for categorical data. Here a categorical attribute is selected and changed to other
values of the attribute e.g. blue is changed to yellow if this change is tolerable in certain appli-
cations. In [68] the authors introduce a distortion-free scheme for watermarking categorical
data, where database depositions are arranged in a key-dependent way. Their results are high
probability detection and also the possibility for localization of modification in the watermarked
data. However, for cryptographic hashes this approach is not possible. If a cryptographic hash
is modified, it is useless for white- and blacklists. Distortion-free approaches are easy to obviate
by e.g. a random hash permutation. After the permutation the watermark detector will not find
the embedded information while the database is still the same.
Salting is a well-known alternative to individualize cryptographic hashes. A random binary
sequence is added to the data to be hashed or encrypted to ensure that the hash or cipher
message differs from other versions made from the same data. When used with hashing, the salt
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is made public to enable the verification of the hash. The primary goal of salting is to increase
the security of passwords by making lookup-tables impractical to use [98]. In combination with
cryptographic hashes salting also can be used to individualize those hashes by simply adding the
salt to the data to be hashed [17]. Thereby common files like OS libraries cannot be recognized
in salted hash sets without re-calculating their hash together with the known salt. This makes
the process of recognition much more complex. Salting, on the other hand, also increases the
complexity of the hash-set generation. In case of massive data collections re-hashing all data
with a salt would be very expensive. Even just adding the salt to the original hash and re-hash
both can be a time-consuming operation when many copies of a hash set consisting of 100,000
files or more are distributed.
For this reason, a fingerprinting approach is desirable. Individualizing each hashtable by apply-
ing collusion secure fingerprinting codes promise a security level that finally allow distribution
of blacklists or whitelists. Requirements needed for the application of for example Tardos codes
[114] or its derivatives, e.g. [121, 86] are discussed in chapter 5.5.
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4 Collusion secure fingerprinting codes: Concepts and properties
The weaknesses of random generated transaction watermark messages against collusion attacks
combined with the effortlessness to create such attacks lead to the development of sophisticated
codes that, applying these as transaction watermark messages, promise resistance against collu-
sion attacks. Due to this property and because transaction watermarks in its early days were also
denoted as active fingerprints, e.g. [23], these codes were named collusion secure fingerprinting
codes. Not to be confused with passive fingerprinting alias robust hashing as briefly described in
chapter 2.2.
However, the history of these codes began even before digital watermarking became popular.
Already in the 1980s mathematical codes were published that provide minor collusion resis-
tance, i.e. that are collusion resistant to some extent, [125], [20]. Already at that time these
codes were referred to as fingerprinting, as their main purpose was identification of different
users.
This chapter introduces the general definitions, parameters and properties that are needed deal-
ing with collusion secure fingerprinting codes in detail. Section 4.1 concerns the general finger-
printing scheme, in section 4.2 we list the different types of fingerprinting schemes and state
some examples. The most important parameters and definitions are explained in section 4.3
in accordance to the parameter description in state of the art literature. Section 4.4 gives the
definition and explanation of the marking assumption, an assumption most fingerprinting codes
in literature as well as our approaches rely on. This is followed by a description of the so
called Tardos scheme by Tardos [114] and accordingly the symmetric Tardos scheme by Škori´c
et al. [121]. Afterwards we list some sophisticated collusion attacks, i.e. independent of the
watermarking application, in section 4.6. Section 4.7 closes this chapter with a short summary.
4.1 The general fingerprinting scheme
A fingerprinting scheme in this manner represents the whole system that concerns the protection
of a digital product. Therefore it can be divided into five independent processes, as enumerated
in the following:
1. Fingerprint Generation Process: The first process of the scheme is the generation of
the fingerprints. A fingerprint is a codeword that is generated to serve as a clear identifier
for a user or source. The fingerprints need to be generated in advance. That is because,
contrary to randomly generated transaction watermark messages as described in chapter
2.4, most codes are generated under certain conditions and probabilities. For example,
the number of fingerprints to be generated and their lengths must be known. Hence, the
result of the fingerprint generation process is a codebook of a set of codewords, a list of
fingerprints respectively.
2. Fingerprint Embedding Process: As soon as a customer confirms purchasing a media
copy of content, the fingerprint embedding process starts. Therefore, one of the generated
fingerprints is assigned to the customer. This fingerprint is transformed into its watermark
information and embedded into the current media copy in analogy to the watermark
embedding process as described in chapter 2.4.
3. Collusion Channel: The collusion channel represents the phase in which a fingerprinted
media copy is not in the hands of the distributor or copyright holder. Thus, it starts as soon
as the fingerprinted media copy is sold to a customer. By that time the distributor has no
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longer control of this copy. In the collusion channel the fingerprinted copy is potentially
prone to manipulations and attacks. In case of no unauthorized action, no unauthorized
copy can be found and thus, the psychological protection by means of discouraging from
unauthorized actions via fingerprinting was successful and the fourth and fifth process
of the scheme need not be called at all. On the other hand, in case an unauthorized
version of the media content is found the distributor or copyright holder initiates the next
processes.
4. Fingerprint Detection Process: The fingerprint detection process tries to detect and
read out the fingerprint contained in this copy. More precisely, a watermark detection
process as described in chapter 2.4 detects the watermark information, transforms this
information into the corresponding fingerprint code and compares it to all fingerprints
that have been assigned. If the fingerprint is equal to one of the fingerprints that have
been assigned, the responsible customer is found and the scheme is completed. On the
contrary, if there is no unique match, it is assumed that the copy underwent a collusion
attack. In that case, the final process is called.
5. Fingerprint Tracing Algorithm: The last process of a fingerprinting scheme represents
the tracing algorithm. The tracing algorithm receives the fingerprint that was detected
from the unauthorized copy, the list of all fingerprints that have been embedded into
distributed copies, as well as all the other information from the fingerprint generation
process, e.g. fingerprinting parameters and embedding distribution as defined in section
4.3, etc. By means of this information it is evaluated which fingerprint(s) of the list is
responsible for the collusion.
Note that, the processes two through four, i.e. the fingerprint embedding process, the collu-
sion channel, and the fingerprint detection process, represent a classical watermarking scheme.
Therefore, the technique behind the embedding process as well as the detection process is not
topic of further consideration. As already mentioned in the introduction chapter, this work as-
sumes total sovereignty of the basis watermarking scheme, in order to focus on the challenges
that are specific for fingerprinting exclusively. Moreover, the transformation of fingerprints
to watermark information and its inverse transformation is negligible for this work. That is
because the majority of watermarking algorithms, including all algorithms of Fraunhofer SIT,
operate with binary watermark messages, and for that reason all fingerprinting codes proposed
in this work are binary codes as well. In addition, the collusion channel is equal to the attack
channel as described in chapter 2.4. Thus, the first and fifth process, the fingerprint genera-
tion as well as the tracing algorithm respectively, are fingerprinting specific. Consequently, the
fingerprinting solutions proposed in chapters 6 through 9 typically consider both, a fingerprint
generation process and a suitable tracing algorithm.
4.2 Types of fingerprinting schemes
Fingerprinting schemes are classified as whether probabilistic or deterministic, and whether
static or dynamic. The following definitions explain the corresponding context.
Definition 1 (Deterministic Fingerprinting Scheme) A fingerprinting scheme is called deter-
ministic, if it is able to prove with certainty that its output fingerprint actually is a colluder-
fingerprint.
With colluder-fingerprint is meant a fingerprint that is assigned to a colluder that has partaken
in the current attack.
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Definition 2 (Probabilistic Fingerprinting Scheme) A fingerprinting scheme is called proba-
bilistic, if it is able to prove within a certain error probability that its output fingerprint actually is
a colluder-fingerprint.
Note that these definitions do not consider the case for which the fingerprinting scheme does
not output any suspicious fingerprint at all.
Regarding the significance in practical applications, especially regarding legal issues, determin-
istic fingerprinting schemes provide a stronger statement compared to probabilistic schemes
that always provide a probability of failure. However, probabilistic fingerprinting schemes are
the most appropriate for applications in practice, since the error probability that is permitted in
general allows to generate significant shorter fingerprints. Therefore, all fingerprinting schemes
but one proposed in this thesis are probabilistic. In chapter 6.1 we will also propose one out-
standing deterministic fingerprinting scheme which is at least competitive to state of the art
probabilistic schemes of the same kind and that is approved capable of being applied in practice
[94].
Definition 3 (Static Fingerprinting Scheme) A fingerprinting scheme is called static, if its pro-
cesses are called solely once.
Static schemes are the most common. Each of the processes of a typical fingerprinting scheme,
i.e. fingerprint generation, fingerprint embedding, collusion channel, fingerprint detection, trac-
ing algorithm, is called once at most. Additionally, the order in which the processes are called
is distinct, from process 1 to process 5.
Definition 4 (Dynamic Fingerprinting Scheme) A fingerprinting scheme is called dynamic, if
its processes are called several times in circles.
In a dynamic fingerprinting scheme the first or second process can be run again after the end of
the fourth or fifth process. In other words, after receiving a first feedback from the fingerprint
detection process or tracing algorithm, the fingerprinting scheme uses this information for a
second round and utilizes this feedback information for generating adjusted fingerprints and
embeds these into the media. In consequence, after the second round, the tracing algorithm
is able to output a potentially more reliable statement about which fingerprint is a colluder
fingerprint. Again this feedback is taken for a further round and so on. In that way is proceeded
until the statement is sufficiently reliable.
Note that applications scenarios for dynamic fingerprinting schemes in practice are very limited.
Streaming media provides the only scenario in which utilizing received feedback for further gen-
eration and embedding is possible. Furthermore, static fingerprinting schemes are investigated
much more and can be transformed into dynamic ones, for instance see e.g [63]. Therefore,
dynamic fingerprinting schemes are no longer topic of this work.
In summary, there exist four combinations of the properties defined above. Consequently there
are four different kinds of fingerprinting schemes.
We refer the ambitious reader to Laarhoven in [66] for a deeper discussion about the different
kinds of fingerprinting schemes. Here we only list some examples of the combinations possible.
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static-deterministic fingerprinting schemes A fingerprinting scheme is referred to as static-
deterministic, if the fingerprint generation process as well as the tracing algorithm is
called only once and the output of the tracing algorithm provably identifies one or more
colluders. Corresponding examples are frameproof codes, e.g. [112], [19], and codes pro-
viding the identifiable parent property (IPP-codes), i.e. codes that find the correct source
(parents) of e.g. molecules or DNA sequences, [48], [6].
static-probabilistic fingerprinting schemes A fingerprinting scheme is referred to as static-
probabilistic, if the fingerprint generation process as well as the tracing algorithm is
called only once and the output of the tracing algorithm with a high probability iden-
tifies one or more colluders. The most prominent examples for this kind of codes are [23]
by Boneh and Shaw as well as [114] by Tardos.
dynamic-deterministic fingerprinting schemes A fingerprinting scheme is referred to as
dynamic-deterministic, if the fingerprint generation process as well as the tracing al-
gorithm can be called in rounds several times and the output of the (final) tracing
algorithm provably identifies one or more colluders. Prominent examples are inter alia
Fiat and Tassa in [37] and Berkman et al. [16].
dynamic-probabilistic fingerprinting schemes A fingerprinting scheme is referred to as dynamic-
probabilistic, if the fingerprint generation process as well as the tracing algorithm can be
called in rounds several times and the output of the (final) tracing algorithm with a high
probability identifies one or more colluders. The basis scheme was given by Tassa in [115],
recently Laarhoven et al. published a sophisticated version in [63].
The combination that is explored the most in recent research is the class of static-probabilistic
fingerprinting schemes. In the following, if not explicitly stated contrary, the term ’fingerprinting
scheme’ always represents a static-probabilistic fingerprinting scheme.
4.3 Fingerprinting parameters
As already mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the fingerprint generation process as
well as the tracing algorithm are the processes that are special for fingerprinting within a fin-
gerprinting scheme.
The general understanding of the probabilistic fingerprint generation and subsequently of the
different kinds of tracing algorithms are described in this section. At first the definitions and
conventions that are required are posted below.
Definition 5 (Fingerprint) A fingerprint in the context of this thesis always is a unique message
code with the purpose to clearly identify a person or data file. Related to coding theory, a fingerprint
is a codeword belonging to a fingerprinting code.
In the procedure of this thesis we restrict ourselves on binary fingerprints, i.e. binary codes to
be embedded as watermark messages.
Definition 6 (Fingerprinting Code) A fingerprinting code is a code book containing a set of co-
herent generated fingerprints, that provide the collusion resistance property.
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Note that a fingerprinting code that stands on its own is solely able to provide the collusion
resistance property. In order to additionally provide collusion security, a fingerprinting code
needs to belong to a fingerprinting scheme supplying a tracing algorithm that makes use of
the specific information from the corresponding fingerprinting code. Thus, a collusion secure
fingerprinting code can be seen as one part of a two-tuple containing the fingerprinting code
and its corresponding tracing algorithm.
In accordance to Tardos in [114], now and in the following the number of fingerprints, number
of users respectively, is denoted as n. The number of positions of each fingerprint, i.e. the code
length, is always referred to as m.
Definition 7 (Fingerprinting Matrix X) The fingerprinting matrix X consist of n rows. Each of
these rows represents a fingerprint of length m associated to the same fingerprinting code.
The dimensions n and m of X, present the number of fingerprints and its length, respectively.
Note that to embed fingerprints of code length m, the media cover ought to provide suffi-
cient payload, denoted as M . That is, the amount of watermark information that is needed to
successfully embed a fingerprint of length m must be smaller than the available payload M .
In a probabilistic scheme the fingerprint matrix X is generated according to a distinct distribu-
tion that follows whether a continuous density, e.g. [114], [121] and recently [86], or a discrete
distribution, e.g. [84], [65].
More precisely, the matrix is filled column-wise and column independent. Thus, the symbols
α from an alphabet Λ that are sorted into a column i where i = 1, ...,m are prescribed by a
probability pi(α). This probability pi(α) follows a probability density function f (pi), describing
the distribution of the probabilities, i.e. the number of occurrences of the different probabilities
pi for the columns of the fingerprint matrix X.
Downscaled to the binary case, i.e. Λ = {0,1}, this ends up to α ∈ {0,1} and for simplification
purposes, we restrict ourselves to a probability pi representing the probability for a 1 in column
i. Thus, the probability for a 0 is represented by the counter-probability 1− pi. In addition, we
will often make use of the notation pyi . This represents the probability of the actual symbol (1
or 0) in position i of a fingerprint y .
The probabilities are generated according to a certain distribution function f : [0,1] 7→∞ that
is either continuous and follows a symmetric curve, or discrete meaning that it has several sup-
porting points. Chapter 4.5 below gives a more detailed description of a continuous distribution
by the example of the famous Tardos distribution.
The maximum number of colluders the fingerprinting code aims to provide resistance against is
another important parameter for the fingerprint generation process. This parameter is denoted
as c0. For the work with fingerprinting codes it is inevitable to understand, that this parameter
must be chosen in advance, already before the code is actually affected by a collusion. Thus,
the distributor of media content, who makes use of the protection of fingerprinting codes, has
to estimate the number of pirates that potentially cooperate in a collusion. Therefore, he has
to choose the maximum number the applied fingerprinting code should be resistant against.
Throughout this thesis it is referred to as c0.
This parameter has a massive effect on the fingerprinting code and its applicability. It is re-
sponsible that a distinction of different application scenarios is necessary in order to apply
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fingerprinting codes in practice. That is because c0 massively effects the code length, i.e. the
length of the fingerprints. The fingerprint has to fit the given watermarking payload to be em-
bedded by the watermarking embedding process, otherwise the fingerprinting scheme does not
provide the desired protection. In most recent probabilistic fingerprinting schemes, c0 effects
the code length to the square. Tardos already prove this to be optimal [114].
For simplification purposes, the set of colluder-fingerprints, i.e. the set of fingerprints that have
partaken in a collusion attack, in the following is abbreviated with C . The matrix that consists
of all colluder-fingerprints is accordingly denoted as XC . The number of fingerprints within C ,
the number of colluders respectively, is referred to as c. Hence, XC is a (c×m) subset of X. Note
that for a fingerprinting scheme to be sound, it must always hold c ≤ c0, the actual number
of colluder must be at most as high a the maximum number the code is construed to provide
resistance against.
As mentioned before, a probabilistic fingerprinting scheme allows certain probabilities that the
algorithm might fail. There are two corresponding errors, the false positive error and the false
negative error.
Definition 8 (False positive error) In a fingerprinting scheme, the event that the tracing algo-
rithm erroneously outputs a fingerprint that was not part of the collusion is called false positive
error.
In other words, a false positive error occurs, if there appears one or more fingerprints of innocent
users within the set of fingerprints that the tracing algorithm identifies as colluder.
Definition 9 (False negative error) In a fingerprinting scheme, the event that the output set of
the tracing algorithm does not contain any colluder-fingerprint is called false negative error.
In other words, a false negative error occurs, if the tracing algorithm is not able to identify
any of the colluders at all. The above definition of the false negative error is taken in the
further proceeding of this thesis. It must not be mistaken with the deviating definition saying a
false negative error is the event in which not all colluder-fingerprints, but only a subset can be
identified.
For the generation of a probabilistic fingerprint matrix, the distributor has to choose in advance
an upper bound of the error probabilities that he allows for his scheme. The corresponding
rates are denoted as "1 and "2.
Definition 10 (The error bound "1) In a fingerprinting scheme, the upper bound for the proba-
bility of identifying a specific innocent-fingerprint is denoted as "1.
This must not be mistaken with η1, that describes the upper bound for the probability η that
there are innocent-fingerprints among the accused. More explanation regarding η is provided
in the appendix A.
Definition 11 (The error bound "2) In a fingerprinting scheme, the upper bound for the proba-
bility of not accusing any colluder-fingerprint at all is denoted with "2.
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Note that in most fingerprinting schemes only the "1 rate is required for the fingerprint matrix
generation process, e.g. [114], [121], [102].
The previously mentioned definitions are related to the fingerprint generation process. The
definitions that follow are associated with the fingerprinting tracing algorithm.
The fingerprinting tracing algorithm outputs one or more suspicious fingerprints. This is a
subset of the fingerprints from the fingerprint matrix X or it is the corresponding suspicious
users. The output is denoted with Σ. The decision of which fingerprints are suspicious is made
according to certain scores between the unauthorized and potentially manipulated fingerprint
y and one or more of the fingerprints in matrix X.
These scores now and in the following will be referred to as accusation scores or simply scores.
They can be calculated between y and X j := X j;1,...,m, for a single user j, or between y and
X j1 , ...,X jl for several users j1, ..., jl . Consequently, they are divided into single accusation scores
or joint accusation scores.
Definition 12 (Single accusation score) For every position yi of the detected and potentially col-
luded fingerprint y of the unauthorized media copy, a certain position-dependent score is calculated
between yi and the corresponding position i of each user’s fingerprint X j(i), j ∈ {1, ...,n}. For an
arbitrary user j, the accusation score S j is calculated as a certain composition of all position-scores.
S j =©mi=1ϕ
 
yi;X j(i)

(1)
Definition 13 (Joint accusation score) For every position yi of the detected and potentially col-
luded fingerprint y of the unauthorized media copy, a certain position-dependent score is cal-
culated between yi and the corresponding position i of a group of user’s fingerprints X joint =
X j1(i), ...,X jl (i) with users { j1, ..., jl} ∈ {1, ...,n}. The accusation score S joint is calculated as a
certain composition of all position-scores.
S joint =©mi=1ϕ
 
yi;X joint(i)

(2)
The weight function ϕ is defined as
ϕ : [yi;X j1(i), ...,X jl (i)] 7→ ϕ
 
yi;X joint(i)
 ∈ R.
Note that for a single accusation score it holds l = 1. The composition symbol© in definitions
12 and 13 represents the mathematical operation that is applied. In the fingerprinting scheme
proposed by Tardos in [114] and in most of its derivations, the symbol© stands for the sum-
mation operation, thus, the accusation score for each (single) user is calculated as the sum over
all position scores of the corresponding user.
Because the tracing algorithms applying a single accusation score calculate the scores for each
single user separately, they are called single tracing algorithms.
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Definition 14 (Single tracing algorithm) A fingerprinting tracing algorithm T that calculates
the single accusation score for each user j, j = 1, ...,n and with it decides which fingerprints are
output as potential colluder-fingerprints, is referred to as single tracing.
Most single tracing algorithms use a threshold in order to separate potential colluder-
fingerprints from innocent fingerprints, see section 4.5.
Definition 15 (Joint tracing algorithm) A fingerprinting tracing algorithm T that calculates
joint accusation scores between y and several users’ fingerprints X j1 , ...,X jl in correlation, and
with it decides which fingerprints are output as colluder-fingerprints, is referred to as joint tracing.
A typical example of generating a joint accusation score is the use of the maximum likelihood
estimator, e.g. in [74].
4.4 Marking assumption
The so called marking assumption, or marking condition [114], was introduced by Boneh and
Shaw in [23]. It claims that the only chance for attackers to generate a high quality copy that
cannot be traced back, is to manipulate the copy only in the positions where the watermark is
placed. Obviously the attackers have no knowledge about the watermark positions. Thus, in
order to manipulate watermark positions the whole media file is affected by common attacks,
e.g. compression. Consequently, due to the sophisticated watermarking algorithms and percep-
tual models applied in the course of embedding, the manipulations that significantly alter the
watermark also extensively degrade the quality of the copy. However, as already described in
chapter 2.5, the attackers have a chance to detect positions of the watermark when they con-
duct a collusion attack. Since the watermark messages embedded into each customer’s copy
are individual, at least some watermark positions differ from each other. These positions can be
detected by simply comparing two or more individually marked copies of the same content, by
e.g. subtracting their energy or creating the difference-image. These positions carry parts of the
watermark information and are thus called detectable.
Definition 16 (Detectable positions) Comparing two or more individually watermarked copies
of the same content, the positions where the copies differ from each other are called detectable
positions.
By means of this, the following definition allows a more handy interpretation of Boneh and
Shaw’s marking assumption.
Definition 17 (Marking assumption) In order to avoid the possibility of being traced back for
their forged high quality copy, the attackers only manipulate at detectable positions.
Note that the attackers are only able to detect differences within the corresponding media file,
e.g. different positions such as pixel values in images. Neither have the attackers knowledge
about which detected difference position belongs to which watermark message bit, nor does
one single detected difference position thoroughly represent a watermark message bit. This is
because a watermark message bit is represented by a group of modified content values, e.g. a
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group of pixel values. One single detected difference position thus is only a part of these content
values that represent the watermark bit.
Mapping this to the fingerprinting scenario, for simplification purposes the assumption is made
that the attackers are able to detect not only content values but ordinary watermark or finger-
print positions. Also for simplicity we assume that they even know the corresponding symbol,
i.e. whether it is ’1’ or ’0’, since already Furon and Perez-Freire proved that there is no distinction
regarding the strength of their attack, whether the attackers know the symbol or not [41].
Based on this, the following extension of definition 16 is utilized in the further procedure of this
thesis.
Corollary 1 Be C = {X j1 , ...,X jc} ⊂ {X1, ...,Xn} a collusion of size c. A fingerprint position i is
called detectable if holds
∃ X jk ,X jl ∈ C , k 6= l : X jk(i) 6= X jl (i) (3)
A fingerprint position is called undetectable if holds X j1(i) = X j2(i)...= X jc (i).
Note that regarding the watermarking application, a small addition to the definition of the
marking assumption is necessary. To avoid creating perceptual artifacts within the forged copy,
the manipulation of the detectable positions must be restricted to the difference range of the
corresponding positions of the individually watermarked copies that are compared. However,
for simplification purposes the fingerprinting scenario of this thesis is restricted to the message
symbols of the watermark or fingerprint. As this is a binary decision, the watermark detection
outputs a binary message respectively, a manipulated position can only result in a flipped binary
message symbol. For other detection models see for instance Škori´c et al. [122], Boesten and
Škori´c [22] or Oosterwijk et al. [86].
4.5 Symmetric Tardos scheme
This subsection explains probabilistic fingerprinting schemes with the example of the symmetric
Tardos scheme, consisting of the fingerprint generation process with a continuous distribution
function according to Tardos in [114] as well as an alternative fingerprint generation with a
discrete distribution function. This is followed by the fingerprint tracing algorithm according to
[121].
4.5.1 Tardos fingerprint generation
For the fingerprint generation process the distributor needs to choose the parameters "1 and c0
to calculate the minimum code length m the fingerprinting scheme mathematically proves to
satisfy the chosen error probabilities. The code length formula is given as
m≥ dmc20 ln 1"1 (4)
The code length parameter dm depends on the chosen fingerprinting scheme. That is, for the
original Tardos code [114] dm is set as 100. Recently it was shown, that in the asymptotic case
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the parameter can be lowered to dm ≥ pi22 , [64]. However, this is provable secure only for very
large and therefore not realistic collusions, that are not considered within this thesis.
With it, the distributor generates an n×m matrix X, where the n denotes the number of users to
be accommodated in his system. Ergo the jth row of the matrix corresponds to the fingerprint
which is later embedded in the copy that is released to customer j ∈ {1, ...,n}. The entries X ji
of matrix X are generated in two steps:
First, the distributor picks m independent random numbers {pi}mi=1 over the interval pi ∈ [t, 1−
t], with a so called cutoff parameter t < 14 . Each pi = sin
2(ri) is selected by picking uniformly
at random the value ri ∈

t, pi2 − t

with 0< t < pi4 , where sin
2(t) = t. The choice for the cutoff
parameter t in the original Tardos code [114] was t = (300c0)−1, without giving any rationale.
In [121] Škori´c et al. prove that this was suboptimal, the asymptotical optimal choice is t ←
γ
4 c
−4/3
0 with γ =
 
2
3pi
2/3
, as proven by [66]. More concerns regarding the cutoff parameter can
be found in the appendix I or in [55] and [62].
Second, the matrix X is filled by picking each entry X ji independently from the binary alphabet{0,1} according to P[X ji = 1] = pi . The independence of the entries X ji holds only in the sec-
ond step, since two overall random bits X ji and X j′ i of the same column are positively correlated
since both of them have a higher probability to be 1 if pi is large.
The most famous distribution and also the most applied throughout this thesis is the arcsine
distribution introduced in [114] by Tardos. Its corresponding continuous probability density
function f is defined within the interval [t, 1− t], with t close to zero. It is symmetric around
0.5 and heavily biased towards values close to the limits of [t, 1− t], as can be seen in the left
graphic of figure 2. This is motivated by the marking assumption explained in subsection 4.4.
It is the only restriction on the colluders attack model and it is more likely to apply to these
columns with a high bias. This choice of the distribution of pi is used to show that the colluders’
attack model only has a minor effect on their chance to be caught. For the binary case the
probability density function is defined as
Definition 18 (The Tardos probability density distribution function)
f (p) =
1
2arcsin(1− 2t)
1p
p(1− p) , p ∈ [t, 1− t]. (5)
4.5.2 Fingerprint generation with discrete bias distribution
This subsection describes an alternative fingerprint matrix generation by means of discrete ver-
sions of the arcsine distribution mentioned in the afore subsection. This type of fingerprint
generation will be relevant in chapters 7.3 and 7.4 and are used for instance in the approaches
by [43], [84] and recently [65]. In the latter, Laarhoven and de Weger proved that for very large
collusions (c0 −→∞), the results for the discrete distribution tend to those for the continuous
distribution, what is adumbrated in figure 3.
Instead of selecting the m bias values pi as for the Tardos fingerprint generation, for the dis-
crete generation these are selected according to (discrete) supporting points, represented by
finite random variables P , with Pr[P = p] = q = Pr[P = 1− p]. Note that the value q is the
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Figure 2: Tardos probability density function and score functions g1 and g0, according to [88]
equivalent to the value f (p) that describes the occurrences of the probability p in the finger-
print matrix X for the Tardos fingerprint generation. The number of those random variables is
prescribed by the number of expected colluders c0. Hence we get (p,q) ∈ Pc0 .
According to Nuida et al. [85] the distributions are related to Gauss-Legendre distributions. For
T ≥ 1, let
LT (x) =
1
2T T !

d
dx
T
(x2 − 1)T
be the T -th normalized Legendre polynomial with LT (1) = 1. This polynomial has T simple
roots that can be taken as supporting points:
(p,q)T =

x + 1
2
,
2
(1− x2)3/2L′T (x)2

for LT (x) = 0 [85].
But as the polynomials LT (x) get more and more complex for increasing T , a method to ap-
proximate this distribution is presented by Laarhoven and de Weger in [65]:
Let x1,T < ...< xT,T denote the T roots of the polynomial LT (x) and let pk,T = (xk,T + 1)/2 and
qk,T = 2/((1−x2)3/2L′T (x)2) denote the corresponding values from the distribution (pk,T ,qk,T ) ∈P2T . Laarhoven and de Weger show in [65] that pk,T = sin2
 
pik
2T

+ o(1) and qk,T = 1/T + o(1/c)
for T →∞.
Therefore, instead of computing the roots of the more and more complex polynomial LT (x),
one can approximate the values (pk,T ,qk,T ) by computing
pˆk,T = sin
2

4k− 1
8T + 4
pi

and qˆk,T =
1
T
for 1≤ k ≤ T . This gives the following fingerprint generation process:
1. Initialization: Let m = dmc0 ln(1/"1) denote the code length and set T = dc0/2e. First
select m bias values pi, for i = 1, ...,m, by drawing k for each value uniformly at random
from {1, ..., T} and setting pi = sin2
 
4k−1
8T+4pi

.
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Figure 3: Approximated code length parameter dm for the continuous arcsine distribution [114]
and the discrete distribution by [65] with the symmetric score function [121], taken
from [88]
2. Fingerprint generation: Each entry X j,i of the fingerprint matrix is selected indepen-
dently from the binary alphabet with Pr[X j,i = 1] = pi.
Figure 3 shows the code length parameter for the continuous arcsine-distribution and for the
discrete distribution by Laarhoven and de Weger [65]. In both cases, the tracing algorithm from
Škori´c et al. [121] (see below) is assumed.
4.5.3 Symmetric Tardos tracing algorithm
When the distributor receives an unauthorized copy and the fingerprint detection process out-
puts the potentially manipulated fingerprint y , he initializes the fingerprint tracing algorithm.
In case he chooses the symmetric Tardos tracing algorithm by Škori´c et al. [121], he first creates
the single accusation score S j between each users’ fingerprint X j and the attacked fingerprint y .
The corresponding single accusation score according to (12) is defined as follows.
Definition 19 (Symmetric Tardos accusation score) For an arbitrary user j, with accusation
functions g1 and g0 defined as
g1(p) :=
√√1− p
p
g0(p) := −
√√ p
1− p ,
the symmetric Tardos accusation score is calculated as
S j =
m∑
i=1
ϕ
 
yi;X j(i)

=
m∑
i=1
δyi ,X ji g1(p
(i)
yi
) + [1−δyi ,X ji]g0(p(i)yi ). (6)
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Figure 4: Normalized distribution of the accusation scores in [121]: innocents’ scores (left), col-
luders’ scores (right).
where δyi ,X ji denotes the Kronecker Delta and p
(i)
yi
stands for the probability of the symbol in yi
within the entries of the fingerprint matrix X .
The accusation score functions are depicted in figure 2.
To determine, whether a fingerprint is suspicious or not a threshold decision is applied. This
means, the distributor suspects a user j to have partaken in the collusion, if the corresponding
accusation score S j exceeds a predefined threshold Z ,
∀ j ∈ {1, ...,n} : S j > Z ⇒ j ∈ T,
where T denotes the output set of the tracing algorithm, i.e. the set of fingerprints that are
suspected of having partaken in the collusion.
The threshold Z depends on the chosen maximum number of colluders c0 and of the chosen
rate for "1,
Z ≤ dzc0 ln 1
"1
, (7)
with a threshold parameter dz depending on the chosen fingerprint tracing algorithm. For the
symmetric Tardos tracing algorithm, dz is set as σ ·pi. Note that the standard deviation of the
expected accusation scores of innocent users σ is assumed to be 1 for the symmetric Tardos
scheme [121] as well as for the original Tardos [114] and most of its derivatives e.g. [86, 21,
73]. Figure 4 depicts the score distribution for the symmetric Tardos scheme [121]. Note that
the score distributions and threshold Z have been normalized. The figure also illustrates the
understanding of the error bounds "1 and "2.
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4.6 Sophisticated fingerprinting attacks
A group of malicious customers can execute different collusion attacks in order to avoid de-
tection by the tracing algorithm. Due to the marking assumption by [23], see section 4.4, we
assume the colluders are only able to modify detectable positions, i.e. positions where their
watermarked media copies differ from each other due to the individual watermark information
embedded.
4.6.1 Stateless attack strategies
Apart from that, a typical assumption model found in literature within the marking assumption
is the location independence of the attack strategy, in other words, a memoryless collusion
channel.
Definition 20 (Stateless attack model) In an attack model that is location independent, the not-
necessarily deterministic output yi of the position i only depends on the symbols X j1,i, ...,X jc ,i of the
colluder fingerprints X j1 , ...,X jc of that particular position i. It is independent of other positions or
any other output yk, with k 6= i. This attack model is defined as stateless attack.
The reason for the assumption that the colluders restrict themselves to a stateless attack strategy
is that the fingerprint generation as well as the tracing algorithm works completely position-
symmetric, so it might be disadvantageous for the attackers to deviate from this symmetry.
Moreover, it significantly simplifies the proofs for the security of the corresponding fingerprint-
ing scheme. Also, Moulin shows in [76] that enforcing this restriction does not change the
fingerprint capacity asymptotically, which means for very large collusion sizes.
Let C = { j1, ..., jc} ⊆ {1, ...,n} denote a coalition of size c with corresponding fingerprints
X j1 , ...,X jc . Be XC the colluder’s fingerprint matrix with entries [XC], ji = [X j,i] j∈C ,1≤i≤m. The
colluders may create a forged fingerprint y = ρ(XC) according to a (possibly non-deterministic)
strategy ρ with the constraint that it holds yi = X j1,i if X j1,i = ... = X jc ,i, according to the mark-
ing assumption. In stateless attack strategies, the strategy ρ does not depend on the column
index i, thus, the different symbols of the forged fingerprint y are generated column by column
by yi = ρ(XC ,i), where XC ,i denotes the i-th column of the colluder-fingerprint matrix XC .
In literature, it is assumed that the colluders want to participate equally in the forgery. There is
no hope in identifying an idle colluder. Hence, we assume that the strategy is invariant under
permutation of the colluder identities.
Let bi be the number of ones in column XC ,i, with 0 ≤ bi ≤ c. Then the attack strategy ρ can
be parameterized by a set of probabilities θ = (θbi )0≤bi≤c with Pr[yi = 1] = θbi . The marking
assumption enforces θ0 = 0 and θc = 1.
• Interleaving attack: For the interleaving attack, an index k ∈ C is selected uniformly at
random and for the symbol position the corresponding colluder-fingerprint value is taken,
yi = Xk,i. Using the above notation, the interleaving attack can be parameterized as
θbi = bi/c. In [54] Huang and Moulin showed that the interleaving attack is the strongest
attack in an asymptotic sense, i.e. if the number of colluders tends to infinity.
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• Minority vote attack: For the minority vote attack, the colluders choose the least common
symbol for that position. In case of a tie, a symbol is selected uniformly at random. The
attack can be parameterized as
θbi =

1 if 0< bi <
1
2 c or bi = 1
1
2 if bi =
1
2 c
0 if bi = 0 or
1
2 c < bi < c.
• Majority vote attack: Analogously to the minority vote attack, here the colluders output
the most frequent symbol. In case of a tie, a symbol is selected uniformly at random. The
attack can be parameterized as
θbi =

1 if bi >
1
2 c
1
2 if bi =
1
2 c
0 if bi <
1
2 c.
• All-1 attack: The colluders output the symbol ’1’ at each detectable position. The attack
can be parameterized as
θbi =
¨
1 if bi > 0
0 if bi = 0.
The All-0 attack works analogously, but only that the colluder output a ’0’ at each de-
tectable position. The bias generation as well as the score function is symmetric, therefore
there is no real difference between the all-1 and the all-0 attack.
Note that this attack is solely listed for reason of completeness, in practice the colluders have no
knowledge about which positions of the media content belongs to which fingerprint position,
nor can they guess the corresponding symbol. Thus, this attack is only interesting in an infor-
mation theoretic sense and for other application scenarios such as group testing, e.g. [72], and
will not play a role in the further procedure of this thesis.
• Coin flip or random attack: At each detectable position, the colluders ’flip a coin’ to
decide whether to output a zero or a one. The attack can be parameterized as
θbi =

1 if bi = c
1
2 if 0< bi < c
0 if bi = 0.
Note that in case the collusion consists of only two attackers, all attack strategies are substituted
to the coin flip attack or random guess attack.
• Minimal mutual information: In [41] Furon and Pérez-Freire presented the worst case
attack from an information theoretical point of view. They attempt to find the collusion
strategy that minimizes the mutual information between the forged fingerprint y and the
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Table 1: Attack strategies that minimize the mutual information between the forged fingerprint
and colluders’ fingerprints (cf. [41, Table II]).
c0 θ
∗ = (θ0, ...,θc)
2 (0, 0.5, 1)
3 (0, 0.652, 0.348, 1)
4 (0, 0.488, 0.5, 0.512, 1)
5 (0, 0.594, 0.000, 1.000, 0.406, 1)
6 (0, 0.503, 0.175, 0.500, 0.825, 0.497, 1)
7 (0, 0.492, 0.000, 0.899, 0.101, 1.000, 0.508, 1)
8 (0, 0.471, 0.000, 0.689, 0.500, 0.310, 1.000, 0.529, 1)
9 (0, 0.440, 0.000, 0.698, 0.230, 0.770, 0.302, 1.000, 0.560, 1)
colluder-fingerprints. They define the achievable rate R against a given collusion attack θ
as:
R(θ ) = EP[I(Y ;X |P = p)]
= EP[H(Y |P = p)]−EP[H(Y |X , P = p)]
with I(Y ;X |P = p) denoting the conditional mutual information and H(Y |P = p) refers to the
conditional entropy.
To make a clear distinction between innocent users and colluders gets harder, if the mutual
information is comparably small. This argumentation in general is independent of the tracing
algorithm. If R is zero, the forged fingerprint y is independent of the colluder-fingerprints and
it is not possible at all to distinguish between innocent user and colluder. Furon et al. found the
stateless attack strategy that minimizes the mutual information for collusion sizes c < 10 using
numerical optimization. The corresponding attack strategies θ are listed in table 1. Note that
the attack strategy by Furon et al. is not necessarily the worst case attack strategy for the specific
fingerprint generation, tracing algorithm or collusion size. Different attack strategies might be
more efficient due to a suboptimal construction of the corresponding tracing algorithm.
4.6.2 Stateful attack strategies
As the colluders do not know fingerprint messages of innocent users, they cannot raise a specific
innocent-fingerprint’s score to increase his chance to get accused. Instead, they aim to stay
undetected by trying to lower their own accusation scores. They succeed, if all colluders get an
accusation score lower than the threshold Z .
As mentioned in the afore section, a typical assumption in literature is the location indepen-
dence of the attack strategy. Due to definition 20, the stateless attack model does not depend
on the index i nor on the symbols for the other detectable positions or the selected output for
other positions.
However, in the real world the colluders are not restricted to this assumption. Instead they
can apply attack strategies for which each symbol is chosen also with respect to the symbols
observed on all other detectable positions.
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Definition 21 (Stateful Attack Model) In an attack model that is location dependent, in order
to choose the symbol yi of the current position i, the colluders may use the information about the
symbols yk, k = 1, ...,m taken for the other positions k 6= i as well. This attack model is referred to
as stateful attack.
To generalize this observation, we need the subsequent definitions and statements. Define the
accusation score as S j = S′j +S′′j , where the score computed over the non-detectable positions is
denoted as S′j, and S′′j represents the score computed over the detectable positions. The value
S′j is equal for all colluder-fingerprints and cannot be changed due to the marking assumption.
Hence, the optimal attack strategy to avoid getting accused can be defined as in Definition 22.
Definition 22 (Optimal Attack Strategy) An attack strategy is referred to as optimal, if it out-
puts a manipulated fingerprint y∗ for a collusion C with arbitrary j ∈ C , that minimizes the
probability that the largest accusation score of the colluder-fingerprints exceeds the threshold Z .
Pr[Smax > Z] = Pr[S
′′
max > Z − S′j]
As the actual column probability value pi of the fingerprint matrix X is unknown to the collud-
ers, they cannot compute S′′max exactly. However, for instance using the maximum-likelihood
method, the colluders may guess each pi from the observed symbols. Let b
′′
i denote the num-
ber of observed 1’s at position i. The maximum-likelihood method results to the estimation
pˆi = b′′i /c and
Sˆ′′j =
∑
i detectable
g(X j,i, yi, pˆi).
The value
yˆ∗ = argmin
y
(max
j∈C Sˆ
′′
j )
therefore appears to be a reasonable candidate to minimize E[S′′max].
We define the stateful attack strategy that aims to find valuable approximations of yˆ∗ in an
efficient way as Greedy Attack, as it applies a greedy strategy to generate y .
• Greedy Attack: For this stateful attack strategy the colluders aim to minimize their ac-
cusation scores, i.e. to minimize E[S′′max]. More precisely, they approximate the column
probabilities pi, i = 1, ...,m, of the fingerprint matrix X by analyzing their colluder matrix
XC . With the approximated values for p, they compute the accusation scores of all col-
luders up to position i − 1. For the selection of the symbol in the current position i of the
manipulated fingerprint y , they choose whether a ’1’ or a ’0’ according to the symbol that
decreases the accusation score that was the highest up to that position.
For a more detailed description of the greedy attack and for an additional stateful attack strat-
egy, we refer the reader to section B in the Appendix.
4.7 Summary
Chapter 4 describes the general structure of a fingerprinting scheme for watermark applications
and classifies the different types of fingerprinting schemes. For the type that is most important
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in both literature and this thesis, namely for the static probabilistic fingerprinting schemes, the
three processes of each scheme that are especial for fingerprinting, i.e. the fingerprint generation
process, the collusion channel and the tracing algorithm, are explained in more detail. Providing
more insight into these processes, we showed the example of the famous Tardos code [114, 121,
64] and completed the section listing common sophisticated collusion attack strategies as well
as proposing the new model of stateful attack strategies, that have to be considered in some
practical applications.
In summary, with the choice of the eligible fingerprinting parameters, the number of users n, the
maximum number of colluders to be resistant against c0, and the desired upper bound on the
False Positive error "1, the code length m for the chosen fingerprinting code can be calculated
and thus the dimensions of the fingerprint matrix X are fixed. With it the content provider is
able to generate the fingerprints using a continuous distribution or a discrete distribution.
Note that in many practical applications the watermarking payload prescribes the limit of the
code length m. Therefore, the interaction of the above mentioned parameters can be reorga-
nized to serve the payload requirements. The matching of the varying requirements for the
different application scenarios is devoted to the subsequent chapter 5.
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5 Requirement analysis of fingerprinting codes in the considered application scenarios
In this chapter we identify the requirements for the collusion secure fingerprinting codes ac-
cording to the application scenarios described in chapter 3. These requirements will form the
basis for the algorithms and fingerprinting schemes described in chapters 6 through 9. Espe-
cially important is the conclusion, that the different scenarios necessitate varying fingerprinting
schemes. It will become clear that the different requirements for the different scenarios typically
cannot be satisfied by one single fingerprinting scheme.
In order to describe and evaluate these requirements, the parameters and definitions are taken
that were introduced in the afore chapter 4. The main significance for the classification of
application scenarios to the appropriate fingerprinting schemes is devoted to the parameters
c0, n, and M , the maximum number of colluders the fingerprinting code should be resistant
against, the number of users to be accommodated in the system, and the maximum payload that
is provided by the media copy, respectively. Additional analysis is performed for requirements
on the probability that the scheme misfires in its accusation decision, i.e. the probabilities that
the errors exceed their acceptable bounds "1 and "2. Although this thesis is not engaged in legal
affairs, a comparison to the usability of DNA may provide a directive for the selections of "1 and
"2. According to Lindsey et al. in [69], assuming a Gaussian distribution, 10 persons (including
the responsible perpetrator) out of 10 millions would be associated to the same DNA-profile.
Due to test-inaccuratenesses, one assumes 100 false positive errors on average for 10 million
persons tested, which equals a false positive rate of 10−5. Therefore, for our fingerprinting
solutions proposed in the upcoming chapters we assume bounds on the error rates that are
chosen close to this rate, in order to increase the acceptance of fingerprinting codes (at least)
as clear indication when it comes before court.
An especial focus is laid on the maximum number of colluders the fingerprinting code should be
resistant against c0. This parameter, its impact on the code length respectively, and thereby its
choice of fingerprinting code characterizes the actual application scenario. In summary, in the
further procedure of the thesis, we decide between three magnitudes to classify the potential of
a collusion size.
Small: A collusion size indicated as small is mainly restricted to up to three colluders.
Medium: A medium sized collusion consists of at least four through up to 15 colluders.
Large: A large collusion comprises more than 15 colluders.
Note that this separation is not obligatory, but it assists classifying the results of this thesis in
the next chapters. Though we make a clear distinction between small collusion sizes, medium
collusion sizes and large collusion sizes, the switchovers oftentimes are blurring. In the following
we distinguish between parameter values classified as small, medium or large not only for c0
but also for the other parameters n and M , in order to classify the requirements for the current
scenario. Therefore, the distinctions can be seen as a general statement of the requirements of
the actual application scenario and the corresponding chosen fingerprinting scheme.
5.1 Fingerprinting codes for promotional and pre-release purposes
The promotional and pre-release application scenario as defined in chapter 3.3 requests the
following requirements for a suitable fingerprinting scheme. The given payload is the cru-
cial part. Since the promotional application scenario uniquely depends on its corresponding
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end-customer scenario, the payload that is available generally stays the same (given the same
requirements on the basic watermarking scheme). The expected number of colluding customers
c0 is relatively small since the overall number of users that receive promotional material is small
as well. For example, according to an analysis by The New York Times1, the jury that votes for
the Oscar’s contains about 6000 members. However, not every member gets to vote for every
category, which means in this scenario the number of users n is clearly limited by 6000.
Moreover, the receivers of promotional material are typically not acting anonymously, at least
the copyright holding party or company has a legitimately signed contract about the restrictions
dealing with their copyrighted material. This reduces the potential of large collusions and,
on the contrary, improves the probability that the evidence brought by fingerprinting codes
holds before court. For this reason, the promotional application scenario in particular, in which
users that were bound by a clear contract collude and get accused, provides solid ground for
fingerprinting codes.
Besides the probabilistic fingerprinting schemes that will be considered in this thesis, especially
the promotional scenario provides high potential for a deterministic fingerprinting scheme, i.e.
a scheme that is able to mathematically prove the guiltiness of colluders. That is, if the identity
of the user that was legitimately bound by a contract is assigned clearly to the mathematically
proven guilty fingerprint, the judges would have a very strong argument to sue this user guilty.
However, the applicability of a deterministic scheme obviously depends as well on the payload
that is available for the actual media cover.
For the promotional application scenarios as classified in chapter 3.3 the following requirements
arise regarding the maximal number of colluders c0 that can be expected, and regarding the
number of fingerprints needed, i.e. the number of users n, as well as the payload M that typically
is provided by the current scenario.
• Maximum expected collusion size c0: For the applicants of fingerprinting schemes a
maximum number of colluders the scheme is provable resistant against is desired to be
arbitrary high. Fingerprinting schemes satisfying this requirement are inter alia [121]
[7] or [86]. However, the strong dependency on its applicability requires a more realis-
tic choice for c0. The potential for large collusions is assumed to be relatively small for
all the promotional media types, i.e. musical promotion, audio books, Ebooks, movie/TV
promotion as well as the pre-release phase for video games. It seems plausible that jour-
nalists for music publishers do not want to expose themselves in a collusion. The threat
of a collusion consisting of more than two journalists therefore is negligible. The same
holds for audio books and movie/TV promotion, since there are cases known in which
common transaction watermarks already lead to damning evidence, as already posted in
chapter 3.3. Ebook promotion until now is not established to an amount for which it is
obligatory to resist against large collusions, a proper watermarking basis combined with a
fingerprinting scheme resistant against up to two or three colluders appears appropriate.
For the different phases in the life-cycle of a video game as postulated in [12], see figure
5 of section 5.4, also the potential of large collusions changes. In the first phases of the
life-cycle of a video game there is a potential of at least small collusions. During the later
testing phases, named as Beta and Master, that precede the official release of a game,
sometimes large numbers of testing persons have access to the game. Depending on the
game and the environment there is a risk of a collusion that can be sorted into a medium
sized collusion.
1 http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/electronic-voting-comes-to-the-oscars-finally
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• Number of fingerprints/users n: As most fingerprinting schemes require that the num-
ber of fingerprints n has to be chosen in advance in order to generate the fingerprint
matrix X, see chapter 4, the distributor needs to have a clear position about the number
of copies that need to be protected by fingerprints. For the promotional application sce-
nario this number is typically determined from the first. Compared to the corresponding
end-customer scenario, only a relatively small number of selected persons will receive a
media copy. In analogy to the expected number of colluders c0, solely for the pre-release
phases of the video game scenario the parameter value for n exceeds the range of being
small.
• Available payload M : The crucial part for all fingerprinting schemes is the given pay-
load M of the media copy that enforces very strong restrictions on the fingerprints and
leads to compromises between the participating fingerprinting parameters. The payload
for the media types within the promotional application scenario is by nature equal or sim-
ilar to the end-customer product that it advertises. More precisely, for musical promotion
the corresponding song, whatever the format, provides only very limited payload. Using
state of the art watermarking algorithms, only few hundred bits can be embedded into
two through four minutes of audio material, [110]. Consequently, the payload for audio
tracks already is a challenge for common transaction watermarking methods, a fortiori it
is even more challenging for fingerprinting schemes. Audio books, as discussed above, are
rarely applied for promotional purposes, however, they generally provide a magnitude
of the payload provided in musical promotion. Therefore, the potential for embedding
is classified as medium amount of payload. For Ebooks there is a controversy. Though
there exists algorithms for embedding watermarks in the content-text, the more common
method is embedding watermarks into the images that are included as well as into the
images of the cover/title pages. Thus, depending on the cover medium where the water-
mark information is embedded, the available payload is rather small, yet in general larger
than for the musical promotion scenario. The promotion of movies and TV productions,
generally provides a larger amount of payload due to the nature of including video as well
as audio content and also because the average time range exceeds the typical time range
for musical promotion by far. However, efficiently watermarking video content remains
challenging, what limits the amount of payload that can be embedded. In summary, for
the promotion of movies and TV productions we postulate a medium amount of payload
that is available for the embedding of fingerprints. On the contrary to the media types
listed above, the potentially available payload in boxed video games is huge. As discussed
in chapter 3, this is due to its different nature, i.e. because a video game consists not of a
single media file of one type, but it consists of a huge number of files per different media
component. Video games thus provide the maximum payload of all discussed media types
and consequently they are suitable for the longest fingerprints that can be realistically
embedded.
• Acceptable upper bounds "1 and "2 for the error probabilities: The error probabil-
ities are desired to be as small as possible and thus the corresponding bounds should
approximate zero. However, as already discussed, this is generally not realistic. Finding
appropriate selections for the values of "1 and "2 is challenging. The applicant of finger-
printing codes, i.e. the distributor, has a strong desire to catch at least one colluder, which
means he tends to choose a value for "2 that is very small. However, when it comes before
court, the bound on the probability that the accusation is fraudulent, i.e. that the proba-
bility bound for accusing innocent customers is relatively high, gets especially important.
Therefore, in general the selection for "1 is sharper than for "2. According to Škori´c et al.
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Table 2: Classification of the parameters payload, number of users and maximal expected collu-
sion size in the promotional application scenario
Promo. application scenario Music Audio books Ebooks Movie/TV Video games
Max. expected colluders c0 small small small small small/medium
Number of users n small small small small small/medium
Available payload M small medium medium medium large
[121] an upper bound on the probability that on average half of the colluders get accused
is acceptable ("2 = 0.5), whereas the bound on the probability of accusing a specific in-
nocent ought to be significantly lower. Oftentimes a value complying to "1 ≈ 1/n, i.e. one
out of the number of users, is assumed as realistic to get submitted to court.
In summary, the promotional application scenario provides solid legal ground and the potential
of collusion attacks is mainly restricted to small collusions. Consequently, for the most media
types within this scenario we expect a small number of users, i.e a small number of fingerprints
and an analogously small maximal expected collusion size at mostly small available payload,
partly medium sized and solely for the video game scenario there is large payload available.
Table 2 mirrors the results of this discussion for the parameters c0, n and M .
5.2 Fingerprinting codes for online shops
A lot of what was just discussed for some media types in the promotional application scenario
can be transferred to the online shop scenario as well. However, as this is the classical end-
customer scenario, in general the requirements on the fingerprinting parameters increase. In
the following we list the requirements on the fingerprinting parameters maximum expected
collusion size c0, number of users n, and the available amount of payload M , as well as the
error bounds "1 and "2 according to the media types that serve the online shop application
scenario.
• Maximum expected collusion size c0: Compared to the promotional application sce-
nario discussed in the section above, the online shop end-customer scenario has a higher
potential for large collusions. For example, in the field of music distribution, whatever the
format, it can be assumed that groups of dishonest customers that are aware of the water-
mark protection collude in order to avoid being traced back. However, it seems unlikely
that very large collusions are formed, because not only is the benefit for the colluded ma-
terial, e.g. a song, relatively small, but colluding on a wide scale is also a matter of trust.
The rationale for the value of c0 in music distribution therefore is to be resistant against
medium sized collusions. The same holds for the distribution of audio books, images and
video clips. There might be the potential of medium sized collusions, but large collusions
seem very unlikely to appear. Also, in the distribution of Ebooks the potential of large
collusions and even of medium sized collusion seems very low. However, this assump-
tion is only theoretic, as there is not sufficient experience with attacks on watermarked
Ebooks until now, to give a clear statement. Streaming media however, though obviously
strongly depending on the content to be streamed, raises the potential for large collu-
sions. Especially for events that are live-streamed and interest a huge audience, it appears
conceivable that large collusions are formed. Even more in the scenario of video game
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Table 3: Classification of the parameters payload M , number of users n and maximal expected
collusion size c0 in the Online shop application scenario
Music Audio books Ebooks Images Videos Media streams Video games
c0 medium medium small medium medium large large
n large large large large large large large
M small medium medium small medium large large
distribution, since the market is known for active piracy and professional groups attack-
ing the game protection, and because a typical boxed video game promises higher benefit
compared to one music track for instance, the distributors reasonably desire protection
against a large maximum expected collusion size.
• Number of fingerprints/users n: The online shop distribution generally is designed
for unlimited and ongoing number of customers, which means that a choice regarding
the value for n for the fingerprint generation process is very speculative. The overall
opinion is to expect a large number of users, meaning a large number of fingerprints to
be generated in advance. This number is strongly depending on the content, no matter if
in music distribution, audio books, Ebooks, images, video clips, streaming media or video
game distribution.
• Available payload M : The available payload M for the online shop distribution scenario
obviously is equal to the payload given in the corresponding promotional application sce-
nario. Therefore, the available payload for music distribution is very small. The payload
for audio books and Ebooks stays medium sized and for the video game distribution via
online shop the available payload remains huge. In addition, the given payload for images
typically is significantly small, in general even smaller than the payload for music. Images
typically provide payload of no more than 100 bits, making the application of fingerprints
almost impossible. The potentially available payload for video clips is sorted as a medium
amount, because of the possibility to embed fingerprints into both audio track and video
track. For streaming media it again strongly depends on what content is streamed, but in
general assuming a large amount of available payload seems reasonably.
• Acceptable upper bounds "1 and "2 for the error probabilities: The required bounds
on the error probabilities in the online shop scenario remain as strict as for the promo-
tional application scenario (or even stronger). Thus, the parameters chosen as "1 ≈ 1/n
and "2 = 0.5 appear feasible.
In summary, the Online shop application scenario requires similar parameter values for the
error bounds "1 and "2 as the promotional application scenario. Also the available payload M
for most media types, apart from the video game scenario where sometimes only parts of the
game are handed out, is the same as well. This is contrary to the required parameter values for
the number of users n and for the maximum expected collusion size c0. Both strongly depend on
the distribution content, though in general there exist the potential of medium sized collusions.
For the video game scenario there even is the potential for large collusions, thus requiring large
values for c0. The number of users n for all media types of the Online shop distribution scenario
can be classified as large. Table 3 depicts the results on that discussion.
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5.3 Fingerprinting codes for digital cinema
The digital cinema application scenario as identified in chapter 3.6 differs from the end-
customer model alike the online shop application scenario as well as from the promotional
application scenario. Here, the customers that receive watermarked media content play the
role of intermediaries and utilize the watermarked content to further offer a service to their
(end-)customers. Though the model of the digital cinema application scenario covers more
than solely the name giving digital cinema scenario, as already discussed in chapter 3.6, we will
restrict ourselves to this scenario in the further procedure of this thesis. This is due to the main
relevance for fingerprints in the scenario of digital cinemas compared to the other scenarios
within this model, for which the potential for collusion attack is negligibly small.
In chapter 3.6 we explained the need for watermarking both audio and video in a movie, i.e.
watermarking audio is more robust compared to video watermarking but the audio track per
se is of less importance than the video track and therefore it might get exchanged. In the
following we will assume there is no distinction of whether audio or video or both is capable
to get watermarked, but we will assume there is only one media type contained in a movie,
and thus there is only one value for each of the fingerprinting parameters c0, n, "1 and "2 as
well as for the available payload M . Remember that in the attack scenario for digital cinemas
it is not the cinema itself that plays the role of an attacker, yet this role is played by people
visiting the movie. However, as these generally remain anonymous, and so do the criminals
that re-record the movie, the fingerprint intends to solely identify the specific cinema where the
unauthorized re-recording happened. For the collusion potential this means, that re-recorded
movies from different cinemas are compared and attacked. Consequently, tracing back to the
cinemas that provided material for a collusion attacked movie does not automatically mean
finding the responsible criminals. However it might help preventing the next attack.
• Maximum expected collusion size c0: The requirements for the digital cinema applica-
tion scenario regarding the expected number of colluders depends on the movie content,
on the number of cinemas that receive a copy, and on the country where it is screened.
The benefit and the possibilities to conduct a collusion attack are rather high, whereas
the need for a large collusions might yield more risk and effort than needed, as the fin-
gerprints only carries the potential to identify the correct cinemas but not the attackers
themselves. Thus, a parameter value for c0 that is of medium size appears feasible.
• Number of fingerprints/users n: Though the number of visitors of a movie defini-
tively is rated as very high, the number of cinemas that screen that particular movie is
much smaller. Indeed, in the scenario of fingerprinting for digital cinema application, the
number of fingerprints n is represented by the number of cinemas not by the number of
visitors. However, again strongly depending on the content, also the number of cinemas
can be classified as a large value, ergo n is required to be large.
• Available payload M : Due to its nature, the available payload for embedding fingerprints
into movies is equal to the closely related scenario for movies and TV productions in the
promotional application scenario as discussed in section 5.1. Consequently, the movie
in the digital cinema application scenario provides available payload M of medium sized
amount.
• Acceptable upper bounds "1 and "2 for the error probabilities: The acceptable upper
bound for the probability of a false positive error "1 in the scenario for digital cinemas is
less strict compared to the other scenarios described before. This is because the innocent
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that gets falsely accused is not a person that would be made liable for the unauthorized
action, as it is in the other scenarios, but the innocents that get falsely accused are the
cinemas where the movie was screened but no (related) unauthorized action took place.
The cinemas this way or another are not made liable for the re-recording, but inter alia
they can be enforced to improve their controls and security mechanisms. The damage
caused by a false alarm is not as intense as in the other scenarios. It remains lower than
the upper bound "2 for the probability of not finding a responsible cinema, i.e. a false
negative error. In summary, the restrictions on the values for "1 and "2 generally could be
lowered, though for simplification purposes, and as their influence is minor compared to
e.g. c0, we keep the same values as in the sections above, ergo "1 = 1/n and "2 = 0.5.
Overall, for the digital cinema application scenario we assume the following requirements for
the fingerprinting parameters. At a large number of cinemas, which means a large number n of
fingerprints to be generated, we expect the potential of at most medium sized collusions c0 and
adopt the values for the bounds on the error probabilities "1 and "2 from the sections above,
though they also could be lowered. Finally, we work with the assumption of a given payload M
of medium size.
5.4 Fingerprinting codes for video games
Contrary to classical media, where the product is represented by one single file and thus only
this file ought to be protected, in the video game scenario, the product consists of large sets of
files of various media types, among others textures, sound files or 3D models, as depicted in
figure 1 of chapter 3. Moreover, the process of development of one single boxed game may last
several years and throughout the different phases of the development, as depicted in figure 5,
we suggest different watermarking layers for its protection, see [12].
Therefore, the video game application scenario brings new opportunities but also new chal-
lenges. In the following we list the corresponding requirements regarding the fingerprinting
parameters c0, n, "1 and "2. We will also state an assumption regarding the available payload
M . Note that though a video game consists of a magnitude of different files of different types,
we will consider it as a whole, i.e. one single product.
• Maximum expected collusion size c0: As already discussed in chapter 3.6 and partly
in section 5.1, the potential of large collusions is clearly existent. The so called release
groups are professionally organized groups of hackers who intend to break the protection
of video games. Moreover, each of these groups try to break this protection as soon as
possible in order to boast being the first. For the application of fingerprints, i.e. for the
publishers, this means collusion security against a large maximum number of colluders c0
is vital for their business.
• Number of fingerprints/users n: The number of users n obviously is depending on the
content, but for the AAA titles this number is huge, typically it is significantly larger than
for the other scenarios discussed above. For example Ubisoft’s role play game Assassin’s
Creed 4, Black Flag, released in November 2013, shipped 11 million copies until May 2014
2, though it does not belong to the 10 most shipped games of that year according to the
famous video games statistics magazine VGChartz 3. Note that the given sales number
sums the sales numbers of all platforms.
2 http://www.ign.com/articles/2014/05/15/assassins-creed-4-ships-11-million-copies
3 http://www.vgchartz.com/yearly/2013/Global/
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Figure 5: Different watermarking layers during the various phases of the life-cycle of a boxed
video game according to [12]
• Available payload M : The different nature of video games compared to classical multi-
media such as music or images offers an especial huge amount of payload. If the water-
marking basis is capable to embed information into all possible components, the available
payload M is immense. However, a proper watermarking basis, though theoretically pos-
sible, in practice still lacks of sophisticated tools that are able to handle all media types
and also manage the very varying sizes within one type. For the process regarding wa-
termarking video games we refer the interested reader to e.g. [12], here we assume the
payload provided by the watermarking algorithm as given. The total amount of payload
M that is available for fingerprint embedding therefore is massive, thus M is classified as
large.
• Acceptable upper bounds "1 and "2 for the error probabilities: The video game com-
munity generally is very critical regarding protection mechanisms. Therefore, in case it
gets public that an innocent user is accused of having partaken in a collusion attack, i.e.
in case there is a false positive error, the community hardly will forgive the fingerprint-
ing/watermarking system and accept it as appropriate protection. Therefore, the upper
bound "1 on the probability of a false positive error needs to be very close to zero. Since
the number of users for this scenario, as described above, is comparably large, the value
for "1, that is 1/n, appears acceptably small. The desired upper bound "2 for the proba-
bility that no colluder gets accused, ought to be small as well. However, for simplification
purposes and to stay comparable to the other scenarios, we keep the value as "2 = 0.5.
The video game application scenario is the first scenario to allow embedding of fingerprinting
codes on a wide scale. Therefore, taking the same parameter values for the error bounds "1 and
"2 as before, the fingerprinting parameters c0 and n are both considered as large.
5.5 Fingerprinting codes for databases/hashtables
This work proposes a new method that, in case the list is found, allows tracing back illegal
transmission of blacklists and whitelists by individualizing each list. This means, for example, if
several providers of anti-virus programs purchased such a list, the list would be individualized
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for every provider. Thereby, if one of these providers distributed his list and it appeared at
an illegal location, it would be possible to trace it back to him. The result could be that this
provider gets informed to improve his protection methods.
This application scenario is very different from the other scenarios above that exclusively apply
watermarking of media content. In this scenario, the fingerprint positions are represented by
dummy hash entries. Though this changes the amount of data, i.e. the overall number of hash
entries, a few thousands additional entries in a set of several hundred thousands hashes pre-
sumably will not raise suspicion. However, also contrary to the media watermarking scenarios,
where deleting detected fingerprint positions is strongly affecting the content, deleting hashes
in general is possible and will not render the hashtable meaningless. Therefore, the require-
ments on the appropriate fingerprinting schemes are different as well. Moreover, there is no
related or state of the art work that acted on this scenario before. Consequently, the applica-
tion of fingerprinting codes in hash tables is yet widely unexplored and clear argumentation
regarding the requirements is result of our observation.
In the following we list the expected requirements on the fingerprinting parameters c0, n, "1, "2
as well as on the potentially available payload M .
• Maximum expected collusion size c0: The potential for large collusions appears to
be rather small. In this field of distributing sensible data, the union of a large number
of those that receive an individualized hashtable, in order to break the protection is not
realistic. Therefore the required maximum number of attackers to be resistant against c0
is at least of medium size.
• Number of fingerprints/users n: The number of different receivers of hash tables in
the scenario of blacklists and whitelists as described is not comparable to the number
that is needed in an end-customer watermarking scenario. In general the number of
individualized hash tables, i.e. the number of fingerprints is relatively small, presumably
as small as in the promotional application scenario.
• Available payload M : The payload for the embedding of fingerprints cannot be stated
clearly. This is because in this scenario there is no media watermarking basis that embeds
the fingerprints, more precisely it is not yet clarified how the fingerprints ought to be
embedded. Therefore, we anticipate the corresponding fingerprint embedding technique,
that is embedding dummy hash entries as fingerprint positions, and argue that the avail-
able payload corresponds to the number of hashes that are contained in the hashtable. An
increment of hashtable entries of about 5% due to fingerprint embedding will rather not
raise suspicion. Assuming hash tables of several hundred thousands entries, the available
payload for the embedding of fingerprints into hash tables definitively is large.
• Acceptable upper bounds for the error probabilities "1 and "2: Due to the sensitivity
of the content in this scenario, the error probabilities ought to remain very low. However,
as there is no persuasive precedent, we have to apply the lowest upper bounds for the
error probabilities suitable for the corresponding fingerprinting scheme that is applied.
Therefore, for a first approach, it appears most reasonable, to keep the same values as for
the other scenarios. Thus we start with "1 = 1/n and "2 ≈ 0.5 to be comparable to the
other scenarios.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter we elaborated the required parameter values for the corresponding fingerprinting
schemes in the different application scenarios.
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Table 4: Identified requirements on the fingerprinting codes for the different application
scenarios
Application
scenario
Promotional Online shop Digital cinema Video games Hash table
Max. expected
small medium medium large medium
collusion size c0
Number of
small large large large small
fingerprints n
Available
medium medium medium large large
payload M
False positive
1/n 1/n 1/n 1/n 1/n
error bound "1
False negative
1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
error bound "2
We classified the attributes small collusion, medium sized collusion and large collusion. The
resulting requirements that were identified are listed in table 4. Recall that the promotional
application scenario in section 5.1 as well as the online shop application scenario in section
5.2 contain different media types. For this reason, in order to fill the columns Promotional
and Online shop in table 4, we excluded the video game scenario in each case and also the
field of streaming media regarding the online shop application scenario. The corresponding
requirements are shifted to the column for Video games in general.
In general we reason that there are scenarios in which for all fingerprinting parameters only
small values are required. Moreover, in none of the scenarios listed above there was postu-
lated a large value for the maximum expected collusion size c0 where at the same time the
corresponding available payload M was assumed to be small. This argumentation in general
raises hope for the possibility of applying fingerprinting codes for the different application sce-
narios and different parameters. However, the discrepancies in the requirements enforce the
application of different fingerprinting schemes for different application scenarios, different in
the sense, that they are adjusted or adapted to the targeted scenario. With the fingerprinting
schemes found in literature, a matching of suitable parameters to the actual need is rarely ev-
ident, nor is it elaborated in a way that potential applicants are satisfactory instructed how to
adjust these parameters. To the best of our knowledge, these matching of requirements from
given scenarios to the best selection of fingerprinting schemes has not been provided before.
Therefore, we are the first to focus fingerprinting codes with respect on their (watermarking)
application scenario. In the upcoming chapters the resulting fingerprinting schemes that match
the corresponding application scenarios will be introduced.
A general requirement that we exact is the adaption of the fingerprinting schemes to the avail-
able payload. Unless the code length m of the fingerprints does not exceed the corresponding
value for M , the fingerprinting codes cannot be applied at all and further discussion would
be meaningless. The following summary lists the properties of fingerprinting codes that are
required for the identified application scenarios.
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• Zero false positive providing fingerprinting schemes: Especially eligible for all finger-
printing schemes that are applied in practice and that intend to provide legal evidences
before court, are deterministic fingerprinting schemes that provably do not accuse inno-
cent users. As already discussed, this requirement is hardly enforceable. However for very
small values of the maximum expected collusion size, i.e. c0 = 2, chapter 6.1 proposes our
patented solution for a deterministic fingerprinting scheme that additionally provides the
shortest code lengths, [94] and [95].
• Short fingerprinting codes for a small user basis resistant against a small number of
colluders: Especially in the promotional application scenario in section 5.1 the required
values for the fingerprinting parameters are relatively small and so is the payload given
by the most media types. In order to provide collusion resistance at all, the distributor
ought to take fingerprinting schemes that, though providing resistance solely against small
maximum collusion sizes, are sufficiently compact to be embedded at all. Therefore, we
propose our solution of a simple but efficient 3-secure fingerprinting scheme in chapter
6.2.
• Flexible fingerprinting codes for easy adaption of changing requirements of the fin-
gerprinting parameters and varying payload sizes: Whether for small values of the
fingerprinting parameters or for larger values, the distributors need the possibility to ad-
just the fingerprinting scheme according to their current need. Especially in the Online
shop scenario of section 5.2, in which the distributor is not restricted to one product,
e.g. one single song, but typically provides a large portfolio of products, easy adaption of
the current needed parameters for the current product is vital. Our solutions optimized
regarding these requirements are introduced in chapters 6.2, 7.3 and 7.4, as well as in
chapter 8.
• Optimized fingerprinting codes for practical parameter choices and realistic error
rates: In general the applicant of fingerprinting schemes obviously desires to apply
the optimal fingerprinting code. However, since for the practical parameter values there
does not exist the optimal code, the best selection of available fingerprint schemes, i.e.
best selection of fingerprinting generation as well as tracing algorithm, is important. Even
more because the error rates proposed in literature are received for theoretical parameters
and dependencies within the scheme that in practice are not necessarily realistic. This
requirement holds true for all application scenarios, but is especially important in the
online shop application scenario 5.2 as well as in the digital cinema application scenario
5.3. Therefore, our solutions that are introduced in chapter 7.4 and in chapter 8 clearly
expose the best selection of existing schemes and its optimal adaption to the practical
needs.
• Performance optimized fingerprinting codes for large parameter values in real world
scenarios: In addition to the general requirements of optimized fingerprinting codes re-
garding its parameters, some scenarios necessitate to consider the performance of the
tracing algorithms as well. This especially holds for the scenario of watermarking video
games 5.4 but is also true for the scenarios considering online shops 5.2, e.g. for stream-
ing media, and for digital cinema applications 5.3. That is because the complexity grows
exponential with increasing values for the fingerprinting parameters. Chapter 8.1 intro-
duces our solution that first satisfies these requirements in a joint tracing scenario while
retaining a practicably low computational complexity. Additionally, the solution proposed
in chapter 7.1 also provides a means to manage the complexity for large values of the
fingerprinting parameters.
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• A general adaption of fingerprinting codes for hashtables: The scenario of finger-
printing hashtables is special. For example, contrary to the other scenarios, there is
no watermarking basis needed to embed the fingerprints, they are simply added to the
hashtable via dummy hash entries. Though, on first sight this has no effect on the fin-
gerprinting parameters, it opens the possibility of a new kind of attack strategy, that is
deleting (fingerprint) positions. However, the appropriate fingerprinting scheme has to
be optimal regarding small values for the maximum number of colluders c0 and num-
ber of users n, but gets the opportunity of a large value for the available payload M . A
corresponding solution is not existent at all, therefore, we are the first to propose an ap-
proach that allows applying fingerprinting codes for hashtable distribution. This approach
is introduced in chapter 9.
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6 Short fingerprinting codes against small collusions
As identified in chapter 3, we need appropriate fingerprinting codes suitable to be embedded as
transaction watermark messages into different types of media of different formats.
In this chapter we describe two different fingerprinting schemes that are optimized regarding
the properties required for those application scenarios described in chapter 5 for which the
available payload is very limited, i.e. solely very short fingerprinting codes can be embedded.
The approaches differ largely regarding fingerprint generation, tracing algorithm and error di-
agnosing. They also differ in the maximum number of colluders to be resistant against, as the
one approach is fixed 2-secure, and the other approach is fixed 3-secure.
According to the nature of fingerprinting codes as described in chapter 4, in order to generate
short fingerprinting codes, the maximum expected number of colluders c0 ought to be selected
as small. This especially matches the requirements for the promotional application scenario as
identified in chapter 5.1. Hence, the two fingerprinting codes introduced in this chapter are
particularly targeted on this scenario. Both methods provide suitable short code lengths m for
the required maximum collusion sizes c0 at negligible small error bounds "1 and "2.
For some media types within the online shop scenario described in 5.2, the limitations on the
available payload M solely allow embedding of short fingerprints as well. In order to provide
collusion security at all, the fingerprinting codes against small collusion sizes introduced in the
two upcoming sections might be applied in those scenarios as well.
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6.1 2-Secure fingerprinting
In this section we present our approach published in [94] and patented under [95]. It is
collusion-secure against two colluders and especially suits the requirements for the promo-
tional application scenario as described in chapter 5.1. In chapter 3 it was pointed out that very
short code lengths of sometimes less than 100 bits are required. At the same time a determinis-
tic statement regarding the validity of the assumed colluders increases the value of the scheme.
The approach that is introduced in the following provides some deterministic properties in the
sense that there is a probability for a false negative error, but false alarms cannot occur, i.e.
FP = "1 = 0. At the same time the code length is comparably low. It is capable to stay below
m= 100 bits for realistic parameters. This is achieved by requiring special conditions for the fin-
gerprint matrix X. That is the Hamming Distances between each pair of fingerprints of X ought
to be within a prescribed interval. This property is utilized by a specific parent pair searching
algorithm that is applied as tracing algorithm, closely related to the approach by Nuida et al.
[83].
Fingerprinting codes that focus on the resistance against two colluders in order to provide short
code lengths have already been published, e.g. [26], [39], [80]. These are labelled as 2-secure
codes. However, these approaches whether appear as not sufficiently compact ([26], [39]), or
they do not provide the security level that is desired for this scenario ([26], [39], [80]).
The 2-secure fingerprinting scheme we present in the following is the only approach presented
in this thesis, that does not belong to the classes of Tardos Codes as described in chapter 4. That
is because it utilizes neither a probabilistic fingerprint generation nor a corresponding tracing
algorithm based on scoring functions. Though different from the other schemes, it still contains
the especial fingerprinting processes (as described in 4.1).
1. Fingerprint generation process: With the choice of the parameter n representing the
number of fingerprints needed, the distributor estimates the appropriate code length m
and starts the generation of the fingerprints, in a way that all fingerprints have a pairwise
Hamming Distance to each other within a prescribed interval. The fingerprint generation
is described in more detail in the following construction section 6.1.2.
2. Collusion channel: For this approach the collusion channel is restricted to the attack by
two malicious customers. Therefore, all stateless attack strategies as described in chapter
4 do not differ from each other. For this reason we abstain from a wide discussion about
the attack strategies but consider them during the evaluation section 6.1.3.
3. Tracing algorithm: For the tracing algorithm we adopted the idea of applying identifying
parent property (IPP) codes. Our approach represents a parent pair searching algorithm
closely related to the approach by Nuida et al. [83]. The complete tracing algorithm is
detailed in the corresponding paragraph of section 6.1.2.
The fingerprints can be embedded and detected as watermark messages by means of transaction
watermarking algorithms.
6.1.1 Preliminaries
In chapter 5.1 we pointed out, that on the one hand the strong requirements regarding the
payload limitations for many media types presuppose code lengths of few hundred bits. On the
other hand a distinct deterministic statement regarding the validity of the output of the tracing
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algorithm is desirable. Both issues especially hold for the promotional application scenario.
The deterministic statement can be provided solely by deterministic fingerprinting schemes, for
which the provided code lengths exceed the practical range by far. All approaches providing
comparably short code lengths belong to the class of probabilistic fingerprinting schemes, which
means the provided security is not deterministic but estimated via certain error probabilities,
see chapter 4.
For the generation of the fingerprint matrix the number of fingerprints, i.e. the number of users
n, must be determined in advance. The length of the codes m is independent of the false
positive error bound "1 and maximum collusion size c0, that are zero and two respectively, by
construction. The number of fingerprints n appears as the essential parameter to receive both,
m and the upper bound of the false negative error probability "2. This is contrary to the Tardos
Codes and its derivatives.
As distance metric between two arbitrary rows of the fingerprint matrix X, we select the Ham-
ming Distance or L1 norm. Therefore, the maximum distance per fingerprint position is 1, the
distance of two fingerprints X j and X j′ is computed as the total number of bit positions having a
different symbol (’0’ or ’1’). It is denoted as HD(X j,X j′). Examples of distance metrics for codes
using several alphabets are for example listed in [49].
The proposed approach applies a specific modification of a parent pair searching algorithm by
Nuida et al. in [80] in order to trace the colluders. They proposed short 2-secure fingerprinting
codes by means of a searching algorithm belonging to the classes of IPP Codes, see chapter 3.1,
called parent pair search. That is exploring every constellation of a pair of fingerprints, who
might be responsible for the possibly manipulated fingerprint y . However, checking every con-
stellation of (pairs of) fingerprints for its possibility of having partaken in the collusion attack
is computationally very demanding. Therefore, in [79] Nuida optimizes the computationally
expensive approach of [80] applying a pre-search based on Hamming Distances before a mod-
ification of his searching algorithm. Thereby he reduces the number of fingerprints that come
into consideration for the cost of a slightly modified parent pair search, whereby the effort is
reduced essentially.
The parent pair search of [80] roughly works as follows. It analyzes every bit position of a pair
of fingerprints X j,X j′ if it is possible that those fingerprints could possibly be the parents of the
attacked fingerprint y , i.e. yi ∈ {X j,X j′}. The algorithm returns ’YES’ if every bit could have
been created in collaboration of both, otherwise it returns ’NO’. Every pair of fingerprints for
which the algorithm returnes ’YES’ is reasonably denoted as possible colluder pair.
6.1.2 Construction
This subsection details the construction of the approach. It is divided into the fingerprint gen-
eration process and the tracing algorithm.
Fingerprint generation process
The idea is to require specific preconditions on the binary fingerprints, to get a stronger de-
pendence between each. With this preconditions we include additional information to the fin-
gerprint matrix X that later allows a precise accusation decision in the process of the tracing
algorithm.
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In the n×m fingerprint matrix X, where m represents the number of bits, e.g. the code length,
and n stands for the number of users to be listed in the system, each row represents a fingerprint
for a particular user, see chapter 4. The matrix X is created as follows.
An efficient tracing algorithm that uses Hamming Distances as measurement for the affiliation
of y , was originally suggested by Hagiwara et al. [44]. They applied Hamming Distances as
some sort of accusation scores, see definition 12 in chapter 4.3. However, the corresponding
fingerprint matrix X is generated via a coin flipping algorithm.
In order to supply more information from the fingerprint generation process for the tracing
algorithm, the preceding idea was to prescribe a distinct Hamming Distance between each row
of X to every other. With this property the detection of a collusion and identifying the colluders
via a scoring function that uses Hamming Distances would be trivial. However, it can be shown
that the length m of the rows of a matrix becomes impractically large when the matrix is created
such that the Hamming Distances for all possible pairs of fingerprints is equally large [49].
For this reason we allow the Hamming Distance between two fingerprints to be in a predefined
interval [HDmin,HDmax]. The fingerprint matrix X has to fulfill the Hamming Distance condition:
Definition 23 (Hamming Distance condition) The Hamming Distance condition describes the
following requirements for the fingerprint matrix X:
• For every possible pair of fingerprints (X j,X j′) of X, with j 6= j′, it must hold: HD(X j,X j′) ∈
[HDmin,HDmax].
• For HDmin and HDmax it must hold:
i) HDmin >
1
2HDmax
ii) HDmin ≤ 12m
iii) HDmin +HDmax = m
The parameters HDmin and HDmax represent the lowest Hamming Distance value allowed and the
largest Hamming Distance value, respectively.
In order to generate sufficient fingerprints suiting this condition, the inequalities of definition
23 can be exhausted. This means setting HDmin as approximately 1/3 of the fingerprint length
m and HDmax slightly smaller than 2/3 of m.
One way to create the matrix X is to first creating a larger matrix X ′ of the dimensions n′ ×m,
where n′ >> n (empirical experiments yield n′ ≈ 10 · n as appropriate). This larger matrix can
be filled for example applying a coin-flipping algorithm. To receive a feasible matrix X out of X ′,
a simple deletion of all rows of X ′ that do not meet the Hamming Distance condition introduced
above is proceeded. Note that this pragmatic matrix creation is only one possible way. Every
generation of X that satisfies the Hamming Distance condition 23 is feasible.
Parent pair tracing algorithm
The tracing algorithm is separated into the following steps. For a more detailed description
please see [94] and the appendix C.
• First the Hamming distance between every fingerprint X j, with j = 1, ...,n, of the finger-
print matrix X to the possibly manipulated fingerprint y is calculated.
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• Those fingerprints with a Hamming Distance smaller than or equal to 12 HDmax are as-
sociated to one distinct group of fingerprints. The corresponding group is denoted as
G1.
G1 :=

X j; HD(X j, y)≤ 12HDmax ∀ j ∈ {1, ...,n}
	
• Those fingerprints with a Hamming Distance below or exactly 34 HDmax and (at the same
time) exceeding 12HDmax are associated to another group of fingerprints. The correspond-
ing group is denoted as G2.
G2 :=

X j;
1
2
HDmax < HD(X j, y)≤ 34HDmax ∀ j ∈ {1, ...,n}
	
• Those fingerprints with a Hamming Distance exceeding 34 · HDmax are sorted out. The
corresponding fingerprints are no longer considered.
• The parent pair search of [80] is applied to all combinations of pairs of fingerprints possi-
ble in group G1.
• The parent pair search of [80] is applied to all combinations of pairs of fingerprints pos-
sible, for which one fingerprint is associated to group G1 and the other is associated to
G2.
After these steps there might be several pairs of fingerprints labelled as possible colluder pair.
These are considered for the final decision by means of theorem 1.
Theorem 1 1. If there is associated exactly one pair of fingerprints as possible colluder pair,
and at the same time there is no fingerprint with a Hamming Distance to y smaller than
1
4HDmax, this possible colluder pair is the colluder-fingerprints.
2. If there is associated more than one pair of fingerprints as possible colluder pair and one
fingerprint appears in all possible colluder pairs and at the same time there is no different
fingerprint with a Hamming Distance to y smaller than 14HDmax, this fingerprint is a colluder-
fingerprint.
3. If no pair of fingerprints is assigned as possible colluder pair, the fingerprint with the mini-
mum Hamming Distance to y is a colluder fingerprint.
This means, if one of the cases of theorem 1 applies, the corresponding fingerprint (pair) yields
the output of the tracing algorithm. The proof of theorem 1 can be found in the appendix C.
The sorting into the two groups G1 and G2 is done, because the Hamming Distance of at least
one of the colluder-fingerprints, denoted as XCi with i ∈ {1,2}, to y is at most 1/2HDmax. This is
due to the marking assumption as explained in chapter 4.4. Therefore with out loss of generality
it holds HD(XC1 , y) ≤ HD(XC1 ,XC2)/2. This means at least one colluder-fingerprint is always
in the process of group G1. Moreover, if none of the fingerprints is closer to y than
1
4HDmax,
it is assured that both colluder-fingerprints show up in G1 ∪ G2 (see appendix C). In this way
it is guaranteed that if exactly one pair of fingerprints appears as possible colluder pair,it must
be the colluder-fingerprints. If the parent pair outputs a YES more frequently than once, we
have to clarify if one fingerprint is contained in every possible colluder pair. In this case the
corresponding fingerprint is output as colluder-fingerprint, otherwise no fingerprint is output.
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Table 5: Required code length and its errors of our approach in comparison to Nuida ’s in [79]
fingerprints n code length m Nuida [79] Our approach
FP FN FP FN
102
61 10−4 > 10−2 0 0.0018
71 10−5 10−2 0 0.0044
91 10−7 10−3 0 0.0004
103
74 10−4 > 10−2 0 0.033
83 10−5 > 10−2 0 0.011
93 10−6 10−2 0 0.0044
102 10−7 > 10−3 0 0.0021
6.1.3 Evaluation
To evaluate the results on code length and error probabilities, the approach is compared to
Nuida’s approach of [79], which, to our knowledge, provided the best results so far for the
discussed parameter selection. The empirical results are shown in table 5. For identical code
lengths and for similar values for the average number of the event of a false negative error (FN)
as published in [79], we obtain a false positive error (FP) of zero, compared to FP error bounds
of 10−4 through 10−7 by [79].
The particular code lengths in table 5 were selected in order to be comparable to the empirical
results by Nuida. As postulated in 5.1, the goal was to reduce the false positive error rate
at possibly no cost in the other parameters such as false negative error rate and code length,
compared to the state of the art. Please note that a code length of 61 is not the shortest possible
with related bound on the false positive error "1 = 0 and a very small bound on the false
negative error "2. For 10
2 users we are able to provide similar error bounds for a code length of
57.
In summary, to the zero false positive error rate, there comes a very low false negative error
rate for shortest code lengths obtained so far. Code lengths of less than 100 bits still providing
optimal error bounds are the particular attributes of this approach. The requirements regarding
the error bounds as postulated in 5.1 are satisfied. More results can be seen in the appendix C.
The approach already is implemented into Fraunhofer SIT’s anti-piracy audio watermarking
solution. All tests for which the approach was applied with the working audio watermarking
scheme confirm the analytical and empirical results gained so far. Moreover, the approach was
successfully tested with Fraunhofer SIT’s image watermark solution. Within practical tests with
real images, also additional forensic possibilities to further reduce the false negative error were
exposed [101]. As these are strongly entangled with the watermarking algorithm, we will not
examine this here.
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6.2 3-Secure Fingerprinting
In this section we describe a 3-secure fingerprinting scheme that is built in a way that it can be
adjusted to the actual need of the applicant easily, but still provides high security and shortest
code lengths against at most three colluders [92]. With respect to chapter 5, this is especially
utile for the promotional application scenario as discussed in 3.3 but can be reasonably applied
in other scenarios that are prone to small collusions as well.
The code is very flexible and consciously kept simple to be adaptive and fast in order to stay
applicable for all demands of potential appliers. In lieu of making use of the expectation val-
ues of the accusation scores solely for the computation of the error bounds alike the symmetric
Tardos fingerprinting code described in chapter 4.5, in this approach we utilize the actual ac-
cusation scores induced by the current case of collusion attack, for a first decision about which
kind of attack strategy the colluders may have used. Depending on this decision, the tracing
algorithm decides between two different tracing strategies. Both are based on discarding as
many fingerprints as possible and only consider the most suspicious for a final decision.
There already exist 3-secure codes, e.g. [82], [99], but the computational effort and the complex-
ity of the scheme are impractically high with respect to some media scenarios. Our approach
achieves at least equal results regarding security and code length at much less effort. All state
of the art approaches try to stay independent of the attack strategy. This is a requirement that
in some way prevents of better achievable results, i.e. shorter code lengths, faster tracing al-
gorithms, sharper error bounds, etc, but is indispensable to keep a small attack surface for the
colluders.
Our approach proposed in the following consists of a slightly modified Tardos fingerprint gen-
eration process, see chapter 4.5, and a twofold tracing algorithm. By means of the actual
accusation scores by the current case of collusion attack, we decide between two tracing strate-
gies that are constructed to counter whether a minority vote (or alike) strategy or majority vote
(or alike) strategy.
The parameter set required for the scheme are the code length m, the number of fingerprints n
and the upper bounds on the error probabilites, analogously to the Tardos Codes.
6.2.1 Preliminaries
The fingerprint generation for the Tardos Code [114] follows a certain distribution to circumvent
the dependency of different attack strategies, see chapter 4.5. It is structured in a way that the
mean value of the accusation scores for innocent-fingerprints is balanced to zero with a variance
of one. The scores for the colluder-fingerprints will have a distinctive positive value.
This approach in some way resembles Tardos’ fingerprint distribution [114] in order to reduce
the dependency of the attack strategies. However, for a short code that is resistant against three
colluders, an applicable code length is too small to hinder the impact of the conducted attack.
This means, the accusation scores achieved by the proposed 3-secure fingerprinting scheme still
significantly differ for different attack strategies.
Compared to the other possible stateless attack strategies, see chapter 4.6, that match the mark-
ing assumption explained in chapter 4.4, the (Hamming) distance between y and a colluder-
fingerprint is smallest in case of a minority vote attack. It is largest in case of a majority vote
attack.
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With respect to the (Hamming) distance, the other attacks are sorted in between the minority
vote and the majority vote attack. Note that this does not reflect the results achieved by means
of probabilistic accusation scores in general.
For this reason, the proposed 3-secure fingerprinting scheme consists of two different tracing
algorithms. Depending on the attack strategy, each tracing algorithm achieves different results.
The one tracing algorithm achieves competitive error rates for a small code lengths and still is
fast enough for practical applications in case of an attack tending to the minority vote attack.
But for an attack tending to the majority vote attack the resulting error probabilities are fairly
suitable.
The other tracing strategy provides similar proper results yet for the majority vote attack strat-
egy, but the results are unsatisfactory for the minority vote attack.
To get the optimum of both tracing strategies, the attacked fingerprint y is evaluated in order
to receive knowledge about the attack that was applied to generate y .
As the attack strategy, whether minority vote or majority vote or else, directly influences the
symbols in y , the score of y to itself reveals information about the attack strategy. This is
reasoned by the following trick: We calculate the accusation score of y to itself. Note that
this represents the case in which there is only one malicious customer re-distributing his media
copy containing his fingerprint not manipulated at all. Obviously, only positive amounts are
added for this accusation score. This means the properties pi that are used to fill the columns
of the fingerprint matrix X, see chapter 4.5, are the decisive factors for this score. It is likely
that the columns of the colluder matrix XC also follow the probabilities of X. This means, if
pi is very low in the ith column and thus only few ’0’s appear in this column, the number of
’0’s in the corresponding column of the colluder matrix is low as well. Hence, in a minority
vote attack, where always the symbol occurring the least is taken to create y , see chapter
4.6, the probabilities py for these symbols are low as well. With the inverse proportion of the
probabilities to the amount added to the accusation score, see for instance figure 2, we reason
a coherence of the score Sy and its collusion attack that created y . In other words: The larger
Sy , the more likely it is that the colluders conducted a minority vote attack, and vice versa.
With it we are not able to precisely tell the actual strategy, but it tells something about its
tendency. Other attacks result in values for Sy somewhere in between the results for minority
vote and majority vote attack. To decide between minority tracing or majority tracing, we apply
an empirically identified threshold β . Tests showed a success rate for this decision of more
than 95 percent. This success rate is not outstandingly high, but in case the decision is wrong,
the corresponding fingerprints, and thus the attacked fingerprint y , are by chance favorably
generated anyway – due to the probabilities p. This means, also a wrong decision, i.e. the
improper tracing strategy, results in a reliable output of the tracing algorithm, see table 24 in
the appendix D.
For the process of tracing colluders we need the following descriptions and definitions.
A triple of fingerprints of matrix X is denoted as (t1, t2, t3). Be t ji the symbol of fingerprint t j
in position i. The envelope of a triple of fingerprints (t1, t2, t3) is defined as
ε(t1, t2, t3) :=

(α1, ...,αm)| ∀i = 1, ...,m ∃t ji : αi = t ji , j ∈ {1,2,3}
	
A triple that could possibly have created the attacked fingerprint y is denoted as colluder triple.
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Definition 24 (Colluder triple) A colluder triple is a triple of fingerprints, t1, t2, t3, for which
the colluded fingerprint y belongs to their envelope ε(t1, t2, t3).
The definition of a colluder triple resembles the idea of the parent pair from section 6.1 ex-
panded for three parent fingerprints.
6.2.2 Construction
The following two paragraphs detail the fingerprint generation process and the tracing algo-
rithm respectively.
Fingerprint generation process
The basic fingerprint generation process is based on the Tardos Codes [114]. Technically, Tardos’
choice of the distribution of pi is used to show that the colluders’ attack strategy has only a minor
effect on (an exponential average related to) their chance to be caught [114]. Our choice of the
distribution of pi for this approach differs from [114], because we want the attack strategy to
have a distinct effect on the code.
The distribution is realized by the probability density function f ′ which is also symmetric around
0.5 and biased towards values of pi close to the limits of the interval [t, 1− t] but additionally
with a local maximum at p = 0.5.
Definition 25 (Probability density function f ’)
f ′(p) = 1
N
 
p(1− p)− 12 + a ·  p(1− p)b.
Note that the first summand of the right side (p(1− p))−12 represents the ordinary beta function
also taken for the original Tardos Code [114]. The second part is an adaption to emphasize the
effect of the accusation score of y to itself, see [92]. N denotes the normalization constant
ensuring that the integral of the probability density function f ′ over p ∈ (0,1) equals 1. The
parameters a and b regulate the curve progression of f ′. In figure 6 these are set to a = 200
and b = 4. These parameter choices approved best in empirical results. They are kept for the
evaluation 6.2.3.
Instead of generating the n×m matrix X according to the probability density function f ′, we
create two matrices X l and X r each of size n×m/2 and each individually generated according
to f ′.
The two n×m/2 matrices put together represent the n×m fingerprint matrix X.
3-secure tracing algorithm
The tracing algorithm works the following steps.
• The tracing algorithm starts calculating the accusation scores according to equation (6) in
chapter 4.5.
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Figure 6: The probability density function f’
• The accusation score of the manipulated fingerprint y to itself is denoted as Sy . It is
calculated according to
Sy(y, y) = Sy =
m∑
i=1
g1(p
(i)
yi
).
These scores perform as a pre-evaluation of potential colluder-fingerprints.
• The value of Sy decides which tracing strategy to apply. If the value exceeds a certain
threshold β , y probably was created in an attack strategy tending to the minority vote
attack. The tracing strategy that corresponds to this decision is referred to as minority
tracing. If Sy stays below β , the tracing strategy denoted as majority tracing is applied.
The threshold β and the corresponding decision is empirically justified.
Majority tracing:
The majority tracing strategy applies a technique similar to Meerwald and Furon’s joint decoding
algorithm [74].
At first we calculate a certain value s, that serves to separate between potential colluder-
fingerprints and fingerprints that probably have not partaken in the collusion.
s =

m · Sy
c0 · β · ln(n)

(8)
The s fingerprints with the highest scores are sorted into a group Gsus of suspicious fingerprints.
The value s in equation (8) depends on the code length m, the number of fingerprints n and of
the attack strategy in form of Sy . For very large values of Sy , there is no need for s to be large
in order to keep a high security level. Whereas if Sy is close to β , a large value for s is required.
This is because, if the decision is tight, the probability that the assumption of the attack strategy
was wrong is comparably large. This means, the probability of a colluder-fingerprint not being
sorted into the group of suspicious fingerprints increases.
All possible triples of the group Gsus of suspicious fingerprints are generated. For each triple is
tested if the attacked fingerprint y could possibly belong to the envelope of the current triple
ε(t1, t2, t3), if the current triple is a colluder triple according to definition 24 respectively.
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Figure 7: Majority tracing strategy
Finally, the fingerprint that appears most in all colluder triples found is output as being a mem-
ber of the collusion. A rough description of this tracing strategy is depicted in figure 7.
Note that in this example only one fingerprint is output by the tracing algorithm. Allowing
a small decrement regarding security, it is feasible to output the second and/or third most
appearing fingerprint as well, provided that these three themselves form a colluder triple.
Minority tracing:
The minority tracing strategy is applied if Sy exceeds the threshold β . This is the case if the
Hamming distances of the colluder-fingerprints to y are comparatively large. A tracing strategy
analogously to majority tracing does not provide sufficient results.
Score calculation: First, y is split into two halves y l and y r . For both corresponding halves of
each fingerprint X j the two accusation scores S
l
j and S
r
j are calculated. Both halves are
treated independently from each other, in the following we restrict our explanations on
the left side, S lj, y
l , etc. The right side is proceeded analogously.
Group generation: In case the accusation score S lj of the left side of fingerprint X j exceeds a
certain threshold Z l , X j is sorted into a group G
l . The threshold Z l is computed (for
example) in dependency of the mean value of all scores of y l . The choice of Z l regulates
the trade-off between computational complexity and security for the further procedure of
the tracing algorithm. For the infrequent case that G l is empty or consists of only one
fingerprint, it is simply filled up to a certain number with the fingerprints that achieve
the highest scores. For performance reasons during the next steps, we propose to sort G l
according to the maximum scores in descending order.
Pair building: Next we build all possible pairs of fingerprints out of group G l . The set of pairs is
denoted as PG l . For every pair of fingerprints in PG l , we calculate the Hamming Distance
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to y l . In other words, we calculate how many symbols in y l could possibly be generated by
the current pair of fingerprints. The set of pairs PG l is sorted according to the minimum
Hamming distance to y l in ascending order. If two pairs provide the same Hamming
distance, the pair containing the fingerprint with the highest accusation score is favored,
because of the proposed sorting order of G l from the last step.
Triple searching:
1. The first pair within PG l , referred to as (X lj1 ,X
l
j2
), is compared to the first pair
(X rk1 ,X
r
k2
) of the corresponding set of pairs of the right side PG r (that is created
analogously).
2. Check if there is a fingerprint whose fingerprint halves appear in the first pair of
PG l as well as in the first pair of PG r , i.e. if there exists an fingerprint index j that
appears in both pairs, e.g. (X j,Xk) and (X j,X r). If this is the case, continue with step
3, otherwise jump to step 4.
3. Check if y belongs to the envelope of the corresponding three fingerprints X j, Xk, X r ,
i.e. check if the triple (X j,Xk,X r) is a colluder triple. If this is the case, the algorithm
stops and outputs X j as a colluder-fingerprint. Otherwise continue with step 4.
4. Proceed with step 1 by comparing stepwise the next pairs of PG l with the next pairs
of PG l .
This way is proceeded for all pairs of fingerprints of both sets until a colluder triple is
found or all pairs of PG l have been considered to all pairs of PG r .
A rough description of the algorithm is depicted in figure 8. More information can be found in
[92] or in the appendix D.
The proposed specification of the algorithm is only one example of a set of different ones, that
differ in the chosen thresholds or limitation values within the process. Depending on what
purpose the scheme is applied to and which limitations regarding code length, effort, and error
bounds are provided, the scheme can be adjusted.
6.2.3 Evaluation
This approach provides a very fast and though effective tracing algorithm. It is simple and easy
to manage by construction. This means the scheme may be adjusted to the individual needs of
the applicants easily.
To demonstrate the efficiency of our scheme, we selected the parameters a = 200 and b = 4 for
both testbeds of table 7 and table 24.
Table 6 shows the empirical error rates for different code lengths m and different number of
fingerprints n. As expected, the larger the code lengths the lower the error rates, and the larger
the number of fingerprints the higher the error rates. The chosen values for the parameters m
and n are selected in order to show the variability of the scheme.
In table 7 our results are compared to the results of Nuida in [82]. Accordingly, the choice of
attack and the parameter selection for code lengths and number of fingerprints is adopted from
[82]. The table shows the results for a minority vote attack. This makes sense, since for both
approaches the minority attack strategy forces the most effort for the tracing algorithm and
often is hardest to trace back. Our approach improves the error rates compared to [82].
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Figure 8: Minority tracing strategy
Table 6: Probability of a FP, i.e. an innocent fingerprint among the output colluder triple, de-
pending on number of users and code length
number of fingerprints n: 10 100 1000 1.000.000
probability of a false positive
code length m
100 0.0001 0.00023 0.0038 0.19
250 1.1 · 10−13 4.8 · 10−10 5.23 · 10−7 0.002
500 3.5 · 10−28 1.5 · 10−24 1.67 · 10−21 1.7 · 10−12
Table 7: Comparison of the proposed approach to Nuida [82]
code length m no. of fingerprints n error rate Nuida [82] error rate our approach [92]
135 100 0.009 4 · 10−5
180 1000 0.001 < 10−5
More concerns regarding expansion of the algorithm and more tests with different attack strate-
gies proving the comparability of the scheme can be found in the appendix D.
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6.3 Summary
In this chapter we proposed two approaches of fingerprinting codes that are resistant against
collusions of maximum 2 or 3 colluders and therefore serve as a distinct protection for the
scenarios that were classified to provide potential for attacks of small collusions as analyzed
in chapter 5. For the scenarios that expect attacks by larger collusions, these approaches are
not suitable, as the false negative error rate increases significantly with larger collusions. In
general, the false positive error rate is not affected.
false positive error bound: Both approaches intend to reduce the false positive error as small
as possible. The 2-secure approach provides an approved zero false positive error rate, and
therefore is unique among the probabilistic fingerprinting codes. Note that this approach
does not belong to the family of Tardos Codes. The 3-secure approach also provides
competitive low false positive error rates.
false negative error bound: Both approaches achieve much lower false negative error rates
than assumed to be sufficient for the corresponding scenario.
code length: Reducing the code length is the primary concern for both approaches. Both pro-
vide shortest code length for whether 2-secure or 3-secure codes compared to the state of
the art.
number of fingerprints: The 2-secure fingerprinting scheme is restricted to a relatively small
number of fingerprints provided that the code length is kept to the minimum. This is due
to the Hamming Distance condition 23 that constricts the number of fingerprints that can
be generated. For a set of 103 fingerprints the scheme still is the best choice. To be able to
generate a set of 104 fingerprints that suffice the Hamming Distance condition, the code
length needs to be extended significantly. In this case other approaches in literature are
to be favored, e.g. [80], [8]. The 3-secure approach, alike most Tardos Codes, is only
negligibly affected by the number of fingerprints.
complexity: Due to its nature of a limited number of fingerprints, the 2-secure tracing algorithm
is per se very efficient. The fingerprint generation however can be time consuming. The
3-secure approach is by intention very simple and compared to the state of the art, e.g.
[82] and [8], the complexity is very low.
The different parameter sets and more test results regarding the error rates and the code length
are arranged in the appendix C and D. The tests prove the comparability and quality of the two
approaches.
The 2-secure fingerprinting approach proposed in this chapter in a more general form has been
patented. It was submitted in September 2010 and approved in March 2012 [95].
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7 Optimized fingerprinting codes against medium sized collusions
In chapter 6 we introduced two approaches to be resistant against two or three colluders. In
this chapter we introduce four different approaches capable to resist against larger collusion
sizes. For several reasons these are most effective for medium sized collusions. Other pub-
lications that intend handling comparable parameter selections are for instance [84], using
discrete distributions for the fingerprint generation process, and [73], iteratively outputting
colluder fingerprints utilizing these as side information for the next iteration.
Our approaches partially (though simultaneously) take on those ideas, though all are based
on the works [114], [121], [64] and [86]. They refinish those state of the art fingerprinting
schemes in several ways. They differ in the targeted process, whether with respect to the
fingerprint generation process or to the tracing algorithm and also regarding their originator
scheme that they add modifications to. All four approaches have in common that they reduce
the false positive error compared to the state of the art at minimal cost for the other parameters
but for a low increment of complexity.
70
7.1 Efficient tracing by filtering suspects: Ranking search
This approach generates fingerprints similar to the Tardos codes described in chapter 4.5. Its
main contribution is the efficient and adaptive tracing algorithm that employs a ranking search
based tracing of suspects.
In literature the fingerprints achieving accusation scores that exceed a certain threshold are
either directly output, e.g. [121, 91] or chosen for further analysis, e.g. [81], [75], [40]. The
approach introduced here can be handled in both ways. On the one hand it is a self-contained
tracing strategy providing a very fast and high accurate colluder tracing directly outputting one
or more colluder-fingerprints. On the other hand it acts as a filter selecting the most suspicious
fingerprints in order to constrict the number of fingerprints to be considered. This way the effort
for adjacent ordinary tracing algorithms is significantly reduced. The approach was published
in [93].
The proposed approach is suitable for most fingerprinting schemes utilizing a probabilistic fin-
gerprint generation process. Essential is that the columns of X are generated according to
specific probabilities pi, i ∈ {1, ...,m}, for which the probability density function is symmetric
around 1/2 and has a high bias towards its bounds.
7.1.1 Construction
The algorithm starts calculating the accusation scores and defining the ranking vector and rank-
ing ’matrix’ in a preparation stage. This is followed by a deeper search for suspected fingerprints
in the core tracing algorithm.
Preparation
Accusation score: First, the accusation scores are calculated according to equation (6) in chap-
ter 4.5.
Ranking vector: Each position of y = (yi)i=1,..,m = (y1, ..., ym) is considered according to the
corresponding probability vector p = (pi)i=1,...,m = (p1, ..., pm).
As described in chapter 4.3, pi stands for the probability of the symbol ’1’ in column i
of X. For the counter probability, the probability for a ’0’ in column i, we write 1 − pi.
The probability of the symbol yi is denoted as pyi . The lower pyi , the more significant is
its amount for the accusation score, see chapter 4.5. This is used to create a significance
ranking for y . We compute every value
k(i) := |1− (pi + yi)|, i ∈ {1, ..,m}. (9)
Hence, the closer k(i) is to 0, the higher is its ranking. For example, in case yi = 1 ≈ pi,
k(i) will be close to 1. The same holds for yi = 0≈ pi. Other constellations will lower the
(positive) value for k(i).
A ranking vector V = V1, ...,Vm is filled with the indices of the positions of y from highest
ranking to lowest. This means, for the first entry of V it holds V1 = i¯ where k(i¯) =
argmin{k(i)}. For each column of X there is one entry in V .
Ranking ’matrix’: We consider the k columns of X for which the corresponding positions of y
achieve the highest rankings: X (:,V1),X (:,V2),X (:,V3), ...X (:,Vk). Within each of those
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selected columns, we are interested in all entries providing the same symbol as y in the
corresponding position, i.e. in column i we search the entries for which it holds yi =
X ( j1,Vi) = X ( j2,Vi) = ... = X ( jl ,Vi). The corresponding indices j1, ..., jl of those entries
are sorted into a structure denoted as ranking matrix R. Hence, the first row of R is filled
with the indices of column V1 = i¯ of the fingerprint matrix X providing the same symbol
as yi¯. The second row of R is filled with the indexes of column V2 having the same symbol
as y in position V2, and so on.
R(r) =

j1, ..., jl |X ( j1,Vr) = X ( j2,Vr) = ...= X ( jl ,Vr) = yi
	
,
for every row r of R.
Core tracing algorithm
The core tracing algorithm is divided into several steps. The first two steps directly counter the
minority vote attack and the majority vote attack respectively. In many cases the algorithm out-
puts one or more colluder-fingerprints already after these two steps. Otherwise or if it is desired
to catch more colluder-fingerprints, the core tracing algorithm can be expanded (with arbitrary
complexity). The core tracing algorithm intends to reconstruct the manipulated fingerprint y ,
but it can be stopped prior to that as its abortion criteria can be adjusted to the individual need.
Proofs and reasons of the following statements are explained below in subsection 7.1.2.
1: Single entries of R: If there is a row jR in R that contains only a single entry, the correspond-
ing fingerprint XR( jR,1) is a colluder-fingerprint and is output by the tracing algorithm.
T = {XR( jR,1)}
2: Indexes in each row of R: Count the number of appearances of every index within R. If the
index that appears most at the same time belongs to the fingerprint with the largest accu-
sation score, this fingerprint is output as colluder-fingerprint.
3: Reconstruct the collusion: The fingerprints associated to the indexes appearing most in R,
especially the indexes in the first row, are taken to reconstruct y .
4: Successive search through R: If one or more colluder-fingerprints have been exposed, cre-
ate a vector y ′ in the following way. Define y ′ as y ′ := y . Discard every entry in y ′,
in case the corresponding symbol equals the symbol(s) in position i′ of one or more
of the exposed colluder-fingerprints. Hence y ′ exists of positions the already exposed
colluder-fingerprints could not have created. Create a new set of rows R′ in the following
way. Execute the steps Accusation score, Ranking vector and Ranking ’matrix’ R once again
utilizing y ′ instead of y . The resulting ranking matrix is denoted as R′. Execute step Re-
construct the collusion with the new results of R′ in order to reconstruct y ′. In case this is
possible, the corresponding entries in R′ show up to further colluder-fingerprints. This way
can be proceed until y is reconstructed completely, or until enough colluder-fingerprints
are found.
5: Filtering suspects: In case the afore steps did not suffice or in case the intention was to solely
apply this algorithm as a filter, the entries of R can be taken as input for a proper tracing
algorithm. Thereby the input reduces from the total set of fingerprints in the fingerprint
matrix X to an appropriate small set of fingerprints.
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7.1.2 Explanation of the algorithm
To reason the steps of the tracing algorithm above, this section contains some explanations and
an example.
Preparation: Figure 9 illustrates the creation of the ranking vector V with the example of
an 8 bit fingerprint. The probability vector p provides a probability of p4 = 0.01 for a ’1’ in
position i = 4. In the same position the attacked fingerprint y = y1, ...y8 contains a y4 = 1. By
equation (9), k(4) is 0.01 as well. Because this value of k is closest to zero, the 4th column of
the fingerprint matrix X is ranked highest and set as first position of ranking vector V .
Following the example of figure 9, we focus on the 4th column of the 7×8 fingerprint matrix X
in figure 10. The symbols in the third and fifth row, in fingerprints 3 and 5 respectively, equal
the corresponding symbol in the attacked fingerprint y of figure 9. Hence its corresponding row
indexes 3 and 5 are the entries in the first row of the ranking matrix R. Which index is sorted
in first is depending on its accusation scores. The fingerprint with the larger accusation score is
more suspicious and for this reason favored.
Note that R is not an ordinary matrix at all, it is a list of vectors or rows containing indexes of
the corresponding rows of X. Each row may contain a different number of entries.
The number of rows of R, i.e. the number of positions of V that are considered, depends on the
demands of the actual distributor and hence on the code length, the number of fingerprints and
on the error probabilities. It also depends on the attack strategy the colluders have chosen.
Core tracing algorithm: For a small number of fingerprints contained in the fingerprint matrix
X the first rows of R frequently consist of solely one entry each. This is because of the bias
generation of the fingerprints, see chapter 4.5. The closer the probability value pi is to zero or
one, the higher the probability that the entries of the corresponding column i of X all have the
same symbol but one. Obviously, the less entries a column provides, the higher the probability
of this event. In such an event, i.e. if there is a column in X consisting of e.g. one ’0’ and all other
entries contain ’1’s, and the corresponding position in y carries a ’0’ as well, the corresponding
fingerprint must be a colluder-fingerprint4. These fingerprints can directly be output by the
tracing algorithm with a zero false positive error rate.
This is because the probability density function is required to have a high bias towards 0 and 1,
such as in equation (5). The probability for a symbol different than the others in one specific
position is very low, but on the other hand, the probability that this happens at least one times
throughout the whole length of the fingerprint is comparably high.
The larger the collusion, the more fingerprints can lead to such an event, i.e. the higher is
this probability. This means, if the colluders chose the minority vote attack strategy for the
manipulated copy with attacked fingerprint y , there might occur a symbol that directly and
undoubtedly leads to one of the colluder-fingerprints. This frequently happens also in case of a
random attack strategy.
Remember that in a real watermarking application, the colluders are not able to simply choose a
symbol, they only compare between different values of frequency bands, pixel values, etc., and
choose corresponding values of frequency bands, pixel values, etc., to create the forgery. The
resulting manipulated fingerprint y is not categorical altered in all detectable positions. This
4 Given a perfect watermarking algorithm underneath
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0.9 0.8 0.2 0.01 0.3 0.6 0.99 0.9 p= 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
0.9 0.2 0.8 0.01 0.7 0.6 0.99 0.1 
4 8 2 6 5 3 1 7 
y= 
k= 
V= 
V(1)=4: Column 4 has highest ranking  
-> is considered first 
Figure 9: Example for creation of the ranking
vector V
¨ ¨ ¨ 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
¨ ¨ ¨ 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
¨ ¨ ¨ 1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
¨ ¨ ¨ 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
¨ ¨ ¨ 1 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
¨ ¨ ¨ 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
¨ ¨ ¨ 0 ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
X(j,i) 
j=3 
j=5 
5 3 
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ ¨ 
R= 
-> R(1)=(5,3) 
-> if fingerprint 5 has a 
greater accusation score 
than fingerprint 3  
-> it is more suspicious 
Figure 10: Example for creation of the ranking
matrix R
fact enhances the probability of a direct identification of colluder-fingerprints after the first step
1: Single entries of R, consequently this example actually mirrors a realistic scenario.
On the other hand, in case the colluders followed an attack strategy alike the majority vote
attack, a direct zero false positive output after the first step is not possible. This is because the
majority vote decision by construction prevents from such events described before. However,
for the same reason, i.e. because the majority of colluders contribute to y in every position,
the first rows of R = R(1),R(2), ... are likely to include all colluder-fingerprints. According to
step 2: Indexes in each row of R, if the fingerprint that appears most in R also gets the highest
accusation score, this fingerprint can be output for participating in the collusion with a very
high probability. Note again that because of the small distance to the attacked fingerprint y , as
well as the large value for the accusation score that an attack strategy alike the majority vote
attack brings about, we assume that most attackers presumably prevent from this strategy.
Due to what was carried out in the afore paragraphs, the first and second steps are are capable
to output at least one colluder-fingerprint with a high probability. The next steps concern the
cases in which tracing of one colluder (or a few) is not sufficient, or for the cases in which up
to this point no clear identification of a colluder-fingerprint has been possible. A closer look at
R discloses the following. It is granted that at least one index of a colluder fingerprint appears
in each row of R. Hence, for a majority vote attack strategy the first rows of R are likely capable
of including all indexes if the colluder fingerprints. Consequently, following step 3: Reconstruct
the collusion, a rebuilding of y with the corresponding fingerprints is possible even for larger
collusion sizes.
Optionally, a deeper successive search through R can be applied by step 4: Successive search
through R. A closer look on R reveals options to further reduce the number of fingerprints
to be considered for following tracing algorithms. For the case where one or more colluder-
fingerprints have been found during the first step(s), we compare y to the exposed colluder-
fingerprints and create the new vector y ′ by discarding all positions where the exposed finger-
prints and y equal. This new vector now declares which rows of R may be discarded (these
are the ones generated according to a position that is no longer appearing in y ′) to generate
R′. In addition y ′ also is the new vector to which we compute new accusation scores. Thereby
we change the prior accusation scores by subtracting by accident high amounts that were as-
sociated to fingerprints that did not partaken in the collusion. All in all we now only consider
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Table 8: False positives (FP) and false negative (FN) results for c0 = 3 after step Single entries of
R for minority vote attack and random vote attack
code length attack strategy FP FN (T = {;}) T = {c1} T = {c1, c2} T = {c1, c2, c3}
135
minority vote 0 20.5 % 43.4 % 29.5 % 6.4 %
random vote 0 45.6 % 41.2 % 12 % 1.1 %
100
minority vote 0 26 % 44.8 % 24.7 % 4.3 %
random vote 0 51.5 % 38.4 % 9.2 % 0.7 %
the positions of the attacked fingerprint y that the already found are not responsible for. The
size of R is further reduced, the number of fingerprints to be considered is reduced respec-
tively, and the ones within R′ provide accusation scores that likely lead to the remaining the
colluder-fingerprints.
These steps whether constrict the number of fingerprints to be considered or in many times
already disclosed one or more of the colluder-fingerprints. If rebuilding of y is still too costly, it
is possible to add another – usually cost intensive – tracing algorithm here. The effort for this
algorithm should be reduced enormously by now, because due to the already filtered suspects,
it has to consider decisive fewer fingerprints.
7.1.3 Evaluation
The proposed approach was tested with different parameter sets and collusion strategies. The
variety of possible parameter selections and step handling of the algorithm allows a magnitude
of different results. We constrict the evaluation here to two parameter sets and to step 1 and
step 2 of the core tracing algorithm as it already shows competitive results and because for the
subsequent steps there are no similar approaches to compare with.
In order to be comparable to the approach presented in chapter 6.2 and to the state of the
art approach of [82], the first test set empirically tested the approach against a collusion of
three applying the minority vote attack and the random vote attack. Accordingly, the number
of fingerprints was set to n = 100 and the fingerprint length was set to m = 135 and m = 100
respectively. The results after step 1: Single entries of R are depicted in table 8. We split the
results into the cases for which no colluder-fingerprint was found (false negatives; T = {;}), for
which exactly one colluder-fingerprint was found (T = {c1}), for which exactly two colluder-
fingerprints were found (T = {c1, c2}) and for which all three colluder-fingerprints were found
(T = {c1, c2, c3}) already after step 1 of the core algorithm. The corresponding percentages are
listed in the associated columns. As false positives did not occur, summing up the percentages
of one test set yields 100%.
Since up to this point we only accuse the ones that appear in a row of their own in the Ranking
Matrix R, the probability of outputting someone innocent (false positives) obviously is zero. In
most cases we can already stop the algorithm at this point and provide distinguished results.
Table 8 shows, that the approach already provides acceptable results against a collusion of three
fingerprints for a code length of 100 bits. This is shorter than all published 3-secure codes before
including our approach for a 3-secure fingerprinting scheme presented in chapter 6.2. However,
at this step of the approach, in case of a majority vote attack strategy or any alike, step 1: Single
entries of R will not lead to any practical results at all. This is dedicated to the step 2: Indexes in
each row of R and all that follow.
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Table 9: False positive (FP) and false negative (FN) results for m = 1.000 and c0 = 6 after the
first step Single entries of R (minority vote, random attack) and second step Indexes in
each row of R (majority vote attack)
attack strategy FP FN T = {c1} T = {c1, c2} T = {c1, c2, c3} T = {c1, ..., c4/c5}
minority vote 0 36.3 % 40.16 % 18.58 % 4.38 % < 1%
random vote 0 60.57 % 31.63 % 6.86 % < 1 % < 1%
majority vote 0 45.92 % 54.08 % not considered
A false negative error rate of more than 0.5 seems insufficient, but in case the algorithm outputs
a false negative error, i.e. no fingerprint is output at all, the next steps of the algorithm will
highly probably identify colluder-fingerprints.
The second test set expands the collusion size to c0 = 6 at a code length of m = 1.000 and for
a set of n = 1.000 fingerprints. Table 9 shows the corresponding intermediate results after the
first step, regarding minority vote and random vote attack, and after the second step regarding
the majority vote attack strategy. Here only those fingerprints were output whose accusation
score outreached the other scores by a significant amount.
In table 9 the last entries for the majority vote attack are marked as not considered. This is
because in this (second) step we only output the one fingerprint with the highest accusation
score, which is already listed in column T = {c1}.
The approach provides shortest code lengths at satisfactory error probabilities already at this
point of the tracing algorithm. If at this point some colluder-fingerprints are exposed, the
applicant can choose to whether stop the tracing now or go on with the other steps to probably
find further colluder fingerprints. The proposed code length in this example already reaches
1.000 bits, however existing 6-secure codes (c-secure codes at c0 = 6) in literature provide code
lengths that exceed our proposal by far, e.g. [84], [114], [23].
For larger collusions most results improve (inter alia) due to higher probabilities for significant
positions appearing in R. An exception forms the majority vote attack strategy. Here the results
for larger collusions turn worse. To balance this, an increment of the code length is inevitable.
For smaller number of fingerprints listed in the system, e.g. for parameters alike table 8 and 9,
this approach acts as a tracing algorithm standing on its own. It provides practical results for
the interaction of the struggling parameters code length, error probabilities and effort of the
tracing algorithm.
For larger number of fingerprints listed in the system and for realistic code lengths, the first step
seldom leads to a direct exposure of a colluder-fingerprint. In this case it provides a filtering
of the most suspicious fingerprints and reduces the numbers of fingerprints significantly. This
implies a significant reduction of the effort for a subsequent tracing algorithm that otherwise
required too much effort. This is important especially for large distribution runs.
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7.2 Optimized fingerprint generation for the continuous distribution
In chapter 4 we described that the fingerprinting specific processes in a fingerprinting scheme
are represented by the fingerprint generation process and the tracing algorithm. In this section
we present a modified fingerprint generation process and its accordingly adjusted tracing algo-
rithm. The results are taken from our publication [11]. The idea of the approach is especially
important for the approaches presented in section 7.3 and 7.4 as well as the approaches pre-
sented in chapter 8 as it presents some new ideas to the Tardos Codes that among others form
the basis of the other approaches to come.
For probabilistic fingerprinting codes we can show that if an innocent-fingerprint was output by
the tracing algorithm, the constellation of the colluder-fingerprints was very disadvantageous.
In this section we propose a fingerprint generation that tries to decrease the impact of those
disadvantageous constellations. This leads to a significant reduction of the error rates of the
adjusted tracing algorithm.
7.2.1 Preliminaries
From chapter 4 we know that in the fingerprint generation according to the Tardos Codes [114],
all columns of the fingerprint matrix X are generated independently from each other. The
entries in each column are filled randomly according to the probabilities p1, ..., pm. For a very
large probability of the symbol αi in column i, only few entries in this column have the opposite
symbol |1−αi|. This means only few rows of the fingerprint matrix X will have the symbol |1−αi|
in position i. According to section 7.1 we insert a ranking into the probabilities. Contrary to 7.1
the manipulated fingerprint y is not considered here, as it is unknown during the fingerprint
generation process.
A significant position represents a position in column i, for which the probability for the symbol
αi is very low. For example, if pi = 0.9, i.e. a high probability for the symbol ’1’ in column i, all
positions in column i that contain a ’0’ are significant positions as their corresponding probability
(1− pi) is very low.
A fingerprint with a number of significant positions well over the average is potentially prone to
get falsely output by the tracing algorithm. This is because in a disadvantageous constellation
of colluder-fingerprints, the corresponding accusation score may sum up many large positive
amounts. The result is a score that exceeds the threshold Z separating the innocent-fingerprints
from the suspected ones. The same holds for the other case. A fingerprint that has no signif-
icant position at all, may achieve a large accusation score as well. This is because there will
be disadvantageous constellations of fingerprints that for the appropriate attack strategy will
enforce positive amounts to the score at the majority of positions. Hence, to prevent the impact
of disadvantageous constellations of colluder-fingerprints, as many fingerprints as possible must
have a very average amount of significant positions. We achieve this by decreasing the number
of potentially large innocent-fingerprints’ accusation scores by means of reducing the variance
of the score distribution. Thereby it is less likely that an innocent-fingerprint’s score exceeds the
threshold. Hence the false positive error rate can be reduced. More concerns and explanations
can be found in the appendix E
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7.2.2 Construction
In this approach, the columns of X are no longer independent from each other, more precisely
the fingerprint bits are no longer independent from the previous ones. Thereby we are able to
restrain the number of significant positions.
Generation of a provisional fingerprint matrix
On the one hand, the generation of the column probabilities (pi)i=1,...,m is adopted from [114],
which means, the probabilities still follow the probability density function quoted in equation
(5) of chapter 4.5. On the other hand a second vector v = v1, ..., vn is introduced. Each v j
is allocated to row X j of the fingerprint matrix to be generated. Since the fingerprint matrix
ought to be column dependent, the columns are generated one by one, starting with the first
column. The first column is filled according to the probability p1. The counter vector v notices
the r rows j′1, ..., j′r that were assigned with a significant position. For the second column the
probability p2 dictates the distribution of the second column as ever, but in cooperation with
v . That is, in order to prevent a second significant position assigned to the same rows j′1, ..., j′r
in the second column again, according to the counter vector v these rows are blocked. Hence,
v decides for each column to be generated in which rows it is forbidden to assign significant
positions. After the generation of the second column, v again notices the r ′ rows that now were
assigned to significant positions. For the generation of the third column, the r+ r ′ rows noticed
by v (according to the information of the first and second column) are blocked for further sig-
nificant positions. The probability p3 dictates the entries accordingly. In this way the generation
proceeds until the matrix is completely filled, or each row is assigned to (at least) one significant
position. For the latter case, v simply restarts again blocking significant positions at according
rows as in the beginning, and the column generation continues accordingly. Thereby the ma-
trix is filled column correlatively and the number of disadvantageously generated fingerprints
is bounded. An example with a very small matrix can be found in the appendix I. Note that
the generation is according to the approach presented in chapter 8.2, however, because of its
small size, the example works analogously and can be taken for a correlated matrix generation
as presented in this section as well.
The fingerprint matrix generated this way results in a slightly deviating distribution of the ac-
cusation scores. In [114] the variance value for the accusation scores was set to σ2 = 1. The
matrix generated as above leads to decreased variance values. Figure 11 shows the difference of
the variances between the original matrix generation and our approach introducing correlations
to the columns.
Generation of the fingerprint matrix X
As error rates and code length strongly depend on each other, a reduction of the false positive
error rate allows a reduction of the code length instead.
To achieve a reduction of the code length, we proceed as follows. The average variance value
of the accusation scores is computed for many runs and for the different attack strategies listed
in chapter 4.6. The average variance values for each attack strategy are compared and the
average variance that achieves the largest value σ˜2 is taken for a new adjusted formula for
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Figure 11: Histogramm of the accusation sums at Tardos ’ and our matrix generation
the code length. More precisely, we multiply σ˜2 to the old bound on the code length m of the
Gaussian assumption formula in [121] and get the new one:
m˜ := σ˜2 ·m= dmc20σ˜2 ln  "−11  (10)
The parameter dm is equal to the code length parameter dm =
pi2
2 in [121]. We re-generate
the fingerprint matrix X according to the symmetric Tardos scheme described in chapter 4.5
applying equation (10) as code length formula. This way X is generated with a significantly
reduced code length at the same expected error rate.
Adjusted threshold and tracing algorithm
Because of the reduction of the code length, the threshold Z needs to be adjusted as well.
Therefore, the actual variance σactual of the accusation scores need to be calculated. The ad-
justed threshold is computed as
Z˜ := σactual · Z = dZ c0 ln
 
"−11

σactual .
The threshold parameter dZ is set to pi according to [121]. The calculation of the accusation
scores is equal to the symmetric Tardos scheme in equation (6) of chapter 4.5.
All fingerprints whose accusation scores exceed the new threshold Z˜ are output by the tracing
algorithm.
The idea to take the actual variance for the threshold calculation will be utilized again especially
in section 7.4 and chapter 8.3.
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7.2.3 Evaluation
The decreased variance of the distribution of accusation scores induce that it is less likely that
an innocent-fingerprint’s accusation score exceeds the threshold, hence the false positive error
rate is reduced. We will get back to that especially in section 7.3 and in chapter 8.2. The
empirical test confirm our results. We observed a slight increment of the false negative error
rate compared to [121], yet it stays below 0.5. The false positive error rate, that is assumed to
be more important, slightly decreases. In addition the code length was shortened by the factor
of the variance σ˜2. For example, at a maximum collusion size of c0 = 12, m˜ reduces to 3671,
compared to 4908 in [121]. For c0 = 18 we are still much shorter, m˜ = 8852 compared to
m= 11044 in [121].
On the downside is that the false negative error rate sometimes exceeded the selected upper
bound of 0.5 for the mutual information attack in [41], see chapter 4.6. Note that this also
happens for the original scheme of [121].
The computations of the variance values of the accusation sums have to be computed only once
for each eligible parameter and attack strategy and can be done in advance. For this reason the
effort and computational time of the whole generation process for a distributor only increases
negligible in comparison to [114] and its derivatives.
The approach provides two ideas that can be applied in probabilistic fingerprinting schemes in
general and which we will recall for the remaining approaches in this thesis. The one idea is
to insert correlation into the columns of the fingerprint matrix X in order to reduce the number
of disadvantageously generated fingerprints. The other idea is to use the variance of the actual
accusation scores to calculate a higher accurate threshold that is adjusted to the actual case.
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7.3 Adapted fingerprint generation for discrete bias distributions
This section proposes an approach for a discrete bias distribution for generating the fingerprint
matrix X.
In chapter 4.3 we mentioned that apart of the continuous generation of fingerprints, i.e. prob-
abilities following a continuous distribution function alike the Tardos code [114] presented in
chapter 4.5, there is also the possibility of selecting a discrete distribution, e.g. [43], [84]. The
prescription of generating the fingerprints accordingly was also given in chapter 4.5. Espe-
cially for maximum collusion sizes smaller than 30, some discrete distributions provide shorter
code lengths than continuous distributions [85]. The approach presented in this section is a
modification of the approach recently published by Laarhoven et al. [65] for generating the
supporting points for the discrete distribution as described in chapter 4.5, which itself was an
approximation to the discrete distribution construction introduced by Nuida et al. [84].
Our modification takes on the idea of section 7.2 introducing correlations to the column gener-
ation of the fingerprint matrix X. The approach is based on our elaboration in [88]. The effect
is only marginal compared to [65], but in combination with the tracing algorithm presented in
the subsequent section 7.4, which introduces an adapted threshold calculation, the approach
performs highly well.
7.3.1 Construction
The fingerprint matrix X is generated according to [65] via the following two steps as described
in chapter 4.5.
1. Initialization: Let m = dmc0 ln(1/"1) denote the code length and set T = dc0/2e. First
select m bias values pi, for i = 1, ...,m, by drawing k for each value uniformly at random
from {1, ..., T} and setting pi = sin2
 
4k−1
8T+4pi

.
2. Fingerprint generation: Each entry X j,i of the fingerprint matrix is selected indepen-
dently from the binary alphabet with Pr[X j,i = 1] = pi.
Due to the considerations in section 7.2.1, where we pointed out that the generation of disad-
vantageously generated fingerprints result in higher error rates, we propose to add three other
steps [88]. The first step is to avoid the centricity of the bias values, i.e. to avoid that the bias
values in the entries of the probability vector p are by chance centered close to 0.5. This is
achieved by enforcing an average distribution of the bias values, i.e. the number of columns to
be filled with probability p is proportional to the overall number of columns, see step 1 below.
The second step ensures that the sum of each column actually is npi and not deviated due to
stochastic impreciseness. Note that these two regulations only matter for finite values of c0, as
they simply enforce average values and prevent outliers. In the asymptotics (very large collu-
sions) these steps will have no effect at all, for which the corresponding proofs do not differ at
all from the proofs of the original versions. As a third step we ensure that each row of X, aka
each fingerprint, contains the expected number of ’1’s. This goes back to the ideas proposed
in section 7.2.1, to integrate correlations to the columns of the fingerprint matrix X. Here we
describe an adjusted version for discrete distributions. For the same reason as in section 7.2.1
it holds, that fingerprints close to the average less frequently cause errors in the accusation.
Hence reducing the number of outliers – those fingerprints that are very unlike the average –
compared to the original fingerprint generation due to [65], will reduce the error probability.
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The three steps are depicted in the following pseudo-algorithm. For a more detailed discussion
on these steps as well as on the fingerprint generation due to [65] see the appendix F.
Define Ip = {i|1 ≤ i ≤ m, pi = p} to be the index set of the columns with bias value p. In other
words, the set Ip contains the indexes of all columns of the fingerprint matrix X for which the
probabilities pi have the same value p.
1. Initialize the bias vector p = (p1, ..., pm) randomly such that each probability value p
occurs with the same frequency: |bm/T c| ≤ |p| ≤ |dm/T e| (first optimization step).
2. For each column i, compute the number of 1s li := bnpic. Increment li by 1 with probabil-
ity npi − bnpic (second optimization step).
3. Iterate randomly through all positions X j,i. For each position select s ∈ {0,1} uniformly at
random.
a) If s = 1:
• If the number of ’1’s in column i is smaller than li (second optimization step), and
there are less than dpi · |Ipi |e ’1’s in the sub-fingerprint X j,Ipi (third optimization
step), then set X j,i = 1.
• Else, if the number of ’0’s in column i is smaller than n − li, and there are less
than d(1− pi) · |Ipi |e ’0’s in the sub-fingerprint X j,Ipi , then set X j,i = 0.
• Else, go on with 3. c)
b) If s = 0:
• If the number of ’0’s in column i is smaller than n − li, and there are less thand(1− pi) · |Ipi |e ’0’s in the sub-fingerprint X j,Ipi , then set X j,i = 0.
• Else, if the number of ’1’s in column i smaller than li, and there are less thandpi · |Ipi |e ’1’s in the sub-fingerprint X j,Ipi , then set X j,i = 1.
• Else, go on with 3. c)
c) If X j,i is not yet initiated, i.e. none of the above conditions applied:
• if there are more ’1’s left for column i than ’0’s, i.e. if li > n− li, then set X j,i = 1.
• otherwise, set X j,i = 0.
The first step affects the initialization step of the fingerprint generation, while the second affects
the columns of the fingerprint matrix X and the third step affects the rows of the matrix. Finding
a matrix that fulfills simultaneously the condition from the second step as well as the condition
from the third step is not trivial.
To avoid backtracking as well as to avoid that the resulting fingerprint matrix becomes too
predictable, our proposed generation method will allow violating the third condition if it notices
that the so-far generated matrix cannot fulfill the second and third condition simultaneously.
As discussed above, the condition in the third optimization step might be violated through c).
But by our observations, this escalation step is only required to fill in few final positions of the
fingerprint matrix X.
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7.3.2 Evaluation
The adapted fingerprint generation method for the discrete distribution is primary evaluated for
the classical tracing scheme using the symmetric score function described in chapter 4.5. The
empirical results mirror what we expected from theory, the reduced number of outliers lead to
a reduced error rate.
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Figure 12: The false positive rates for c0 = 4,6,8 and a fixed false negative error rate of 10−3 de-
rived by the discrete bias distribution according to [65] and by our adapted approach,
both combined with the symmetric score function from section 4.5, taken from [88]
Table 10: Estimated code lengths to achieve a false positive rate of about "ˆ1 for fixed false neg-
ative rate of "ˆ2 = 10−3 for the discrete distribution by [65] and the symmetric score
function described in section 4.5
c0 Random fingerprint generation Our adapted fingerprint generation
2 2.40c20(ln(1/"ˆ1) + 2.76) 2.50c
2
0(ln(1/"ˆ1) + 2.97)
3 3.81c20(ln(1/"ˆ1) + 1.85) 3.76c
2
0(ln(1/"ˆ1) + 1.37)
4 3.62c20(ln(1/"ˆ1) + 1.55) 3.66c
2
0(ln(1/"ˆ1) + 0.95)
5 4.12c20(ln(1/"ˆ1) + 0.62) 4.08c
2
0(ln(1/"ˆ1)− 0.24)
6 3.99c20(ln(1/"ˆ1) + 0.38) 3.93c
2
0(ln(1/"ˆ1) + 0.09)
7 4.33c20(ln(1/"ˆ1)− 0.18) 4.10c20(ln(1/"ˆ1)− 0.97)
8 4.12c20(ln(1/"ˆ1) + 0.10) 3.84c
2
0(ln(1/"ˆ1)− 0.61)
9 4.23c20(ln(1/"ˆ1)− 0.02) 3.56c20(ln(1/"ˆ1)− 0.61)
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The adapted fingerprint generation method with discrete distribution functions resulted in no
improvement for a chosen maximum number of colluders c0 that was smaller than or equal to
6. For c0 > 6 however, the adaption resulted in significant lower error rates of about 10-15%.
This is exemplary apparent in figure 12.
Equivalent, improved error rates allow the content distributor to choose shorter code lengths
while still obtaining the same security level. For the results in table 10 we empirically tested
against more than 2 million attacks.
For a detailed evaluation and discussion we refer the reader to [88] and the appendix F.
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7.4 Dynamic threshold computation for the interleaving score function
In this section we present a tracing algorithm that is optimized against the general requirements
of a fingerprint generation process alike described in chapter 4.5 and especially alike the discrete
fingerprint generation presented in section 7.3. The approach performs best against medium
sized collusions as defined in chapter 5.
Other works that motivated this approach have been recently published. Recently Oosterwijk
et al. [86] published a more general score function, denoted as interleaving score function, see
equation (11) of definition 26. They proved it to be asymptotical optimal against the inter-
leaving attack. Independently, Huang and Moulin [54] proved the interleaving attack to be the
asymptotical optimal attack. Hence this new score function is accepted as the asymptotical, i.e.
c0 tends to infinity, optimal score function. It is left open, if this score function is also optimal
in practical parameters, e.g. c0 < 30. Of more importance was, that at first no method was
given to calculate the accusation threshold Z . For the symmetric score function investigated in
[121] described in chapter 4.5 the threshold is fixed taking the parameters chosen in advance.
Adjusting this calculation for the interleaving score function is not possible, because it gener-
ates scores that heavily depend on the colluders’ attack strategy and therefore the scores vary
strongly. As the strategy is generally not known, a fixed threshold cannot be applied in practice.
Note that recently, Ibrahimi et al. [55] proposed a method to calculate a dynamic threshold
especially tailored for the interleaving score function of [86]. However, it is only investigated
for the asymptotic (large collusions) behavior and only provable sound to counter interleaving
attacks, whereas our approach is suited for applicably small collusion sizes and independent of
the attack strategy.
In this section, we revisit the idea of section 7.2 and utilize the actual accusation scores in
order to propose a dynamic threshold calculation adjusted to the actual case of collusion attack
and that is not depending on the collusion strategy. The results are taken from [88] and were
derived independently from [55].
Our tracing algorithm requires the actual accusation scores according to [86] and the probability
vector (p1, ..., pm) from the fingerprint generation process, for instance from the approach in
section 7.3.
7.4.1 Construction
As discussed in section 7.2, the standard deviation of the fingerprints’ accusation scores is the
crucial factor for the threshold calculation. In this approach, we intend to approximate the stan-
dard deviation of the (generally not known) innocent fingerprints alone, i.e. of all fingerprints
in X but the colluder-fingerprints. The whole scheme is as follows.
Fingerprint generation: The tracing algorithm described in the following is not depending on
the fingerprint generation process. All approaches in literature for generating the finger-
prints, e.g. [114], [84], [64], including the approaches explained before in this chapter,
e.g. section 7.2 using a continuous distribution and section 7.3 that uses a discrete distri-
bution, are feasible.
Tracing algorithm: Score calculation: The interleaving score function proposed by Oosterwijk et
al. in [86] is defined as follows:
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Definition 26 (Interleaving score function) For the probability pyi of the actual symbol
in position i of the manipulated fingerprint y , the accusation score for fingerprint X j is
calculated as
S j :=
m∑
i=1
ϕ
 
yi;X j(i)

, with ϕ
 
yi;X j(i)

:= δ(X j,i, yi)
1
pyi
− 1 (11)
where δ(X j,i, yi) represents the Kronecker Delta.
The Kronecker Delta yields 1, if the symbol in position i of the manipulated fingerprint y
equal the corresponding symbol in the fingerprint X j, otherwise 0.
Tracing algorithm: Dynamic threshold calculation: The dynamic threshold is calculated as fol-
lows.
With the same fingerprinting parameters and with the same probability vector (p1, ..., pm)
that were used in the fingerprint generation process for filling the columns of the finger-
print matrix X, another ordinary fingerprint matrix X (New) is generated. As the finger-
prints of the newly generated matrix X (New) obviously have not partaken in any collusion,
especially not in the collusion that is responsible for y , all fingerprints contained are
innocent-fingerprints.
For each of the new generated fingerprints X (New)k , with k = 1, ..., l, we calculate the
accusation scores S(New)k for the actual colluder-fingerprint y according to the interleaving
score function in equation (11) of definition 26. The resulting mean and variance values
are not ’falsified’ by scores of colluder-fingerprints. Hence, the the corresponding standard
deviation promises being a tighter approximation to the standard deviation of the scores
of the actual innocent-fingerprints denoted as σinn. The corresponding sample variance
for the new accusation scores S(New)k is computed as
σˆ2 =
1
l
l∑
k=1

S(New)k
2
.
As the newly generated fingerprints did not participate in the forgery, σˆinn converges to
σinn. This value multiplied to Z as calculated according to the corresponding chosen fin-
gerprint generation method, represents the dynamic threshold Zˆ . Note that our definition
of Zˆ does not differ from the original threshold calculation for the Tardos codes [114],
because there the factor σinn was a multiplication factor in the definition of Z as well.
However, there σinn was equal to 1 by construction, see chapter 4.5. For this reason the
proofs can be fully adopted and the definition for Zˆ is sound.
Tracing algorithm: Accusation: The tracing algorithm outputs all fingerprints for which it holds
S j > Zˆ .
This way, the sample variance σˆ2 is not computed on the scores for the existing fingerprints,
thus the attackers have no possibility to influence σˆ. The consequence is that for an innocent-
fingerprint j the ratio S j/σˆinn is nearly identical for all examined attack strategies.
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Figure 13: False positive and false negative rates applying our proposed dynamic threshold cal-
culation for the interleaving score function and discrete bias distribution by [65]. For
c0 = 5 and m = 1300 it shows (a) the minimal and maximal observed false positive
rate and (b) false negative rate for different strategies. Based on [88]
7.4.2 Evaluation
Our dynamic threshold calculation first makes the usage of the interleaving score function prac-
tically possible. In order to evaluate the approach, the value σˆinn is computed by generating
1000 new fingerprints. The false positive rate was estimated executing 20 million attacks, each
time with new randomly generated colluder-fingerprints. The false negative rate was deter-
mined by averaging over 2 million attacks, each with newly generated colluder-fingerprints.
For the fingerprint generation process, the discrete bias distribution by Laarhoven and de Weger
[65] has been used.
The presented dynamic threshold calculation method was evaluated for collusion sizes c0 =
2, ...9 and each with various code lengths. It was evaluated against all attack strategies pre-
sented in chapter 4.6. The results show, that the scores of innocent-fingerprints are almost
identical for all considered attack strategies, except the majority vote attack. There the scores
for innocent-fingerprints become smaller, i.e. the probability of a false positive is smaller, com-
pared to other evaluated attack strategies.
Figure 13 (a) depicts the empirically evaluated probability Pr that an innocent-fingerprint gets
a score exceeding Zˆ for c0 = 5 and m= 1.300.
Our results show, that the interleaving score function with the proposed method to compute σˆinn
leads to lower error rates for c0 ≥ 5 in comparison to the symmetric score function described in
chapter 4.5. For c0 = 3 and c0 = 4, the symmetric score function resulted in smaller error rates.
For c0 = 2, the interleaving score function and the symmetric score function are identical for
the used discrete bias distribution.
In analogy to section 7.3, the code length was parameterized as m = dmc20(ξ+ κ), where ξ is
shorthand for ln(1/"ˆ1), and dm as well as κ were determined to achieve a certain false positive
rate "ˆ1 and a fixed false negative rate of either "ˆ2 = 10−2 or "ˆ2 = 10−3. The results of the
parameterization is shown in table 11. For example, given the maximum expected number of
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Table 11: Code lengths for the symmetric score function and the interleaving score function
using our dynamic threshold computation and the discrete distribution by [65]. The
parameter ξ denotes ln(1/"ˆ1). Note that for c0 = 2, both score functions are identical,
as pi = 0.5 for all i.
c0 Symmetric Score Function Interleaving Score Function
"2 = 10−2 "2 = 10−3 "2 = 10−2 "2 = 10−3
2 2.32c20(ξ+ 0.94) 2.40c
2
0(ξ+ 2.76) - -
3 3.58c20(ξ+ 0.82) 3.81c
2
0(ξ+ 1.85) 3.89c
2
0(ln(1/"1)− 2.3) 4.01c20(ξ− 1.49)
4 3.41c20(ξ+ 0.67) 3.62c
2
0(ξ+ 1.55) 4.23c
2
0(ξ− 2.48) 4.48c20(ξ− 1.77)
5 3.84c20(ξ− 0.06) 4.12c20(ξ+ 0.62) 3.29c20(ξ− 3.02) 3.48c20(ξ− 2.07)
6 3.77c20(ξ− 0.35) 3.99c20(ξ+ 0.38) 3.21c20(ξ− 3.30) 3.39c20(ξ− 2.30)
7 4.06c20(ξ− 0.80) 4.33c20(ξ− 0.18) 2.48c20(ξ− 0.15) 2.67c20(ξ+ 0.32)
8 3.97c20(ξ− 0.81) 4.12c20(ξ+ 0.10) 2.40c20(ξ+ 1.16) 2.56c20(ξ− 1.69)
9 4.12c20(ξ− 0.99) 4.23c20(ξ− 0.02) 2.12c20(ξ+ 1.95) 2.27c20(ξ+ 2.26)
colluders as c0 = 8, a code length of at least m= 4.12c20(ξ+0.10) is necessary to observe a false
positive error rate of "ˆ1 and a false negative error rate of "ˆ2 = 10−3 for the symmetric score
function. For the same parameters, the interleaving score function with the dynamic threshold
calculation suffices a code length of m= 2.56c20(ξ− 1.69).
For c0 ≥ 5 the code length parameter dm is much smaller applying the interleaving score func-
tion in comparison to the symmetric score function. Also, it is fairly close to the asymptotic
lower bound of dm = 2, that was proven by [86].
More evaluations are to be found in the appendix G.
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7.5 Summary
We proposed four different approaches in order to improve the fingerprint generation and the
tracing algorithm. Each approach aims at specific properties and parameters. Sections 7.1 and
7.2 generate the matrix with a continuous distribution, sections 7.3 and 7.4 make use of a
discrete distribution to generate the fingerprint matrix. The approaches in section 7.1, 7.2 and
7.3 present adjusted or modified tracing algorithms for the symmetric score function in order to
trace colluder fingerprints, section 7.4 also introduces a method to firstly apply the interleaving
score function recently published by [86]. All approaches are focused on (but are not restricted
to) medium sized collusions.
false positive error bound: All approaches result in improved empirical false positive error rates.
During the tests for the ranking search approach (section 7.1) no false positive error
occurred at all. The other approaches utilized the reduced false positive error rate in order
to improve other parameters such as the code length, and therefore the false positive rate
was fixed.
false negative error bound: The presented tests for the ranking search approach only consider
the first and second step of the whole tracing scheme. Already then the selected rate
of 0.5 was satisfied. For reason of comparison, the approaches in sections 7.3 and 7.4
were tested with a fixed selected choice for the false negative error rate. However, the
correlated matrix approach for the continuous distribution (section 7.2) achieved slightly
increased false negative rates compared to its predecessor [121].
code length: All approaches achieve significant reductions of the code lengths compared to its
corresponding preceding fingerprinting scheme.
number of fingerprints: The ranking search approach is mainly restricted to scenarios with a
small number of fingerprints. Depending also on the other parameters, the approach
will lose its effectiveness, i.e. directly outputting colluder-fingerprints in step 1 or step 2
of the algorithm, with increasing number of fingerprints and colluders (e.g. n = 104 and
c0 = 10). The other approaches in this chapter are not noteworthy affected by the number
of fingerprints alike all Tardos Codes in literature.
complexity: The complexity for the ranking search approach varies in dependency of the se-
lected steps within the tracing algorithm. The effort is very low stopping after the first
two steps, but it can increase arbitrarily during the further steps. In that case the ap-
proach is intended to serve as a filter instead, reducing the effort for adjacent tracing
algorithms. The other approaches result in increased complexity compared to its corre-
sponding predecessors. This is because each works operating additional steps in order to
improve the state of the art. The additional complexity however remains negligibly.
maximum chosen collusion size: As mentioned, the ranking search approach is most effective
for small values of c0 (c0 ∈ {3, ..., 6}). The correlative fingerprint matrix generations (sec-
tions 7.2 and 7.3) lose in effectiveness for increasing values of c0, but achieve significant
improvements for all medium sized selections. The dynamic threshold calculation (7.4) is
mainly tested against c0 ∈ {2, ..., 9} but as it is the first approach to apply the interleaving
score function of [86] in practice, it is not restricted to small values of c0.
Two major important awarenesses are taught in this chapter. The first is that the additional
conditions in the fingerprint matrix generation process are able to reduce fingerprint outliers
that are disadvantageously generated. The second is that both the discrete distribution for the
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fingerprint generation and the interleaving score function, but also its combination, allow to
significantly reduce the code length also for practically small choices of c0.
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8 Short and efficient fingerprinting codes
The approaches we proposed in chapters 6 and 7 are optimized against a very small to medium
sized upper bound of colluders c0. They serve well scenarios for which a relatively small value
for c0 is required. For large values we need other fingerprinting schemes or adjusted and modi-
fied ones.
Various publications consider very large (c0 →∞) collusions, e.g. [23], [21], [76] and others
already mentioned, [114], [121], [51], [50], [52]. Our approaches presented in this chapter
focus on maximum collusion sizes of c0 from 15 to at most 30. Compared to smaller values for
c0, such as during the last chapters, the approaches in literature achieve better results for larger
collusion sizes, e.g. c0 = 15,16, ..., 30. However, for the same reasons (impractical assumptions
regarding c0) these schemes still lack of applicability.
We present three different approaches. The first approach follows the idea of [74] proposing
a joint tracing algorithm, see chapter 4.3. We propose a combination of a single tracing and a
subsequent joint tracing algorithm in order to reduce the code length. The approach is based
on our work in [10].
The second approach proposes an enhancement of the correlated fingerprint generation ap-
proach already proposed in chapter 7.2 based on our results of [11]. Introducing a rank
correlation coefficient for the fingerprint matrix generation, we further reduce the error rates.
The third approach also goes back the approach of chapter 7.2. We propose a modified tracing
algorithm applying a dynamic threshold calculation using mixture models. The idea to that
approach is taken from our works in [71] and was recently published in [96]. The new threshold
calculation can be applied on any score function, including the interleaving score function, see
chapter 7.3. It is independent of the attack strategy and it remains reliable also in case the
actual number of colluders differ from the chosen upper bound, i.e. c0 6= c.
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8.1 Efficient joint decoding tracing algorithm
In this section we present a joint tracing algorithm based on the idea of Meerwald and Furon
[74] that utilizes our correlative fingerprint generation process presented in chapter 7.2 ([11]).
The reduction in the code length achieved by the correlative fingerprint generation process and
the idea of adaptive thresholds for the tracing algorithm according to chapter 7.2 are combined
with a joint decoding tracing approach that reduces the error probabilities. The approach is
published in [10].
In a joint tracing algorithm, each accusation score is no longer calculated between one single fin-
gerprint X j and the manipulated fingerprint y according to a single accusation score as defined
in equation (12) of chapter 4.3. It is calculated according to tuplets of fingerprints X j1 , ...,X jl
and y according to a joint accusation score as described in equation (13). The advantage of
a joint tracing algorithm compared to a single tracing algorithm is a reduced error probability
that can be traversed into shorter code lengths. On the downside is the significant increment
of computational complexity. For compensation reasons, in our approach we combine a joint
tracing algorithm with a single tracing algorithm in order to gain the advantages of both.
We apply the single tracing algorithm of [121] described in chapter 4.5 to primary reduce the
number of fingerprints to be considered for the following steps of the joint decoder. Similar to
the approach introduced in chapter 6.2, the resulting fingerprints are used to extract the most
likely attack strategy. The resulting information is taken as input for the maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE) applied in a modified joint decoding approach according to [74] to output the
most probable colluder-fingerprints.
Compared to the approach of [74], our approach also significantly reduces the complexity of
the tracing algorithm. This allows to extend our approach also to larger collusion sizes, for
which other joint decoding approaches demand impractically high efforts.
8.1.1 Preliminaries
The fingerprint generation process is taken from chapter 7.2. The corresponding formula for
the code length is
m= σ2 ·mŠkoric´ = (c0piσ)
2
2
ln
1
"1
p
2pi
.
The tracing algorithm uses the following notations and definitions.
• X joint denotes the subset of fingerprints that are still under supervision. Its number |X joint|
decreases with every step of the algorithm.
• The actual step of the joint decoding algorithm is represented by parameter T . Note that
this equals the actual subset size.
• With XSI we denote the actual T − 1 subset of fingerprint indexes of those fingerprints
that are determined already as colluder-fingerprints and that will be output by the tracing
algorithm. The notation bears on the side information that it adds to the corresponding
tracing step.
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• The subset τT ( j) consists of the fingerprint X j currently considered and of subset XSI:
τT ( j) = { j,XSI}.
• May K denote a subset of fingerprint indexes and XK the corresponding matrix, then
byi (K) is defined as the number of occurrences of symbol yi in column i of XK , in position
i of the manipulated fingerprint y , respectively.
• We use the channel information Chθ ( j, j′) as a measurement for the interaction between
the actual considered fingerprints X j and X j′ and the manipulated fingerprint y .
• The channel information vector θ = θc0 denotes the output vector of Chθ . It represents the
assumed type of collusion strategy.
The channel information Chθ and its output vector θ will be considered in more detail in the
subsequent section.
8.1.2 Construction
The tracing algorithm is divided into four steps of which the last step is an iterative algorithm.
The first step is the adjusted tracing algorithm described in chapter 7.2, that intends to reduce
the number of suspicious fingerprints. Step 2 gives an estimation of the collusion strategy and
an according vector θ , it is adjusted from the approach of [74], though the values are derived
through empirical examination only. With the third step, the first pair to be set as colluder-
fingerprints is determined. We make use of the log-likelihood ratio to sort out the fingerprint
pair having the highest probability of having pertained in the collusion. The corresponding
score is an adjusted version of the score applied in the approach of [74]. It was shown that the
score is optimal in the Neyman-Pearson sense [77] in case the collusion vector θ was known (as
the collusion is never known, this is never true, for which we need the estimation in step 2).
The error probabilities for the log-likelihood ratio in this step as well as in the (iterative) step 4
of the algorithm strongly depend on the number of iterative steps and the estimated collusion
strategy. Because they are analogue to [74], we will not examine this here.
Step 1: Pruning fingerprints by single decoding: The accusation scores for all fingerprints
X1, ...,Xn are computed according to [121] described in chapter 4.5.
S j :=
m∑
i=1
δyi ,X ji g1(p
(i)
yi
) + [1−δyi ,X ji]g0(p(i)yi ).
Those fingerprints whose accusation scores exceed the threshold
Z˜ := pic0 ln

1
"1
p
2pi

σactual
are grouped into the set X joint.
Step 2: How to handle Theta: The decision about the collusion strategy the colluders probably
applied is brought about by the mean of the channel information Chθ between all possible
pairs of fingerprints {X j,X j′} ∈ X joint, j 6= j′, and the manipulated fingerprint y . It is
calculated as
Chθ ( j, j
′) =
m∑
i=1
δyi ,(X j,i ,X j′,i)(1− pyi )c0−1
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where δyi ,(X j,i ,X j′,i) equals 1 if minimum one of the fingerprints X j,i and X j′,i has the same
symbol in position i as the manipulated fingerprint y . The parameter pyi represents the
corresponding probability for the symbol that occurs in y . Depending on the mean of the
channel information Chθ , we select the value for θ .
θ =

[0,0,0, ..., 1, 1, 1], if Chθ < 5
[0,0.5,0.5, ..., 0.5, 0.5, 1], if 5 ≤ Chθ < 20
[0, 1c0 ,
2
c0
..., c0−1c0 , 1], if 20 ≤ Chθ
The size of the vector is |θ | = c0. In case it holds Chθ < 5, the vector θ is filled with ’0’s
for the first c0/2 positions, the rest of the vector is filled with ’1’s.
Step 3: Selecting the first two suspicious fingerprints: Compute pair-scores Spair as described
below between the manipulated fingerprint y and all possible pairs of fingerprints
{X j,X j′}, j 6= j′, contained in X joint.
Spair( j, j
′) =
m∑
i=1
P

byi ({ j, j′}) , 2, pyi ,θ

P[0,0, pyi ,θ]
The probability P[·] is computed as
P[b, T, p,θ] =
c0−T+b∑
k=b
θ (k)

c0 − T
k− b

pk−b(1− p)c0−T−k+b. (12)
A derivation for equation (12) can be found in [74]. It describes the probability for yi in
the ith position of y , knowing that the same symbol has been distributed to fingerprints
with probability pyi , the collusion model θ , and the identity of T colluder-fingerprints
having b symbols yi and T − b symbols |1− yi|.
Next, for each fingerprint X j sum up the scores of all pairs {X j,X j′} ∈ X joint in which he
participated. The one fingerprint with the lowest sum is discarded from X joint and no
longer considered. The fingerprint pair with highest sum is also discarded from X joint, it is
sorted into the group XSI containing those fingerprints that are definitively output by the
tracing algorithm.
Step 4: Subset size 3 and more: With XSI containing the first two fingerprints, we consider the
next subset size T = 3. The iterative core of the algorithm is started as follows.
i For every step T of the algorithm, the subset τT ( j) is built for each fingerprint X j left
in X joint. Also the corresponding score Ssubset is computed as
Ssubset (τT ( j)) =
m∑
i=1
P

byi (τT ( j)) , T, pyi ,θ

P[byi (XSI) , T − 1, pyi ,θ]
, (13)
with P[·] according to equation (12).
ii In every step T the fingerprint with the highest score according to equation (13) and
the fingerprint with the corresponding lowest score are discarded from X joint. The
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Table 12: Comparison of code lengths for chosen bounds of "1 = 10−3 and "2 = 0.5 and n =
10.000 fingerprints
c0Tracing strategy
10 12 14 16 18 20
Single tracing:
6365 9165 12474 16293 20620 25457
Symmetric Tardos [121]
Joint tracing: ∼ 2479 ∼ 3671 ∼ 5032 ∼ 6725 ∼ 8852 ∼ 11058
Our approach
one with the highest score is sorted into XSI, i.e. the group of fingerprints that will
be output, the one with the lowest score is no longer considered.
iii If the set of fingerprints to be output has reached the size of the maximum chosen
collusion size |XSI| = c0, or if the set of fingerprints to be considered left is empty,
X joint = ;, the algorithm stops and outputs XSI. Otherwise the algorithm increases T
by 1 and continues going back to step i.
The number of fingerprints in X joint after step 1 is approximately the same as the chosen max-
imum number of colluders c0. Oftentimes all colluder-fingerprints are already separated from
the innocent-fingerprints. This is because, the threshold Zˆ (which coincides to the shorter code
lengths) causes a high percentage of the accusation scores of the colluder-fingerprints to exceed
Zˆ , which means they stay under supervision in the further procedure of the algorithm. However,
for the same reason also innocent-fingerprints are constantly appearing in X joint.
Within the description of the channel information vector θ , the parameter n, representing the
number of fingerprints listed in the system, does not appear. This is due to its minor dependency
on Tardos Codes in general that was mentioned before. The only influence of n for the proposed
code comes from the code length computation. We propose the condition n ≤ "−11 . Hence, the
effect of n on the vector θ is negligible.
8.1.3 Evaluation
To evaluate our approach for a joint decoding strategy, we considered the code length m and the
complexity at chosen bounds on the false positive error of "1 = 10−3 and on the false negative
error of "2 = 0.5.
A digest of the results regarding the reduced code lengths are listed in table 12. We compared
our joint decoding approach to the symmetric Tardos code [121] described in chapter 4.5. This
comparison was chosen for reasons of generality and because other joint decoding approaches
so far in our mind are determined as too complex regarding the selected values for code length
and maximum chosen collusion size. The resulting code lengths are reduced significantly for all
presented maximum collusion sizes.
In appendix H there will be more results and a comparison to e.g. the joint decoding approaches
of [74] for reduced collusion sizes.
Table 13 shows the false positive errors and the false negative errors for collusion sizes of
c0 = 10 and different attack strategies. The experimental results for the errors are far below
their chosen bounds of "1 = 10−3 and "2 = 0.5.
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Table 13: Experimental results for different attack strategies with code length of m = 2.479 at
c0 = 10, "1 = 10−3, "2 = 0.5 and n= 10.000 fingerprints
Attack strategy
Error rate
Random vote Minority vote Majority vote Interleaving Worst case
False positive 2 · 10−5 20 · 10−5 0 0 0
False negative 188 · 10−5 164 · 10−5 164 · 10−5 264 · 10−5 1456 · 10−5
Note that the chosen bound on the false positive error was set to "1 = 10−3 instead of n ≤ "−11 .
This was done for reasons of comparison and because of the reduced effort for the testing.
The attack strategy referred to as worst case belongs to the class of stateful attacks as described
in chapter 4.6 and works similar to the Greedy Attack of that chapter. For its explanation please
see in the appendix H.
Our approach is very effective regarding its computational complexity. Hence this approach
is the first in literature to allow joint decoding tracing for comparably large values of c0 (i.e.
c0 ≥ 12). The complexity of the proposed code basically depends on the number of fingerprint
indexes listed in X joint after the single decoding step 1 according to [121]. It can be computed
as the number of score calculations ϑ according to
ϑ =
|X joint|
2

+
c0−(2k−1)∑
k=1
|X joint| − (2k+ 1).
This means, for instance within c0 = 8 our approach suffices ϑ = 37 score calculations from
step 3 onward. At the same time the approach in [74] costs 8 · 106 score calculations.
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8.2 Optimized fingerprint generation for continuous distributions II
In chapter 7.2 we presented our idea of an optimized fingerprint matrix generation by intro-
ducing correlations to the columns of the fingerprint matrix X, that was published in [11]. The
idea was taken on by the approach presented in chapter 7.3 for discrete bias distributions. This
section presents an enhancement of the idea proposed in chapter 7.2, this time for continuous
distributions.
Recalling the observations from chapter 7.2, we know that inserting a correlation into the col-
umn generation for the fingerprint matrix X leads to a decreased standard deviation of the
accusation scores of innocent-fingerprints. Here we elaborate the approach and its impact on
the rank correlation coefficients of X by means of descriptive statistics. Finding a correlation
bound, i.e. an abort criteria of the correlation, in such a way that the correlation is not verifi-
able – or only to a minimum extent – allows generating a fingerprint matrix X with the highest
probability of no disadvantageously generated fingerprints.
In the following is listed the construction and some digest of the evaluation. The statistic
explanations to the approach are shifted to the appendix I.
The approach requires the fingerprinting parameters code length m, maximum expected collu-
sion size c0, number of fingerprints n and selected maximum error rates of "1 and "2.
8.2.1 Construction
The generation of the fingerprint matrix X requires the selection of a continuous distribution
function according to chapter 4.5.
From the corresponding distribution we create a ranked probability vector pˆ similar to chapter
7.1. But this time without the influence of the manipulated fingerprint y instead solely by
permuting the original probability vector p. We create pˆ = (pˆ1, ..., pˆm) so that it holds
|pˆi − 0.5| ≤ |pˆi+1 − 0.5| ∀i ∈ {1, ...,m− 1}
The columns of X are filled successively.
• In column i, if it holds dpˆi ·ne< n2 , all entries in column i are initialized with ’0’. Afterwards
l := dpˆi ·ne entries in i are exchanged with ’1’s. If possible the entries are selected normally
distributed.
• Otherwise, i.e. if holds dpˆi ·ne ≥ n2 , the entries are initiated with ’1’ and the l := n−dpˆi ·ne
entries are exchanged with ’0’.
• All j1, ..., jl indexes of the entries that were exchanged, are locked for the next columns.
This means, for the next column generation processes, it is prohibited to exchange the
entries in positions j1, ..., jl again.
The entries are locked until all other rows are locked as well. This way the next columns of
matrix X are generated until all positions are locked. In that case all locks are nullified and
the process continues until the matrix is completely filled. An example for the generation of a
correlated fingerprint matrix (with exemplary small dimensions) can be found in the appendix
I.
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Table 14: Results for the error rates (FP = average false positive error, |C | = average number of
colluders caught) with uncorrelated and correlated fingerprint matrix X
attack strategy c0 λ FP |C| max. std. deviation
interleaving
21
0.0 0.622 10.435 1.06
0.1 0.057 11.065 0.88
31
0.0 0.576 15.744 1.08
0.1 0.040 15.796 0.89
minority vote
21
0.0 0.677 11.833 1.07
0.1 0.391 10.436 1.01
31
0.0 0.622 14.802 1.07
0.1 0.294 14.301 0.99
majority vote
21
0.0 0.639 10.423 1.06
0.1 0.024 11.217 0.84
31
0.0 0.618 15.438 1.08
0.1 0.101 15.959 0.86
Note that until this point, it is only a slightly different prescription for generating the columns
of X compared to the approaches of chapter 7.2 and 7.3.
The correlation between the columns is evoked by these locking of column positions for the
subsequent column generation steps. For each column generation step we verify if it holds
pˆi ∈Bε(λ), whereBε(λ) :=

x ∈ R : |x−λ|< ε	 denotes the ε-environment of the correlation
bound λ ∈ [t, 1 − t] and t is the cutoff parameter defined in chapter 4.5. In case λ = 0.5
the fingerprint matrix is fully correlated, in case λ = t the matrix remains uncorrelated. Tests
have shown, that the correlation of X inserts negligible alterations into the distribution of the
correlation coefficients until a value of pˆi ≈ λ = 0.10. In section 8.2.2 we will present results
for which this choice of λ leads to significant decrement of the false positive error rate (about
a factor of 6) while the false negative remains the same (or decreases as well). More details
regarding the correlation bound λ and the choice of the cutoff t are sorted into the appendix I.
8.2.2 Evaluation
We evaluated the correlative matrix generation in different test sets. The parameter set was
chosen as n = 1000, c0 = {21,31}, "1 = 1n , "2 = 12 and t = 1n . We generated the fingerprint
matrix X for λ = 0 (representing the standard matrix generation described in chapter 4.5) and
λ = 0.1 (correlative). Both matrices were tested against 1.000 collusion attacks. We applied
the symmetric Tardos (chapter 4.5) for the colluder tracing and for the evaluation of the error
rates.
The results are depicted in table 14. We listed the false positive error rate and the false negative
error rate and also the standard deviation of the accusation scores of innocent-fingerprints.
For all cases we observe a clear reduction of the false positive error, while the false negative rate
remains comparatively stable. Analogue to the observations of [11] explained in chapter 7.2 the
standard deviation of the innocent-fingerprints decreases for correlative fingerprint matrices.
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From the different values in column maximal standard deviation, we see that the column corre-
lation has the most effect on the majority vote and the interleaving attack. The results for the
average number of false positives and the average number of output colluder-fingerprints are
the logical consequence of this observation. All in all we see that for the same parameters no
column correlation (λ = 0.0) compared to column correlation by λ = 0.1 result in significantly
decreased error rates.
A deeper analysis is devoted to the appendix I.
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8.3 Universal threshold calculation for large collusions
For the approach proposed in this section, we revisit the idea of our approach published in [11]
and presented in chapter 7.2. There the goal was to decrease the standard deviation of the
accusation scores of innocent-fingerprints and to calculate an adjusted threshold. The approach
presented in this section is published in [96]. Preliminary work was done in [71].
In chapter 7.3 we presented an approach for discrete distributions, that decreases the standard
deviation of the scores of innocent-fingerprints to be secure against a relatively small number
of colluders (c0 < 20). The corresponding dynamic threshold calculation was introduced in 7.4
that also allows applying the interleaving score function of [86] without the knowledge of the
actual attack strategy.
However, for large values of c0 the chosen bound on the false negative error "2 can no longer be
guaranteed. Due to statistical impreciseness, the larger the collusion size the larger will be the
deviation from this bound. In addition, the advantage for the discrete distributions vanishes for
larger choices of c0. It was shown that in the asymptotics the rates for the discrete generation
tend to their continuous counterpart [62]. What is more important for this chapter’s use case, is
that with discrete distributions a huge drop in the performances occurs, when c is indeed bigger
than the expected c0. Such a thing cannot happen with continuous distribution (smooth drop
as c increases) [87].
In this section, we propose an approach for a dynamic threshold calculation for larger values
of c0 that can be applied for both discrete and continuous fingerprint matrix generations. The
approach can be seen as a universal method for any accusation function, as it solely works with
the scores calculated in the actual case of collusion attack. It does not need any information
about the collusion strategy nor its size. The adjustment of the scores is achieved by employing
two-component mixture models.
8.3.1 Construction
Mixture models are linear superpositions of (two) arbitrary distributions that interfere with
each other. We want one distribution to represent the scores of the innocent-fingerprints and
the other distribution to represent the scores of the colluder-fingerprints.
Note that for smaller values of c0 the scores of the colluder-fingerprints will only be detected as
single outliers and not as belonging to a decent distribution, simply because they are too few.
For this reason the application of mixture models first makes sense for larger values of c0, e.g.
c0 ≥ 15.
A two-component mixture model is defined as
φ(x |Θ) = α1ρ1(x |θ1) +α2ρ2(x |θ2) (14)
for ρ1,ρ2 denoting static probability density functions with parameter sets θ1 and θ2 and where
α1 > 0 and α2 > 0 are the associated weight parameters that satisfy α1 + α2 = 1. The total
parameter set is denoted as Θ := {α1,θ1,α2,θ2}.
We decide for mixture models consisting of two normal distributions, referred to as Gaussian
Mixture Model (GMM) [18]. These are adjusted to the two clusters that represent the accusation
scores of innocent-fingerprints and colluder-fingerprints. The choice for a Gaussian mixture
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Figure 14: Example of a two-component mixture model consisting of two normal distributions.
model is assumed as sound. Already in [124] it was shown that by construction the Tardos codes
yield curves for the scores of innocent-fingerprints and for the scores of colluder-fingerprints,
that are assumed as normally distributed. Hence, the probability functions of equation (14) are
normal distributions ρr(x |θr) =N (x |µr ,σ2r ) with distribution parameters θr = {µr ,σ2r } for r ∈{1,2}. An example of a two-component mixture model consisting of two normal distributions
with φ(x) = 0.8N (x , 0, 1) +N (x , 3, 0.5) is depicted in figure 14.
EM for the Gaussian Mixture Model
The goal is to determine the parameter set, containing the mean and the variance for each
component. This is achieved applying the iterative Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm.
The EM is an approved method for finding a maximum-likelihood-estimator of the parameters
of a mixture model in case not all data is known [18], see the appendix J. Thereby we are
able to find a maximum likelihood estimator for the parameters of the mixture distribution that
represents the accusation scores. The construction is as follows:
1. Initialization: Estimate the first parameter set: Θ(0) = {α1,µ1,σ21,α2,µ2,σ22}.
2. Expectation step: In step k, calculate τ(k)1, j and τ
(k)
2, j for all j ∈ {1, ...,n} as
τ
(k)
r, j := φ(r|x j,Θ(k)) =
α(k)r N (x j|µ(k)r ,σ2,(k)r )∑2
i=1α
(k)
i N (x j|µ(k)i ,σ2,(k)i )
101
3. Maximization step: In step k, calculate the weight parameters α(k+1)r and α
(k+1)
2 , the
means µ(k+1)1 and µ
(k+1)
2 and the variances σ
2,(k+1)
1 and σ
2,(k+1)
2 as follows:
α(k+1)r =
1
n
n∑
j=1
τ
(k)
r, j
µ(k+1)r =
∑n
j=1 x jτ
(k)
r, j∑n
j=1τ
(k)
r, j
(15)
σ2,(k+1)r =
∑n
j=1
 
x j −µ(k+1)r
2
τ
(k)
r, j∑n
j=1τ
(k)
r, j
Update the parameter set Θ(k+1).
4. Abort criteria: Calculate the difference of the log-likelihood given by
lnφ(X |Θ) =
n∑
j=1
ln
 2∑
i=1
αiN (x j|µi,σ2i )

between Θ(k+1) and Θ(k). In case the difference is sufficient small the iteration can be
aborted.
Threshold determination
The parameter set Θ contains the estimated mean µ1 of the scores of the innocent-fingerprints,
now denoted as µinn, and the estimated mean µ2 of the scores of colluder-fingerprints, now
denoted as µC . Hence the accordingly estimated parameters σ
2
1 and σ
2
2 are matched to the
appropriate parameters for the variance of the innocent-fingerprints’ scores σ21 = σ
2
inn and of
the variance of colluder-fingerprints’ scores σ22 = σ
2
C . Note that, if applied in practice, these
parameters come from the actual case of collusion attack. This is contrary to a priori computed
expectation values, what is common sense in literature where the focus is on asymptotic (very
large collusions) behavior of the code, see our explanations in chapter 7.2.
The crucial task is to suffice the selected bounds on false positive and false negative error, "1
and "2. In literature, "2 is frequently set to 0.5, for reason of comparison, so it is here. Hence,
the primary idea is to establish the estimated mean µ2 = µC of the second component of the
mixture distribution as upper bound for the new dynamic threshold. Note that this choice of
a threshold is motivated by the choice of Škori´c et al. [121], where the probabilistic mean of
the estimated colluder-fingerprints’ scores was taken and this decision was followed ever after.
On the other side, the threshold ought to be larger than the highest score among the innocent-
fingerprints. Assuming a standard normal distribution an error of 1 is achieved at Erfinv(1−"1).
Mapped to the fingerprint construction analysis according to [121] this gives a lower bound for
the threshold at Ψ := Erfinv(1− "1) · p2 ·σinn + µinn. The corresponding proofs can be seen in
[121], where this has been widely studied. This means, if holds Ψ < µC , the threshold satisfying
"1 and "2 lies in the corresponding interval [Ψ, µC]. Results with the limits of this interval, i.e.
for Z = µC and Z = Ψ are presented in section 8.3.2. To suffice "1 and "2 any choice within this
interval is feasible. In practice, the distributor or copyright holder has the choice, for instance,
to select a ’conservative’ setting of the threshold (i.e. Z = µC) in order to be sure not to suspect
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Table 15: Results for false positive rate (FP) and average number of colluders caught (|C|) with
different threshold calculations Z (Z∗, GMM+, GMM−), four different score functions
and varying collusion sizes c while c0 = 15, 21 and 31 after an interleaving attack.
’Furon’ [75] ’Škoric´ ’ [121] ’Oosterwijk’ [86] ’Laarhoven’ [62]
c0 c Z FP |C | FP |C | FP |C | FP |C |
c0 = 15
c = 13
Z∗ 0 1 0.21 12.82 0.05 9.74 0.00 9.83
GMM− 0.32 13.00 0.22 12.82 2.17 13.00 0.34 13.00
GMM+ 0 6.16 0.00 6.38 0.05 7.51 0.00 6.47
c = 15
Z∗ 0 1 0.22 13.89 0.05 7.07 0.00 6.04
GMM− 0.24 15.00 0.23 13.88 2.20 14.98 0.34 14.99
GMM+ 0 7.44 0.00 7.08 0.13 8.87 0.00 7.47
c = 18
Z∗ 0 1 0.21 13.21 0.05 3.66 0.00 1.83
GMM− 0.28 17.76 0.21 13.11 2.29 17.66 0.36 17.73
GMM+ 0 9.08 0.02 7.80 0.37 11.18 0.00 8.95
c0 = 21
c = 18
Z∗ 0 1 0.24 17.70 0.01 14.15 0.00 14.37
GMM− 0.36 18.00 0.24 17.70 1.78 18.00 0.33 18.00
GMM+ 0 8.88 0.00 8.86 0.00 9.55 0.00 8.94
c = 21
Z∗ 0 1 0.23 19.06 0.01 10.11 0.00 8.99
GMM− 0.24 20.96 0.23 19.04 1.80 20.97 0.33 20.98
GMM+ 0 10.32 0.00 9.96 0.03 11.46 0.00 10.47
c = 24
Z∗ 0 1 0.23 18.43 0.01 6.22 0.00 4.09
GMM+ 0.52 23.68 0.23 18.32 1.84 23.72 0.33 23.79
GMM− 0 11.96 0.01 10.88 0.10 13.60 0.00 11.92
c0 = 31
c = 24
Z∗ 0 1 0.24 23.88 0.00 22.48 0.00 22.81
GMM− 0.40 24.00 0.24 23.88 1.22 24.00 0.32 24.00
GMM+ 0 12.20 0.00 11.92 0.00 11.69 0.00 11.93
c = 31
Z∗ 0 1 0.24 27.52 0.00 15.32 0.00 14.01
GMM− 0.20 31.00 0.24 27.46 1.23 30.95 0.31 30.97
GMM+ 0 15.28 0.00 14.85 0.00 15.72 0.00 15.43
c = 38
Z∗ 0 1 0.23 24.21 0.00 6.69 0.00 3.92
GMM− 0.28 37.16 0.22 23.79 1.29 36.90 0.32 37.03
GMM+ 0 19.60 0.05 16.93 0.03 20.25 0.00 18.82
any innocents. Or he could select an ’offensive’ setting (i.e. Z = Ψ), in order to catch as many
colluders as possible.
8.3.2 Evaluation
Setting the threshold applying mixture models solely requires the actual scores of the current
collusion attack. Its application does not depend on the digit model or on the alphabet size.
We tested our threshold calculation with the symmetric score function of Škori´c et al. [121] and
the interleaving score function of Oosterwijk et al. [86] we know from the afore chapters. In
addition, to prove the adaptivity we tested it against the score functions of Meerwald and Furon
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in [75] and Laarhoven in [62]5. We reason this choice by the eminent performance in practical
settings of the iterative single accusation score function proposed in [75], and by the asymptotic
optimality of the score function in [62]. Remember, the interleaving score function of [86] also
proves asymptotic optimality.
The results are depicted in table 15. The code length was set to m = 12,248, 22,912 and
47,556 for c0 = 15, 21 and 31 respectively. The number of fingerprints was set to n = 1,000.
For the error bounds we decided for "1 = 1/n and "2 = 1/2. We ran 10,000 attacks for the
symmetric score function [121] and for the interleaving score function [86] as well as for the
score function proposed in [62] and per selection of c, each with Interleaving attack, minority
vote and majority vote attack. Because they are very similar, only the results of the Interleaving
attack are depicted here. Results for the minority vote attack and minority vote attack are
provided in the appendix J. For several reasons – see below – the score function according to
[75] was tested only against a series of 25 attacks for each setting.
The notation is as follows: FP stands for the average number of occurrences of the event of a
false positive, i.e. an innocent that got accused. |C| denotes the average number of colluders
accused in every attempt. Hence, the error bounds are satisfied if holds FP≤ n"1 and |C|≥ c"2.
Z∗ refers to whether a threshold calculation according to [121] for the corresponding symmetric
score function in [121], or to a threshold calculation according to [55] for the interleaving
score function proposed in [86] and its counterpart recently published in [62]. Note that the
computational complexity is comparably large for the single iterative score function of [75] due
to the integrated estimation of the collusion attack. For a fair comparison to the other tested
score functions regarding computational complexity, we stopped after the first iteration and
accused the fingerprint with the highest score. That is why the false positive for Z∗ is always
zero and the number of colluders caught is always one. However, due to the discriminative
nature of this score function, application of the GMMs already proved well. We selected Ψ and
µC as lower and upper threshold for the GMM, i.e. GMM
− = Ψ and GMM+ = µC . As an
initial guess of the parameter set Θ(0) we considered the first component to be standard normal
distribution weighted with α1 = (n− c0)/n. The second component is therefore weighted with
α2 = 1−α1 and initialized with the maximal score to be the mean and with a variance of two.
This choice is reasoned by the large number of innocent-fingerprints’ scores represented by the
first component compared to the small number of colluder-fingerprints’ scores of the second
component. Thereby the initial guess is already aligned in the right direction.
The results achieved with mixture models show competitive ability compared to the thresholds
that are tailored to its scoring function. In some cases, the results for the interleaving score
function [86] fall behind, as we cannot satisfy the requested bound on "1. Observations show
that this is reasoned – for instance – by a skewness of the distribution of the scores. In cases for
which the distribution is no longer Gaussian, i.e. for which the higher moments deviate from
zero, the required error bounds might be hurt. A reasonable approach to manage this problem
would be to use mixture models of skew-normal distributions.
The false negative error rate (FN) is not listed in table 15 because the required upper bound
("2 = 0.5) was satisfied in all attacks and configurations for all tested decoders ("2 = 0.5).
However, with the ordinary threshold calculation Z∗ the FN rate was up to 0.14 (for c > c0) for
the score function proposed in [62] and stayed below 10−3 for the interleaving score function
[86], whereas the FN rate was zero in all parameter settings with GMM+ and GMM−. Hence,
5 This tests were conducted by means of the Matlab toolbox for Tardos codes provided by Teddy Furon http:
//people.rennes.inria.fr/Teddy.Furon/website/software.html
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solely considering the false negative error rate, the threshold calculation via mixture models
provides an improvement, while the other properties are roughly the same.
In summary, this approach allows application on any scoring function to separate innocents
from colluders. The approach is independent of the conducted attack and of the fingerprint
generation process. Moreover, the method does not need knowledge of the collusion strategy
or its size, making it a universal threshold calculation. The results in table 15 show, that com-
pared to ordinary threshold calculations especially tailored to the selected scoring functions,
this method shows slightly improved robustness against outliers. Especially in cases in which
the actual collusion size c differs from the maximum collusion size to be resistant against c0 that
was selected for the fingerprint generation, the threshold calculated via mixture models meets
the selected error bounds longer than with the other thresholds.
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8.4 Summary
We presented three approaches that optimize the error rates for the basis symmetric Tardos
scheme ([114] and [121]). As not all parameters can be optimized at the same time, the
different approaches all have their advantages and also their downsides.
The approach presented in section 8.1 employs a joint tracing algorithm following the idea
of [74]. For evaluation, our approach utilized the fingerprint generation according to [11]
described in chapter 7.2 and combines a single tracing step according to [121] and subsequently
an enhancement of the joint tracing algorithm by [74]. The result was published in [10].
The approach from section 8.2, presents an enhancement of our idea of a correlative fingerprint
generation from [11]. It introduces rank correlation coefficients into the fingerprint matrix that
results in a better separation of innocent-fingerprints and colluder-fingerprints. The approach
is based on our results in [71].
Our approach presented in section 8.3 proposes a universal dynamic threshold calculation ap-
plying mixture models. For instance, we are able to use the interleaving score function of [86]
that is announced as asymptotical (very large collusions) optimal without the need of having
knowledge about the attack strategy. The approach was published in [96].
False positive error bound: All approaches aim at reducing the false positive error rate, hence
all results show significant improvements compared to their predecessors in literature.
False negative error bound: The joint tracing approach, section 8.1, provides false negative
error rates that are far below the chosen upper bound "2.
The correlative fingerprint generation, section 8.2 keeps equal or slightly improved error
rates compared to to [121] at significantly improved false positive rates.
The dynamic threshold using mixture models, section 8.3 shows error rates that are often-
times (though only for smaller values of c0) higher than for the fixed threshold according
to the symmetric Tardos scheme [121]. The false negative rate is always close to the cho-
sen upper bound "2 which, with respect to the other (improved) parameters, mirrors the
high accuracy of the approach.
code length: The joint tracing algorithm is able to reduce the code length substantial, whether
compared to the joint tracing algorithm of [74] for smaller value of c0 or compared to
[121] for larger values.
The other two approaches presented in this chapter do not affect the code lengths per
se, they utilize the code length formula of the symmetric Tardos scheme by [121] or the
optimal parameter choice according to [64], which is described in the appendix A.
number of fingerprints: The number of fingerprints can be chosen almost arbitrary, whether
n= 100 or n≥ 100.000, the affect on the approaches stays negligible.
complexity: Compared to the single tracing of the symmetric Tardos scheme by [121], the joint
tracing approach proposed in section 8.1 provides an increased complexity. Compared
to other joint decoding approaches alike [74], the complexity is significantly decreased.
Hence, our approach allows joint decoding tracing also for larger values of c0 that other
joint tracing algorithms cannot handle.
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The other approaches proposed in this chapter also provide an increased complexity, be-
cause they also add mechanisms to the basis scheme of [121]. The amount of complexity
added to these approaches remains negligible.
maximum chosen collusion size: We mentioned that our joint decoding approach is able to
handle collusion sizes up to c0 = 30, where sizes of c0 = 10−12 is the practical maximum
for other joint tracing approaches, e.g. [74].
The enhanced correlative matrix generation approach handles arbitrary values for c0, best
results are attained for values larger than c0 ≥ 20.
The mixture model approach only works accurately for larger values of c0 > 15. This is
due to the statistical requirements on mixture models, demanding a certain number of
samples for a reliable fitting of the components against the samples, i.e. the accusation
scores. If the number for the second component (=c0) is too small it is not possible to fit
it against the curve of the colluder-fingerprints.
This chapter completes our elaborations on probabilistic fingerprinting codes. The major
achievements are presented in this chapter. The joint tracing algorithm is a general enhance-
ment of single tracing algorithms in case the complexity is not important. In practical settings
where single tracing algorithms do not suffice, the joint tracing algorithm adopts the colluder
tracing. The dynamic universal threshold calculation is not only independent of the score func-
tion but also independent of the attack strategy. This allows utilizing its improved threshold
calculation for any probabilistic fingerprinting scheme.
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9 Fingerprinting codes for database tracing
In this chapter we describe our approach to apply collusion secure fingerprinting schemes for
hash databases. The approach was published in [14]. To the best of our knowledge, our
concept is the first to combine fingerprinting and hash tables in order to trace unauthorized
re-distribution of databases. Hash table databases are inter alia used for blacklisting and
whitelisting, as discussed in chapter 3.7. Because of its potential for misuse of highly sensi-
ble data, e.g. hashes associated to child-pornographic material, distribution of hash tables is
very rare. The main administration is restricted to the different police departments (regional
and nationwide). A reliable method to discourage misuse and re-distribution of hash tables is
essential if you want to hand out these lists also to other parties, e.g. Internet providers or fire-
walls. These could benefit from the lists and detect illegal material and report its transmission
to the corresponding police entity.
Approaches to watermark databases were already published by [3], [104] and [68] focusing
on cryptographic hashes that do not allow any modification of the data. Other approaches that
individualize hash tables by adding a salt were published by [98] and [17].
Our approach utilizes dummy hashes as fingerprint symbols. To individualize a hash table, the
appropriate dummy hashes are blended into it. The blending process is the equivalent to the
embedding process for media watermarking scenarios.
9.1 Construction of a collusion secure hash table
Individualizing hash tables using collusion secure fingerprinting schemes promises a new
method satisfying the corresponding requirements regarding security, robustness and perfor-
mance. To do so, the following (fingerprinting) parameters have to be chosen.
n: The number of fingerprints, the number of individual hash tables respectively.
m: The code length, which represents the number of dummy hashes embedded into each hash
table.
c0: The maximum number of attackers\colluders the scheme promises resistance against.
"1: The upper bound on the false positive error rate, bounding the probability of accusing
innocents.
Fingerprint generation: Thereby the m×n fingerprint matrix X is generated. For our approach
we decided applying the fingerprint generation process according to [11]. The reason
for that the good compromise between code length and error probabilities. As it was
already presented in chapter 7.2, we will not recap it here. Note that all other fingerprint
generation processes would serve as well, as long as they suffice the chosen fingerprinting
parameters listed above.
Dummy hash creation: Next, before the embedding process starts, 2 × m dummy hashes are
generated once. These hashes can be built arbitrarily, the only requirement is an appropri-
ate fitting within the entries of the original hash table. This means, without the knowledge
of these dummies it must be impossible for attackers to detect them.
Attach fingerprint positions to dummy hashes: Each dummy hash di,α represents a (finger-
print) position i, i ∈ {1, ...,m} as well as its corresponding symbol α ∈ {0,1}. This
means, for every column i ∈ {1, ...,m} of the fingerprint matrix X there exists one
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Figure 15: Hashtable Individualization Scheme
dummy hash representing the symbol ’0’, denoted by di,0, and one dummy hash repre-
senting the symbol ’1’, namely di,1. Hence, a fingerprint of dummy hashes is represented
as X j = {d1,α, d2,α, ..., dm,α}.
Blending the dummy hashes: To individualize a hash database for user (or party) j, the
dummy hashes that correspond to the jth row of the matrix X, i.e. X j, are blended into
arbitrary positions in the hash database. The process is depicted in figure 15. The corre-
sponding hash table database is individualized and from now on denoted as H j.
This means, for example, for a fingerprint X j = (1,0,0,1, 0,1, ...), the corresponding dummy
hash set is {d1,1, d2,0, d3,0, d4,1, d5,0, d6,1, ...}. The entries are blended into the hash table to make
it the individualized hash table H j. For security reasons, the dummy hashes should be blended
uniformly distributed into the hash table and via random permutation. Otherwise a simple
cropping attack, see section 9.3 could remove the dummy hashes.
9.2 Detection and tracing
The security of the scheme is based on the list of dummy hashes and their correct allocation.
Only the holder of this list is able to reconstruct the correct message out of the hash table. Here,
the list represents the function of the secret key in media watermarking scenarios.
To build the manipulated fingerprint, we filter all dummy hash entries of the unauthorizedly
distributed hash table that can be found. To reconstruct the corresponding fingerprint, we
order the dummy hash values in the correct way as prescribed by the list. The resulting binary
code represents the fingerprint. In analogy to the other chapters it is also denoted as y .
With the reconstruction of y , the tracing operates in analogy to other tracing algorithms, for
example those presented in this thesis, chapters 4.5, 7.2, 7.4, 8.1, 8.3. Each position of the ma-
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nipulated fingerprint y is compared to each corresponding fingerprint position of all fingerprints
in matrix X in order to calculate the corresponding accusation scores. The only requirement on
the selection of the tracing algorithm is to match the selection of the fingerprint generation pro-
cess. For reasons of generality, we decided for the symmetric Tardos tracing algorithm according
to chapter 4.5. Finally, all users whose fingerprint scores exceed the predefined threshold Z are
considered to be part of the manipulation and output by the tracing algorithm.
9.3 Attack models
The attack models for the hash table fingerprinting scenario differ from the attacks presented
in chapter 4.6.
In order to conduct a collusion attack, the attackers compare their databases and find some
hash entries that do not appear in all colluders’ databases. These hashes obviously belong to
the number of dummy hashes utilized for the database individualization and therefore are called
detectable dummy hashes (DD-hashes) in the following. However, a serious number of dummy
hashes is not detected due to their appearance in each colluders’ database. These are called
undetected dummy hashes (UD-hashes). The union set of the original hashes and the UD-hashes
is denoted as intersection set. The mean number of UD-hashes corresponding to an arbitrary set
of c colluders is
|UD-hashes(c)|= 2Γ [
1
2 + c]p
piΓ [1+ c]
·m,
where Γ [z] :=
∫∞
0 e
−t tz−1d t represents the Euler Gamma Function, see [2]. The mean number
for DD-hashes is given by
|DD-hashes(c)|= m− |UD-hashes(c)| .
For example, in case of c0 = c = 10 colluders, 35% of the dummy hashes are undetectable. With
these 35%, sufficient information is provided for the detector to allow successfully tracing back
to the colluders.
All attack models are analyzed under the condition c ≤ c0 and based on the assumption that
each attacker contributes approximately equal parts to the attacked database. For the case
the attackers contribute unbalanced parts, the detector finds much easier at least one of the
malicious users. In the following we list some apparent attacks.
Intersection attack: For an intersection attack the colluders discard all DD-hashes and take
the intersection set of all their hashes for the attacked database. The security of the
proposed scheme then only relies on the undetected dummy hashes.
Cropping attack: To avoid being traced back, instead of relaying the whole database, for
this attack the colluders distribute only parts of it. In this work, the assumption is
taken that cropping the database reduces the number of UD-hashes proportionally to
the whole database. This means, in case the colluders select only 1/2 of the original
database (whether of the intersection set or of the union set of all colluders’ hashes) for
distribution, the number of UD-hashes would be reduced by the factor 1/2 as well.
Minority adding: In order to set the tracers on the wrong track, the colluders may also add
some of their DD-hashes to the distributed version.
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Figure 16: Leakage detection without access to the hash database
The case, where both, colluder a’s DD-hash da and colluder b’s DD-hash db are added to
the list to be distributed and in addition, da represents a ’0’ and db represents a ’1’ of the
same fingerprint position, this position is denoted as double position.
To avoid the possibility of double positions within the integrated fingerprint of the at-
tacked database, only (some of) the DD-hashes are added which appear in less than bc/2c
times in the colluder’s databases.
Majority adding: Refers to the attack that arbitrarily adds some of the DD-hashes which
appear in more than dc/2e times in the colluders’ databases. In this way the possibility of
a double position is avoided as well.
Full minority adding: In the full minority adding attack, the colluders add all DD-hashes to
the list to be distributed which appear less than bc/2c times in the colluders’ databases.
Full majority adding: For the full majority adding attack, the colluders simply add all DD-
hashes which occur more than dc/2e times.
9.4 Evaluation and discussion
To evaluate our concept we tested with different numbers of fingerprints n, different numbers of
colluders c0 = c and different number of dummy hashes m per individualized hashtable. Table
27 presents the resulting false positive errors FP, and the corresponding false negative errors
FN . Note that the scheme is independent of the number of hashes in the database.
Note that in a reduced hash table, for example, if only 1/2 of all entries are distributed, the
number of dummy hashes to be found, the fingerprint positions respectively, will be reduced
accordingly. The result is a discontinuous fingerprint for which the tracing algorithm needs to
be adjusted.
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Table 16: Comparison of Code length, false positive error (FP) and false negative error (FN) at
small c0
number of
attack strategy
hashtables
c0 dummy hashes FP FN
intersection
100 5 760 0 0
5000 5 854 0 0
1000 10 2672 0 0
5000 15 7679 0 0
cropping 1/2 100 5 568 0 0
cropping 1/4 100 5 760 35 · 10−6 0
cropping 1/2 5000 5 954 10−6 18.8%
cropping 1/4 5000 5 1908 0 8.6%
cropping 1/2 1000 10 2672 10−6 0
cropping 1/4 1000 10 5344 0 3.6%
cropping 1/2 5000 15 7679 0 0
cropping 1/4 5000 15 15358 0 3.3%
minority adding
100 5 760 10−6 0
5000 5 854 0 0
1000 10 2672 32 · 10−6 0
5000 15 7679 0 0
majority adding
100 5 760 0 0
5000 5 854 0 3.3%
1000 10 2672 38 · 10−6 0
5000 15 7679 0 0
A reduction of the error rates can be achieved easily by increasing the number of dummy hashes.
The higher the number of dummy hashes is set, the lower will become the error rates. Here
an appropriate trade-off between robustness against attacks and capability for adding hashes
needs to be found.
Other attacks such as mixture, mix and match, subset alteration and hash adding are not specified
in our evaluation, because the proposed code is resistant against these attacks by construction.
Following the example of blacklisting, the list consists of hashes associated to child-
pornographic content. It is leaked for crawler optimization purposes. The perpetrators do
not emit the hash database, but the hash comparison must be rendered on a server hosted from
the perpetrators. To trace back whose blacklist it is, the distributor uploads to the Internet those
dummy images that worked as templates to generate the dummy hashes. Thereby the crawler
searches for the uploaded dummy images starting from the uploading page. A report from the
crawler shows the set of those dummy images which are blended in the leaked database and
out of these the distributor is able to identify the perpetrator(s). Figure 16 depicts this scenario.
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9.5 Summary
This chapter presents a new method to apply fingerprinting codes in order to trace back leakage
of hash table databases. To the best of our knowledge this is the first of its kind. Individualiza-
tion of a hash table for different users is done on the fly by adding appropriate dummy hashes
to arbitrary positions of the existing hash database. Each of the dummy hashes represents one
bit-symbol of the fingerprint and is calculated only once in advance. The proposed code is
independent of the size of the hash database.
The concept suffices the following properties.
false positive error bound: The false positive error rate remaines far below the chosen rate "1,
even for a reduced hash table of only 1/4th of the original.
false negative error bound: Similar to the false positive error rate, the false negative error rate
remains very low. The dependency to the reduction of the hash table is yet visible (see
table 16).
code length: The number of dummy hashes is depending on the chosen fingerprinting scheme.
In general, contrary to most watermarking scenarios, the available payload is not chal-
lenging in this scenario.
number of fingerprints: Alike most Tardos Codes, the number of fingerprints has only minor
impact on the scheme.
complexity: Beside the typical efforts for the fingerprint generation process and the tracing
algorithm, the additional effort remains linear and therefore is negligible.
maximum chosen collusion size: Whether the chosen bound on the maximum collusion size to
be resistant against is small or comparably large, an appropriate fingerprinting scheme
can be found. However, we do not expect collusions larger than c0 = 15.
The proposed approach is a simple example to show the potential of fingerprinting codes for
hash table databases.
Indeed, there is room for more sophisticated approaches, adjusted to this application of
databases. For example, since the dummy hashes are not somehow connected to the sym-
bols of the fingerprints, the use of higher alphabets is capable to embed more information for
the same number of blended dummy hashes. However, this amount of more information also
induces yet a higher variety of different attack models.
The remaining challenge is the ability to crop the hash table and re-distribute only fractals of it.
In case cropping and re-distributing only a fractal is a realistic option for attackers, the selected
fingerprinting scheme and its parameter selection ought to be adjusted accordingly.
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10 Application scenarios supporting fingerprinting codes
In this chapter we describe the concepts enabled by collusion secure fingerprinting codes for
the scenarios described in chapter 3. Therefore we will rely on the different properties and
characteristics analyzed in chapter 4 and consider the requirements of the corresponding sce-
nario as described in chapter 5, in order to attach the fingerprinting scheme to the appropriate
application scenario.
This way we revert to the initial scenarios and attach fingerprinting codes to receive enhanced
scenarios. The enhancement is mainly restricted to the requirements regarding security that we
identified throughout this thesis.
To evaluate the results we take on the table(s) given in chapter 5. Based on the identified
requirements we show which of the fingerprinting schemes explained in chapters 6 through 9
suffice which requirements and thereby which application scenario. The tables in the following
sections specify if the corresponding requirement is satisfied with a ’Ø’. A ’−’ denotes the case
in which a requirement remains unrealized.
10.1 Fingerprinting codes for promotional application scenarios
The promotional application scenario presents a classical scenario for the application of water-
marks and fingerprinting schemes. To efficiently counter collusion security, the application of
fingerprinting schemes is essential. As summarized in table 4 of chapter 5 the required max-
imum expected collusion size c0 is comparably small. A collusion of more than two or three
participators is rather improbable.
The 2-secure fingerprinting scheme as well as the 3-secure fingerprinting scheme both intro-
duced in chapter 6 are optimized regarding error probabilities and complexity, at the same
time provide shortest code lengths. They suffice the requirements for the promotional appli-
cation scenario and are capable to build the bridge between theory of optimal codes and their
application in practice.
In addition, the ranking search approach presented in chapter 7.1 and further the combination
of the discrete fingerprint generation process, chapter 7.3 and the interleaving score function
tracing scheme with dynamic threshold presented in chapter 7.4 may assist in case the expected
number of colluders exceeds c0 > 3. The combination is easily possible as the one approach
represents a fingerprint generation process while the other represents a tracing algorithm and
they are developed in a way that they can be attuned to each other.
The following requirements are satisfied:
maximum expected collusion size c0: Our zero false positive 2-secure fingerprinting scheme
(chapter 6.1) is solely resistant against two colluders, analogously the 3-secure finger-
printing scheme (chapter 6.2) is resistant against three colluders. This suffices the
promotional application scenario as described in chapter 5.1. Otherwise the other two
approaches listed in table 17 (chapter 7.1 and the combination of 7.3 and 7.4) stand in
yet with limited possibilities.
number of fingerprints n: The 2-secure approach is limited in its numbers of fingerprints. It is
optimized for n≤ 1.000. For higher values of n, regarding the other parameters the other
approaches may serve better. The ranking search approach, if used as a proper tracing
algorithm, also shows its best results if n is likewise small. The effect for the other two
approaches listed in table 17 is negligible.
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Table 17: Fingerprinting solutions for the promotional application scenario
Promotional application scenario Fingerprinting scheme solutions
discrete distribution
Requirements on: 2-secure 3-secure ranking search
+ dynamic threshold
Max. expected collusion size c0 ≤ 2 ≤ 3 2-6 6-15
Number of fingerprints n (Ø) Ø (Ø) Ø
Code length m (M) Ø Ø (*) (*)
False positive error rate FP Ø Ø Ø Ø
False negative error rate FN Ø Ø Ø Ø
code length m: The selected code length depends on the available payload M provided by
the actual media cover. If m exceeds M , the fingerprinting scheme cannot be applied.
Also, in media watermarking scenarios it is recommended to embed the fingerprint sev-
eral times to increase robustness and security. Thus, the approach providing the shortest
code lengths is beneficial. The 2-secure approach provides the shortest code length of
(depending on the other parameters) less than m ≤ 100 bits. The 3-secure approach
and the ranking search approach provide similar short code lengths for c0 = 3 that are
around m ≈ 100 (also depending on the other parameters). The typical media covers in
the promotional application scenario are capable to embed fingerprints of these lengths.
However, in case of a choice for c0 larger than 3, the corresponding code lengths for the
ranking search approach and the discrete generation combined with the dynamic thresh-
old approach may exceed the available bounds for media cover with limited payload, for
example short audio tracks.
False positive error rate FP: The 2-secure approach provides a provable zero false positive
rate. Therefore its output is hardly contradictable. The 3-secure approach provided false
positive rates far below the required lower bound "1. The other two approaches also
provide error rates that stay below the lower bound "1, although, for some parameter
choices, they come very close to it.
False negative error rate FN : For this scenario we required at least a false negative error rate
of 0.5. All approaches are capable to suffice this requirement, in most cases they stay far
below this bound.
The ability of the fingerprinting schemes developed in this work to satisfy the identified re-
quirements for this scenario were documented in the corresponding evaluation sections. More
information regarding the evaluation is provided in the appendix, C, D, F and G.
10.2 Fingerprinting codes for online shops
The online shop scenario requires different adjusted fingerprinting schemes for the different
media covers and different requirements on the fingerprinting parameters. Table 4 in chapter
5.6 tells us that the maximum expected collusion size as well as the available payload is of
medium size whereas the number of fingerprints oftentimes is comparatively large.
We also found exceptions. We identified a small value for c0 only for Ebooks. Therefore, in
case the other parameters fit as well, the fingerprinting schemes suitable for the promotional
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Table 18: Fingerprinting codes for the online shop application scenario
Online shop scenario Fingerprinting scheme solutions
ranking correlative discrete dynamic joint
Requirements on:
search matrix generation threshold tracing
Max. expected collusion size c0 2-6 arbitrary 6-15 6-15 arbitrary
Number of fingerprints n - Ø Ø Ø Ø
Code length m (M) Ø - (Ø) (Ø) Ø
False positive error rate FP Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø
False negative error rate FN (Ø) (Ø) Ø Ø Ø
application scenario may also satisfy the requirements for Ebooks and can be applied without
compunction. However, the large number of fingerprints probably prevents from applying the
2-secure fingerprinting approach.
As already mentioned in chapter 5.6, we excluded the online shop distribution formats video
games and streaming media and sorted them into the general video game application scenario
as it better fits their requirements.
The other media types listed in the online shop scenario can be protected applying the following
approaches introduced in chapters 7 and 8.
• Ranking search approach, chapter 7.1
• Correlated fingerprint matrix generation for the continuous distribution, chapter 7.2
• Correlated fingerprint matrix generation for the discrete distribution, chapter 7.3
• Dynamic threshold approach, chapter 7.4
• Joint tracing approach, chapter 8.1
Table 18 depicts in how far the requirements for the online shop are satisfied by the approaches
listed above.
maximum expected collusion size c0: As the online shop requires collusion security against
collusions of medium sizes, the ranking search approach (applied as a sovereign tracing
algorithm) may suffer some challenges in case c0 exceeds 6. The approach of correlative
fingerprint matrix generation for continuous distributions is not affected by the choice of
c0. Its discrete version as well as the dynamic threshold approach provide suitable results
in a range of c0 ∈ {6, ..., 15}. The joint tracing algorithm may assist in case larger values
for c0 are demanded, but also for smaller values in case complexity is not an issue, the
joint tracing algorithm performs well.
number of fingerprints n: Because the required number of fingerprints was identified as large,
if the other parameters are selected appropriate for this scenario, the ranking search ap-
proach probably fails to act. Hence this approach is reduced to its function as a filter re-
ducing the complexity before subsequent tracing algorithms start. The other approaches
in table 18 are not noteworthy affected by the choice of n.
code length m: In case it suffices the choice of n, the ranking search approach provides compa-
rably short code lengths, as already mentioned in section 10.1. The approach providing a
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correlative generation for continuous distributions though significantly reducing the code
length compared to its predecessors (see chapter 7.2), it cannot keep up with the other
approaches of chapters 7 and 8.1. For this reason table 18 reflects a ’−’. The other three
approaches provide significantly reduced code lengths while fixing the other parameters.
As mentioned in the last section, the discrete generation approach can be combined with
e.g. one of the two tracing algorithms, dynamic threshold or joint tracing, to further re-
duce m. However, for the media covers that provide only small amount of payload, i.e.
music tracks and images, the corresponding fingerprints possibly remain too long for suc-
cessful embedding. For those media types the only chance of collusion security at all is to
revert to appropriate fingerprinting schemes from the promotional application scenario.
False positive error rate FP: All approaches are designed in order to reduce the false positive
error rate while the other parameters are at least fixed. All approaches stay below the
required lower bound "1 given the other parameters as required.
False negative error rate FN : For some parameters the false negative error rate in the ranking
search approach scratches along the lower bound "2. As we find the false negative error
not as important as the false positive error, table 18 depicts a ’Ø’ in brackets. The con-
tinuous generation approach focuses on reducing the code length and the false positive
error rate by inter alia calculating an adjusted threshold for isolating colluder-fingerprints
from innocent-fingerprints. This involves a slight increment of the false negative error
rate, sometimes exceeding "2 (in case of very specialized attacks as the mutual informa-
tion attack or the greedy attack both described in chapter 4.6). The same holds for the
discrete generation approach and the dynamic threshold for the same reason. However,
they are affected significantly less, so that the requirement on the false negative error rate
remains clearly fulfilled. The joint decoding approach provides a false negative error rate
that stays considerably below the demanded upper bound "2.
All in all we recommend the ranking search approach in case relatively small values of c0 (≤ 6)
are accepted or if the available payload prescribes a corresponding small value for c0. For
values of c0 between 6 and 15 the dynamic threshold approach or rather the combination of the
discrete distribution and the dynamic threshold approach are the fingerprinting schemes to be
preferred for the online shop scenario. For the case that the desired value for c0 is larger, the
joint tracing approach (e.g. combined with correlative fingerprint generation) can be selected
instead. Also for smaller choices of c0, the results can compete with the other approaches. Its
only downside is the increased complexity. As already mentioned in chapter 8.1 we further
improved the results by combining the joint tracing with the correlative fingerprint generation.
However, if the prescribed payload provided by the underlying watermarking basis prevents
from applying the just discussed approaches, the only chance to provide collusion security might
be the 2-secure approach or the 3-secure approach we suggest for the promotional application
scenario.
10.3 Fingerprinting solution for digital cinema
In chapter 5.3 we identified the requirements for the digital cinema application scenario. The
scenario strongly depends on the media cover and on the content, i.e. is the movie a large
blockbuster production for worldwide screening or is it a local independent movie production.
We committed ourselves to medium sized maximum expected collusion size c0 and available
payload M , which prescribes the code length m. The number of cinemas screening the movie,
i.e. the number of fingerprints, is assumed as large and the error rates are kept as in the other
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Table 19: Fingerprinting codes for the digital cinema application scenario
Digital cinema Fingerprinting scheme solutions
Requirements on: ranking search discrete generation dynamic threshold joint tracing
Max. collusion c0 2-6 6-15 6-15 arbitrary
No. of fingerprints n - Ø Ø Ø
Code length m (M) Ø Ø Ø Ø
False pos. error FP Ø Ø (Ø) Ø
False neg. error FN (Ø) Ø Ø Ø
scenarios for comparison reasons. This prescription regarding the fingerprinting parameters
leads to the following fingerprinting schemes.
• Ranking search approach, chapter 7.1
• Correlated fingerprint matrix generation for the discrete distribution, chapter 7.3
• Dynamic threshold approach, chapter 7.4
• Joint tracing approach, chapter 8.1
Only in case the number of screening cinemas, that is the number of fingerprints, is comparably
low, the Ranking search approach proposed in chapter 7.1 might be an option as well.
In table 19 we depict the validity for the digital cinema application scenario for the approaches
mentioned above. Due to the comparatively large payload and because we expect only medium
sized collusions, the requirements are clearly satisfied.
maximum expected collusion size c0: As unauthorized re-recording in cinemas is aroused by
(semi-) professional groups, acting in several places a movie is screened, a medium sized
value for c0 is recommended. Hence, the ranking search approach (applied as a sovereign
tracing algorithm), which can only be applied if the choice for c0 is relatively small, is only
fairly suitable for this scenario.
The correlated fingerprint matrix generation for the discrete distribution performs best
against medium sized collusions. This also holds for the approach providing the dynamic
threshold calculation. Both approaches are well suited to be combined, inducing a further
improvement of the scheme.
In case of a medium sized value for c0, the joint decoding approach is well suited.
number of fingerprints n: Similar to section 10.2, application of the ranking search approach
solely is reasonable in scenarios for which n is comparatively small.
The other approaches in table 19 are not (significantly) affected by the number of finger-
prints.
code length m: If possible to apply the ranking search approach, it provides best results re-
garding the code length.
The approach providing a correlative fingerprint generation using a discrete distribution
reduces the code lengths compared to its originating scheme. But the impact is relatively
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small. If combined with the dynamic threshold calculation, however, the resulting scheme
achieves significant reduction. That is because of the possibility to apply the interleaving
score function.
The joint tracing approach provides best results regarding the code length.
False positive error rate FP: All approaches listed in table 19 clearly fulfill the false positive
error rate. This is because we handled "1 as the crucial parameter to be satisfied. Also,
compared to the other application scenarios, the false positive error rate may become
loose for the digital application scenario.
False negative error rate FN : We already mentioned, that the ranking search approach (if ap-
plied as sovereign algorithm) for some parameter settings might exceed the bound on the
false positive error rate. For this reason, the Ø in table 19 is set in brackets. However, in
the digital cinema application scenario, most of these parameter settings do not occur.
As mentioned before, the approach providing a correlative fingerprint generation pro-
cess according to a discrete distribution as well as the approach introducing a dynamic
threshold for the tracing algorithm stay just below the required upper bound for "2.
The joint tracing algorithm achieves significantly low false negative error rates.
We showed that the requirements for the digital cinema application scenario are clearly satisfied
by the proposed fingerprinting schemes. Given a proper watermarking basis, the proposed
schemes are capable to provide reasonable indications of the cinemas where unauthorized re-
recording occurred.
10.4 Fingerprinting solution for boxed video games
Video games are a new scenario for the application of watermarking as we discussed in several
publications during the last three years ([12], [118], [13], [70]). From its beginning, in both,
our opinion but also in the opinion of all developers or publishers we talked to, collusion se-
curity is clearly required. In case a game should be protected by watermarking technology, the
appropriate fingerprinting scheme must be employed.
In chapter 5.4 we identified the requirements on the fingerprinting parameters c0, n as large.
The corresponding available payload M allows large code lengths m (table 4). This holds for
large boxed video game productions, for smaller productions, i.e. in the independent sector,
obviously smaller parameter values may suffice as well.
Our approaches proposed in chapter 8 suffice well these requirements, see table 20.
• joint tracing algorithm, chapter 8.1
• enhanced correlative fingerprint generation, chapter 8.2
• universal threshold using mixture models, chapter 8.3
They have in common, that they focus on larger expected collusion sizes and aim to reduce the
false positive error rate compared to predecessors. The approach for the correlative fingerprint
generation considers the generation of the fingerprints, while the other two approaches are
pure tracing algorithms. The joint decoding tracing algorithm works with, as the name says, a
joint accusation score function, i.e. uses tuplets of fingerprints to calculate the scores, whereas
the dynamic threshold approach considers an optimized and dynamic threshold calculation
independent of the attack strategy and the selected score function.
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Table 20: Fingerprinting codes for the boxed video game application scenario
Boxed video game scenario Fingerprinting scheme solutions
enhanced correlative
Requirements on: joint tracing
fingerprint generation
universal threshold
Max. expected collusion size c0 arbitrary >15 >15
Number of fingerprints n Ø Ø Ø
Code length m (M) Ø (Ø) (Ø)
False positive error rate FP Ø Ø Ø
False negative error rate FN Ø (Ø) Ø
Table 20 depicts the achieved results for the requirements of the boxed video game scenario.
Because of the huge amount of payload that allows comparably long code lengths, also the other
requirements can be satisfied by the proposed approaches. This is proven via huge testbeds
already presented in chapter 8, or in the appendix H, I and J.
maximum expected collusion size c0: As the game industry faces professional release groups
attacking their protection, there is high potential for large collusions. The joint tracing
approach is capable to resist large collusions, but can be applied for smaller c0 as well.
The enhanced correlative fingerprint generation as well as the approach proposing the
dynamic threshold calculation via mixture models may be applied for small values as
well, but show their excellence for value larger than c0 due to statistical properties.
number of fingerprints n: Large productions obviously target large customer bases, the cor-
responding number of fingerprints needed is large. All three approaches are capable to
handle large values > 1.000.000.
code length m: The joint tracing approach provides significantly reduced code lengths, suit-
able also for large c0. The other two approaches have no direct influence on the code
length, therefore the Ø is put in brackets. As both approaches optimize (almost all of) the
other parameters, a reduction in the code lengths is plausible for them as well.
False positive error rate FP: The video game community probably will not forgive an event
in which an innocent user is accused. As all approaches show a strongly reduced false
positive error rate, they suit this requirement as well.
False negative error rate FN : The false negative error rate for the joint tracing approach is
significantly below the selected upper bound "2. For the other approaches we decided
to additionally sum up the average number of colluder-fingerprints output by the cor-
responding tracing algorithm. This is because the false negative error rate was met at
all time. The received results lead to a false negative error rate smaller than with the
approaches in literature we compared to.
The approaches of chapter 8.2 and 8.3, i.e. the correlative fingerprint generation and the tracing
algorithm with dynamic threshold, have successfully been combined and tested. The results
can be seen in the appendix J. The joint tracing approach was also tested in combination to our
fingerprint generation approach presented in chapter 7.2, the results were already posted in 8.1
or in the appendix H. Its effect on the accusation scores turned out to be advantageous for the
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joint tracing approach compared to the other approaches in literature, as can be seen in tables
12 and 27.
Given an appropriate watermarking basis, application of the approaches promise to provide the
desired protection for the boxed video game application scenario.
10.5 Fingerprinting solution for hash table databases
Our approach for hash table fingerprinting presented in chapter 9 differs from the other ap-
proaches because no media watermarking basis is required to embed (and detect) the finger-
prints. Moreover, this scenario does not employ a new fingerprinting scheme but exemplarily
utilizes the scheme presented in chapter 7.2. Any other fingerprinting scheme can be applied
instead as well. Following the course of this chapter, we list the approaches presented in this
thesis that are appropriate to fit the requirements as identified in chapter 5.
• Ranking search approach, chapter 7.1
• Correlated fingerprint matrix generation for the continuous distribution, chapter 7.2
• Correlated fingerprint matrix generation for the discrete distribution, chapter 7.3
• Dynamic threshold approach, chapter 7.4
• Joint tracing algorithm, chapter 8.1
• Enhanced correlative fingerprint generation, chapter 8.2
• Universal threshold using mixture models, chapter 8.3
These are the approaches presented in chapter 7 and in chapter 8. The approaches in chapter 6
are not appropriate, because the identified value for c0 was set as medium. All other approaches
suit this requirement. The number of fingerprints remains comparably small, because the num-
ber of users or parties that are intended for an individualized hash table remains small. For this
reason, all approaches listed may serve well. The crucial limitations for fingerprinting codes in
general is the limited payload, i.e. the code length m. However, in this scenario the payload
is comparably large, hence it is no challenge for the presented approaches. We abstain from
posting a corresponding table, as all entries would be filled with a Ø anyway.
The hash table application scenario is an example for the employment of fingerprinting codes
apart from the media watermarking scenario. The fingerprinting schemes presented in chapter
7 and in chapter 8 are capable to provide the desired protection as identified in chapter 3.7 and
5.
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11 Open challenges and opportunities
In the course of our work on fingerprinting codes, we proposed solutions for several scenar-
ios in the media watermarking sector. In our opinion, some solutions promised concepts or
approaches worthwhile to proceed research. In this chapter we stress open challenges and
formulate required future prospects regarding the research of fingerprinting codes.
11.1 Toolbox containing all recent and state of the art fingerprinting codes
There exists a magnitude of different approaches for collusion secure fingerprinting codes. As
discussed in this thesis, many approaches that are optimal in theory lack of applicability in
practice, e.g. [121], [86]. Though, we argue that some of these approaches require only small
modifications or adjustment for a proper integration into practical applications. This holds
true for the approach we presented in chapter 7.4. It was based on the theoretical optimal
approach of [86]. Applying this approach requires knowledge of the – generally unknown –
collusion strategy. To enable application in practice, we modified the approach and abolished
the dependency of the collusion strategy.
There is a chance that for specific parameter settings (and) in some fringe scenarios, other
yet unconsidered approaches outreach those approaches of the main focus (which have proven
optimality from a general perspective). These unconsidered approaches have not found their
way into practice.
This emphasizes the goal of the last chapters: There does not exist one single best fingerprinting
code. Different scenarios enforce different fingerprinting codes, and the question to solve is,
which fingerprinting code suits best the current specific application scenario. To solve this
question, we suggest setting up a general junction library containing all fingerprinting codes
available and employing the corresponding algorithms in a comprehensive toolbox. The toolbox
ought to provide researchers and especially distributors of fingerprinting codes the possibility
to choose a parameter setting as input (available payload, collusion size to be resistant against,
error probabilities, etc.) and the output should be the corresponding optimal – in terms of best
suited – fingerprinting code.
A first approach in this direction was initiated by Teddy Furon and his group at Inria, France.
They provided a MATLAB-toolbox containing some of their fingerprinting codes as open source
download 6. Expanding this toolbox with (all the) other fingerprinting codes that are publicly
available appears as a reasonable starting point. On the downside is that, even though the
toolbox is open source, MATLAB per se is not. It requires acquisition of at least a basic license.
For the use of additional MATLAB-tools further licenses are required.
11.2 Higher alphabets for watermarking basis and fingerprinting codes
In order to reduce the code lengths of the fingerprints, many approaches utilize higher alpha-
bets. This means, more symbols admissible to select for a fingerprint position allows to embed
the same amount of information into fewer fingerprint positions, e.g. [121], [86], [8], [7].
In practice, fingerprinting codes using higher alphabets cannot evoke any advantage, because –
to the best of our knowledge – the watermark embedding requires downscaling the fingerprint
6 http://people.rennes.inria.fr/Teddy.Furon/website/software.html
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from higher alphabets to a binary again. This holds in particular for the watermarking algo-
rithms developed and provided at Fraunhofer SIT: The watermarking embedding algorithm
modifies the media cover to embed watermark information, see chapter 2.4. Modification is
done by changing pixels of an image or video or altering audio samples, or modifying the re-
spective frequency coefficients, or else. To embed a ’1’ or a ’0’ the relation of two groups of
pixels, samples, frequency coefficients, etc., of equal weight is changed into the one direction
or the other. In other words, the groups are modified in a way that the weight of the one group
is heavier than the weight of the other group by a distinct amount. This way, there are only two
states possible implying that the watermarking algorithm can only handle binary symbols. For
that reason we concentrated on binary fingerprinting codes.
A watermarking algorithm that is able to efficiently embed higher alphabets would allow apply-
ing fingerprinting codes with higher alphabets. The outcome would be a significantly reduced
fingerprint code length. However, remains in question, if the corresponding watermark mes-
sage to be embedded actually requires fewer space in (less modification of) the cover medium,
than what is required to embed the same amount of information with binary fingerprints and
by binary watermarking applications.
In the procedure of this thesis we developed an idea to embed fingerprints with higher alpha-
bets for audio files. The embedding algorithm used at Fraunhofer SIT operates on frequency
coefficients that have been transformed from sample values per audio frame. In lieu of creat-
ing the two groups of a certain approved number of frequency coefficients, we could build, for
instance, three groups of the same (number of) frequency coefficients. Three groups (instead
of two groups) implies more states of relation of the groups. More states of relation implies
more different symbols for one position, i.e. higher alphabets. The optimal way setting these
groups in relation to each other is an open question. Also the optimal parameter setting for the
embedding and detection is not found yet. We need to evaluate corresponding loss in robust-
ness and transparency using three groups instead of two. Developing a concept and evaluating
the benefit of higher alphabets for audio is an announced topic we plan to research in the near
future.
Further research is needed in the following positions:
Watermark embedding of higher alphabets: Is it possible to develop/employ watermarking al-
gorithms allowing the use of higher alphabets in an efficient way? To answer this question,
the watermarking embedding scheme requires reconsideration.
Handling of the different media types: As the watermarking basis depends on the cover media
(type), the question arouses, if embedding of higher alphabets is possible for all media
types or if there are some types better suited? We have described one way for employ-
ing higher alphabets for audio just above. If other media types are qualified for similar
methods remains in question.
Trade-off between code length and watermark complexity: Assuming watermark embedding
allows the use of higher alphabets. It is still questionable that the shorter code lengths
of the fingerprints, by means of higher alphabets, legitimates the corresponding increased
complexity of the watermark embedding process?
Testing against new attacks: We must not forget that attack strategies also benefit from higher
alphabets. Sophisticated (fingerprinting and watermarking) attacks that utilize the ad-
justed watermark embedding and detection have to be designed and evaluated. It is
essential that new attacks do not render application of higher alphabets useless.
123
11.3 Sophisticated collaboration of watermarking and fingerprinting technologies
Fingerprinting codes are applied in watermarking scenarios in order to provide collusion se-
curity. To further increment the level of collusion security, in lieu of continuing research of
fingerprinting codes alone, we suggest to focus on the interaction of the watermarking algo-
rithm and the fingerprinting code.
Watermarking has continuously been optimized regarding the trade off between transparency
and robustness (and capacity). By now – depending on the media type – watermarking achieves
a level of transparency and robustness (and capacity) that is satisfactory for most use cases.
Also, fingerprinting codes have continuously been optimized regarding optimality.
However, the respective optimization work proceeded independently from each other. Both
technologies per se might not offer further space for optimization. But, in our mind, focusing
on joint optimization work has the potential to pose new opportunities. That is, for instance, a
watermarking embedding algorithm that offers collusion security by certain embedding tactics,
or that is especially suited for fingerprint embedding. We already focused this idea in our
approach published in [15]. There, we posted a watermarking embedding algorithm for audio
files that uses properties of fingerprinting codes in order to provide collusion resistance. At
the same time, the algorithm provides properties regarding robustness and transparency equal
to the corresponding watermarking algorithm that is in economic use at Fraunhofer SIT. The
downside of the approach is the increased complexity that refuses from wide application in
practice.
11.4 Additional application scenarios for fingerprinting codes
Most research regarding fingerprinting codes was done against the background of media wa-
termarking. Some other scenarios, see chapter 3.1, such as medical group testing or IPP codes,
can also be found in literature. However the scenarios video game watermarking and hashtable
databases, which are discussed in this thesis, were initiated by our research group and so far no
other works are known. For a broad acceptance and application in practice, more work in this
scenarios is required.
Fingerprinting for videogames:
Our research group initiated video game watermarking as a new application scenario of media
watermarking [12], see chapter 3.6. We already published several watermarking algorithms
for different media types and formats that are contained in video games, e.g. regarding wa-
termarking 3D mesh models [118] or regarding DDS texture images [70]. Modifications of a
watermarking algorithm in use at Fraunhofer SIT can be applied for the sound/audio files con-
tained in games. However this field of research is only at its beginning. We find the general
possibility to apply fingerprinting codes reasoned by the huge payload that is potentially avail-
able, but apart from our work, no one has broached the issue of collusion security in games yet.
For the successful application of fingerprinting codes in video games more research is required
in the following positions:
Sound watermarking algorithms: In this comparably new topic the embedding and detecting
algorithms need adjustment for their especially use case. Some algorithms are first rough
approaches and far from being optimal. For the application of integrity of fingerprinting
codes in video games, the watermarking basis ought to be reliable and sound.
Fingerprinting codes for the individual media formats: In chapter 3.6 we stated to consider one
single payload per game, in lieu of several payloads due to the different media types
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contained in each game. To improve the security brought by fingerprinting codes, each
media type – especially those that are essential for the game play – ought to obtain an
individual and especially adjusted fingerprinting code.
Fingerprinting for databases:
Our approach presented in chapter 9 introduced fingerprinting codes as instrument of tracing
back hashtable databases. To the best of our knowledge, this is still a unicum. Improvement can
be achieved by adjusting proper fingerprinting codes to this scenario. However, the state of the
art is limited to fingerprinting hashtable databases. Expansion to databases in general promises
a wide application scenario.
Further research regarding fingerprinting for databases is necessary in the following positions:
Adjusting proper fingerprinting codes to this new scenario: As already mentioned in section
11.1, there might exist fingerprinting codes that with minor modifications offer appro-
priate properties and behavior. Also, we have to find out, if obsolete fingerprinting codes
could prove beneficial in this new scenario.
Database properties: In order to apply fingerprinting codes for ordinary databases, the interac-
tion of the properties of databases with the properties of fingerprinting codes need to be
considered.
Attack scenario: New application scenarios always initiate the threat of new attacks. Before
applying in practice, the potential attacks have to be considered. Resulting flaws in the
fingerprinting codes need to be corrected.
Apart from that, we insist upon searching for further scenarios, which require collusion security
and application of fingerprinting codes appears reasonably.
11.5 Combination of other security mechanisms and fingerprinting codes
In chapter 2 we already named other security mechanisms that can be combined with digital
watermarking. Most of theses mechanisms are also capable to be applied in combination with
collusion secure fingerprinting. For instance, robust hashing is already in use for video game
watermarking. There, the watermark (and fingerprint) information for one message is split into
several parts and spread over a sequence of files of same and different format, see chapters 3.6
and 5.4. Hence, detection of the correct message requires correctly ordering the detected mes-
sage parts which necessitates a technique ensuring that the corresponding files are recognized.
As attackers can easily manipulate meta data of the files and thereby harden the recognition,
a robust hash is less prone to manipulation and therefore is an appropriate technique to be
combined with fingerprinting codes. More information is to be found in our publication for a
robust 3D hash in [13].
Other security mechanisms, e.g. checksums and error correction codes are only limitedly ap-
plicable in combination with fingerprinting codes. Error correction codes are meant to resolve
errors that can occur during transmission (or by manipulation). This means, the detected mes-
sages and the corresponding fingerprint is searched for errors. However, after a collusion attack,
it is not clear in which direction the error needs to be corrected. As several watermark and fin-
gerprint messages together are responsible for the detected message, an altering of the detected
message by error correction codes not only does not provide any information regarding the at-
tackers, but worse, will definitively falsify the manipulated fingerprint and thus harden tracing
back.
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Similar for checksums, which are are meant to verify if the data has been altered. In a collusion
scenario, several originators are responsible for the considered manipulated media copy. This
automatically implies alteration of the media copy. However, in some scenarios, checksums
could be supposably applied together with fingerprinting codes. For example in case the water-
marking system is constructed as such, that it embeds individual watermark messages for the
fingerprint embedding and a fixed watermark message for other information, e.g. annotations
or integrity watermarks as well. It is to find out, if there is a reasonable application scenario
for this, or if the payload made available for the additional watermark information was better
employed for longer and more secure fingerprinting codes.
Digital rights management (DRM) methods are not conflicting with digital watermarking.
Therefore, application of fingerprinting codes in combination with DRM methods is possible.
We have to find out if there are any combinations of security mechanisms and fingerprinting
codes reasonable and possible. To the best of our knowledge, a combination with most mecha-
nisms is possible if watermarking per se is possible. Verification or confutation of this hypothesis
is open for future research.
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12 Summary and conclusions for future work
During the time of this thesis, the research of collusion secure fingerprinting codes gained an
all-time high and many approaches – especially for information theoretic optimal codes – were
published, many of those with a distinct impact on fingerprinting research, e.g. [86], [65], [55],
[62], [64], [123], [61], [40], [53], [54], [75], to name a few selected ones. Within our work,
we tried to involve the corresponding best approaches whenever possible and plausible, and we
evaluated our optimizations with regards to those approaches as well. The lot of findings we
attained are summed up in the following. Among the following four findings, the first two are
completed by this research. However, the third and fourth findings motivate for some further
research.
Discrepancy between theory and practice. Information theoretic optimal fingerprinting codes
are based on unrealistic assumptions and parameter settings. Their propositions rarely
hold true for application oriented fingerprinting with practical parameter settings. An
asymptotically large value for the number of colluders is particularly inappropriate, be-
cause of its impact on the code length. Absolute collusion security independent of the
collusion size is not possible. We classified the different application scenarios according to
its probable need for collusion resistance, i.e. its maximum collusion size to be resistant
against. The consequence is that we are not totally collusion secure but only to a distinct
number of attackers, differing for every application scenario and proposed solution.
There is no one fits it all solution. Fingerprinting codes are application dependent, different
applications demand different requirements and parameter settings. One solution that
appears as best possible approach for a setting, is not necessary the best approach for
a different setting. On the other hand this means, evaluating only a limited number of
settings, the claims regarding optimality have to be stated with caution. We identified re-
quirements for fingerprinting codes in several application scenarios with varying settings
and proposed different solutions tailored to these requirements. So far no solutions able
to satisfy all discussed scenarios have been found.
Practical fingerprinting codes still lack optimality. Probabilistic – asymptotically optimal – fin-
gerprinting codes have been optimized to the maximum. With respect to an infinite num-
ber of colluders, optimal fingerprint generation algorithms and (recently) optimal tracing
algorithms against the asymptotically best attack have been proposed. However, these
approaches cannot prove – or have not proved so far – optimality with respect to e.g.
practical limited collusion sizes. Neither did we prove optimality for those approaches.
Instead for some approaches we proposed adjustments and modifications to ensure the
targeted security level required for the respective application scenario. More efforts in
further research are needed to also prove optimality for practical parameter settings.
No more significant improvements in fingerprinting research. Following the history of finger-
printing codes, we expect that large steps of improvement will not occur any more.
Though much research has been done within the last three years, as already mentioned,
its impact on practical settings, especially regarding code length, is rather low. Instead,
significant improvements might be achieved in cooperation with the watermarking ba-
sis. As we exclusively focused on suitable fingerprinting codes for different application
scenarios, we missed out the potential of a stronger cooperation of watermarking and fin-
gerprinting in order to improve the possibilities of collusion security in practice. A focus
on this cooperation appears promising for further research.
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Within our examinations on the Tardos codes, we discovered that at several points within the
constructions, modifications could transform a theoretical powerful fingerprinting scheme into
a powerful scheme that can be applied in practice as well.
The developed algorithms are laid out for different application scenarios and different parame-
ter requirements. The algorithms we presented in this thesis are as follows:
Zero false positive 2-secure fingerprinting: The approach differs from the other schemes pre-
sented as it ensures not to accuse any innocents and because it does not belong to the
class of Tardos codes at all. Besides the guaranteed zero false positive error, the probabil-
ity of not accusing any of the attackers is very low as well. Because of this and particularly
because of the short code length provided – almost as short as ordinary transaction wa-
termark messages – it can be applied for all application scenarios we identified and thus
makes collusion security (against two attackers) practicable. The false negative error rate
strongly depends on the selected Hamming Distance interval and the attack strategy and
is therefore evaluated in empirical tests only. The strong statement of a zero false positive
error is analytically proven and also confirmed in empirical tests (chapter 6 and appendix
C).
Efficient and adaptable 3-secure fingerprinting: To be resistant against three attackers, we de-
veloped a simple structured fingerprinting scheme to be adjusted for the needs of appliers
easily. Moreover, the approach provides two different tracing strategies to be selected de-
pending on the (assumed) attack strategy and special tailored to it. Thereby we improved
the performance and achieved an adaptable scheme demanding low computational effort
compared to 3-secure approaches in literature. The manifold parameter settings prevent
from giving a single analytical proof, therefore the soundness of the approach is stated by
empirical tests (chapter 6.2 and appendix D).
Efficient fingerprinting (filter) tracing algorithm: The ranking search approach introduces a
ranking into the columns of the fingerprint matrix according to significant positions in
the manipulated fingerprint. Depending on the attack, the developed tracing algorithm
first searches for positive disclosures of potential colluders according to the introduced
ranking, before the (iterative) tracing algorithm applies a scoring function fed with the
ranking information to trace (more) colluders. Besides the analytical soundness (chapter
7.1), the results are stated in empirical evaluations.
Accuracy optimizing fingerprint generation (correlative continuous I, II/discrete): Another step
towards practical collusion security is achieved adjusting existing algorithms. We pro-
posed three approaches regarding optimizing the fingerprint generation. The idea is to
introduce correlations to the column generation, in order to reduce the number of outliers.
These are by chance unfavorably generated fingerprints that significantly differ from the
average. The correlated fingerprints result in a decreased standard deviation of the distri-
bution of accusation scores. Applying a corresponding adjusted threshold this is capable
to reduce the number of wrong accusations. We proposed the idea of the correlation first
for a continuous distribution function, due to empirical observations. Based on this we de-
veloped a sophisticated approach employing stochastic measurements. Also we proposed
the column correlation for a discrete distribution function. Analytical examinations that
correspond to the proofs and considerations in [121] (appendix E and I) and empirical
tests (chapters 7.2 and 8.2) confirm the improvements of the modifications in the finger-
print generation alone and in conjunctions with the corresponding tracing algorithms (see
below).
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Accuracy optimizing tracing algorithms adjusted to the optimized fingerprint generation:
Based on the results for the correlative fingerprint generation, we developed tracing
algorithms adjusted to those modifications. Therefore we investigated adjusted decision
thresholds special tailored to the corresponding generation process. The results are an-
alytically sound as they correspond to the corresponding adaptations of the fingerprint
generation (see above) and because they match the outcomes of the proofs of preliminary
works, [121], [86] and [55]. This is also stated in large test sets and evaluations (chapters
7.4 and 8.3 as well as appendix G and J).
Attack and accusation score function independent tracing algorithm using mixture models:
Because of the recent publications of various tracing algorithms with optimal score
functions in literature, we developed a tracing strategy that is independent of the col-
lusion attack, the collusion size, and also (in particular) of the selected score function.
We focused on the distribution of the scores and applied mixture models and expectation
maximization strategies to best estimate the colluder-fingerprints. Thereby we are able to
trace colluders more reliably especially in cases for which collusion strategy is unknown
and the actual collusion size differs significantly from the expected collusion size. Results
are presented for various accusation score functions and collusion sizes confirming the
soundness of the approach (chapter 8.3 and appendix J).
Efficient and adaptable joint tracing algorithm: In cases for which computational complexity is
negligible, joint tracing strategies are capable to improve the performance. That is, apply-
ing expectation maximization and log-likelihood scores for tuples of fingerprints result in
decreased error rates. Pruning fingerprints in the first step, our approach also reduces the
computational complexity compared to approaches in literature. Different test sets (chap-
ter 8.1 and appendix H) confirm the analytical results that correspond to the preliminary
approach of [74].
Fingerprinting codes for database tracing: Apart from the media watermarking application
scenarios, we also proposed solutions to employ collusion security for (hashtable)
databases. Blending dummy hashes into the hash tables of databases, we are able to
individualize hash tables for each accessor. The individual dummy hashes represent the
fingerprint positions clearly identifying the corresponding accessor. We investigated dif-
ferent scenario dependent attacks and tested them against our approach to prove its func-
tionality. We also tested possible collusion attacks from the classical media fingerprinting
scenario.
We developed a series of innovative collusion secure fingerprinting codes to be applied in con-
junction with digital watermarking. Our focus is on practicability and security in order to suit
the varying application scenarios we identified. Most approaches are analytically proven and
all are empirically evaluated.
If applied with the help of continuative security mechanisms, first and foremost with digi-
tal transaction watermarking, the proposed fingerprinting codes satisfy the requirements we
identified for the respective application scenarios. The different scenarios are supported with
fingerprinting codes specially tailored for the respective requirements, thereby building the
bridge between watermarking practice and theory of collusion secure codes. The results are
summarized in chapter 10.
Though we accomplished many challenges within our work on fingerprinting codes, some chal-
lenges remain open. In some application scenarios the challenge of collusion resistance against
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large collusions could not be solved. That is, application scenarios naturally providing very
limited watermarking payload for which the required high security level could not be ensured.
Besides, we acted on the strong assumption of a perfect watermarking basis, i.e. the watermark
message always is detected correctly. This assumption obviously does not mirror practical set-
tings. On the one hand, attackers can also perform media processing attacks in conjunction
with collusion attacks, thereby possibly inducing detection (bit) errors. The respective positions
in the manipulated fingerprint contains fraudulent information that tentatively raises the error
rates. On the other hand, comparing their media copies, attackers cannot receive fingerprint
symbols, but differing media information only. Consequently, the number of detectable posi-
tions for the collusion attack in most cases is smaller thus weakening their attack. Hence, for
application in practice the proposed solutions ought to be applied with respect to this imbal-
ance. In chapter 11 we listed further open challenges as well as corresponding concepts and
ideas.
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The appendix contains additional discussions, proofs and tests regarding the different ap-
proaches proposed in chapters 6 through 9. In addition we take on the explanations and
discussions about the fingerprint generation process and the stateless attacks from chapter 4.
A Optimal parameter selection for the symmetric Tardos scheme
The symmetric Tardos scheme described in chapter 4.5 requires the selection of the code length
m = dmc20 ln(1/"1) and the cutoff t = 1/(dt c0) for the fingerprint generation process. The
corresponding tracing algorithm requires a decision threshold Z = dzc0 ln(1/"1). This section
upgrades the selection of these parameters for the symmetric Tardos scheme according to the
approach recently published in [64].
Parameter Selection for the Continuous Bias Distribution
Tardos presented in his original scheme some fixed choices for the different parameters: Code
length m = 100c20dln(1/"1)e, threshold Z = 20c0dln(1/"1)e, and cutoff t = 1/(300c0) and
proved "1-soundness and (c0,"2)-completeness for "2 = "
c0/4
1 .
For a practical usage of collusion secure fingerprints, outputting innocent fingerprints (false
positive) is generally seen as worse than not detecting any colluder fingerprint at all (false
negative). The choice "2 = "
c0/4
1  "1 for c0 > 4 is therefore quite unfavorable. Increasing
"2, while keeping "1 fixed, the code length can be reduced [124]. Instead of this fixed ratio
between "1 and "2 we consider both error rates uncoupled. A quite common selection for "2 is
"2 = 1/2, while "1 is chosen comparably small, e.g. "1 = 10−6.
In [64] asymptotically tight security proofs for the arcsine-distribution and the symmetric score
function are published. These show that asymptotically it holds dm→ pi2/2. It is also presented
a prescription for the selection of dz and dt in order to minimize dm for concrete values of c0, "1
and "2. For the derived values, "1-soundness and (c0,"2)-completeness is proven.
In chapter 4.3 we already introduced the notation η = log("2)/ log("1) such that "2 = "
η
1 . This
allows to describe the size of "2 with respect to "1.
In [64] was proven "1-soundness and (c0,"2)-completeness for the case c0 ≥ 2 and "2 ≥ "1 (i.e.
η≤ 1) for the following set of parameters:
dm = 23.79, dz = 8.06, dt = 28.31.
In the asymptotic case of c0 →∞, the asymptotically tight parameters for "1-soundness and
(c0,"2)-completeness are:
m→ pi2
2
c20 ln(1/"1), Z → pic0 ln(1/"1), t → γ4 c
−4/3
0
with γ= ( 23pi)
2/3.
It was also presented the following equations that lead to a minimization of dm with "1-
soundness and (c0,"2)-completeness.
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Theorem 2 Let η = log("2)/ log("1), c0 be given, and let r, s, g be fixed, satisfying r ∈ (1/2,∞),
s ∈ (0,∞), g ∈ (0,2/pi). Define the function h−1 : (0,∞)→ (1/2,∞),h−1(x) = (ex −1− x)/x2
while the function h : (1/2,∞)→ (0,∞) denotes its inverse function so that ex ≤ 1+ x + λx2
for all x ≤ h(λ).
We define the following four conditions:
dα ≥
p
dt
h(r)pc0 (S1)
dz
dα
− rdm
d2α
≥ 1 (S2)
2− 4dt
pi
− h−1(s)sp
dt c0
≥ g (C1’)
gdm − dz ≥ η
√√ dt
s2c0
. (C2)
Then the optimal choice of dt , dα, and dz that minimizes dm and satisfying conditions (S1), (S2),
(C1’), (C2), is given by:
dt =

1
4
pi − 2g
√√(h−1(s)s)2
c0
+
16
pi

2
pi
− g

+
h−1(s)sp
c
2
dα =max
 pdt
h(r)pc0 ,
r
g
+
√√√ r
g
2
+
r
g
η
√√ dt
s2c0

dz =
gd2α + rη
r
dt
s2c0
gdα − r
dm =
η
Ç
dt
s2c + dz
g
(O4)
It was shown, that if the inequalities (S1), (S2), (C1’), (C2) are fulfilled, the scheme with the
corresponding parameters dm, dz, dt is "1-sound and (c0,"2)-complete. In order to minimize the
code length for given η and given c0, one has to find the triple (r, s, g) with r ∈ (1/2,∞),
s ∈ (0,∞), g ∈ (0,2/pi) that minimizes the right hand side of (O4) such that (S1), (S2), (C1’),
(C2) are fulfilled. This minimization problem can be solved by the Nelder-Mead simplex method
[67].
Figure 17 shows that the code length parameter dm converges fairly slowly towards pi
2/2 ≈
4.93. In practical scenarios, where c0 is comparably small, the code length parameter dm is
larger than pi2/2 for provable security. Table 21 depicts the computed values for c0 ≤ 8. If
the system has 10.000 fingerprints and the probability that any innocent fingerprint is output is
required to be below 1/1000, "1 has to be selected as "1 = 10−8. A secure fingerprinting scheme
that resists up to five colluders with a probability of a false negative error of "2 = 1/2 requires
a code length of at least m= 9.23 · 52 · ln(1/10−8)≈ 4250.57 bits.
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Figure 17: Minimal code length parameter dm at different collusion sizes for given error bounds
"1 = "2 (upper line) and "1 = 10−8,"2 = 1/2 (bottom line). Based on [88]
Table 21: Parameters dm, dz , dt for minimal code length for up to 8 colluder.
c0
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
dm 23.79 20.06 17.93 16.52 15.49 14.70 14.08
"1 = "2 dz 8.06 7.30 6.84 6.52 6.28 6.09 5.93
dt 28.30 28.93 29.56 30.15 30.71 31.23 31.72
"1 = 10−8,
"2 = 1/2
dm 11.16 10.21 9.63 9.23 8.93 8.70 8.51
dz 5.83 5.47 5.23 5.07 4.94 4.85 4.77
dt 26.65 28.47 29.94 31.20 32.31 33.31 34.22
Integral Code Lengths
The code length for the symmetric Tardos scheme is parameterized as m= dmc20 ln(1/"1). As one
might have noticed, m is not necessarily an integer as neither dm nor ln(1/"1) must be an integer.
But in practice an integral code length is required. Tardos solved this by setting the code length
to m= 100c20dln(1/"1)e [114]. But rounding up dm and ln(1/"1) might increase the code length
significantly. With the example above, but instead using m = d9.23e · 52 · dln(1/10−8)e = 4750
bits results to an 11.8% longer code. Hence, instead of rounding up the different factors,
rounding up the entire term would be a better choice: m = ddmc20 ln(1/"1)e. In that case the
code length increases at most 1 bit. However, the different security proofs in literature usually
use the code length m = dmc20 ln(1/"1). The security proofs for soundness and completeness
may not work any longer for m′ = dme. But Laarhoven and de Weger prove in [64], that if
(dm, dz, dt , dα, r, s, g) is a septuple satisfying conditions (S1), (S2), (C1’), (C2) giving the scheme
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parameters m = dmc20 ln(1/"1), Z = dzc0 ln(1/"1) and t = 1/(dt c0), then the scheme with
parameters
m′ = dme, Z ′ = Z + g
c0
(dme −m), t ′ = t
is also "1-sound and (c0,"2)-complete.
142
B Regarding the stateful attack strategies
This section expands the discussion about sophisticated collusion attacks on fingerprinting codes
that was initiated in chapter 4.6 and shows another stateful attack strategy.
As mentioned in chapter 4.6, a typical assumption in literature is the location independence of
the attack strategy. Due to definition 20, the stateless attack model does not depend on the index
i nor on the symbols for the other detectable positions or the selected output for other positions.
This section extends the discussion about these type of attacks. It explaines the Greedy attack of
chapter 4.6 in more detail and presents another attack belonging to this class, that is, however,
not realistic in real world scenarios, see below.
As the colluders do not know fingerprint messages of innocent users, they cannot raise a specific
innocent’s score to increase his chance to get accused. Instead, they aim to stay undetected by
trying to lower their own accusation scores. They succeed, if all colluders get an accusation
score lower than the threshold Z .
However, in the real world the colluders are not restricted to this assumption. Instead they
can apply attack strategies for which each symbol is chosen also with respect to the symbols
observed on all other detectable positions.
According to Definition 21, the colluders may use the information about the symbols yk, k =
1, ...,m taken for the other positions k 6= i as well for the selection of the symbol yi, instead of
being restricted to location dependent attack models.
To generalize this observation, the subsequent definitions and statements are needed. Define
the accusation score as S j = S′j + S′′j , with the score from the non-detectable positions denoted
as S′j and S′′j as the score from the detectable positions. The value S′j is equal for all colluders
and cannot be changed due to the marking assumption, see section 4.4. Hence, the optimal
attack strategy to avoid getting accused can be defined as in Definition 22.
According to Definition 22: An attack strategy is referred to as optimal, if it outputs a manipulated
fingerprint y∗ for a collusion C with arbitrary j ∈ C , that minimizes the probability that the largest
colluders’ accusation score exceeds the threshold Z .
Pr[Smax > Z] = Pr[S
′′
max > Z − S′j]
As pi is unknown to the colluders, they cannot compute S
′′
max exactly. However, using the
maximum-likelihood method, the colluders may guess each pi from their observed symbols. Let
bi denote the number of observed 1’s at position i. The maximum-likelihood method results to
the estimation pˆi = bi/c and
Sˆ′′j =
∑
i detectable
g(X j,i, yi, pˆi).
The value
yˆ∗ = argmin
y
(max
j∈C Sˆ
′′
j )
appears to be a reasonable candidate to minimize E[S′′max]. The subsequent paragraphs describe
two heuristics following the stateful attack model that efficiently find good approximations of
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yˆ∗, and thereby optimal strategies that are to some extend superior to the attack strategies of
the stateless attack model.
• Greedy Attack: The first heuristic to find yˆ∗ = argminy(max j∈C Sˆ′′j ) is based on a greedy
approach. Each position is selected consecutively with the symbol that increases the max-
imal colluder score the least. In the final step, an evolutionary approach is used to further
minimize Sˆ′′max.
1. Initialization: Let C = { j1, ..., jc} denote a coalition of size c with corresponding
fingerprints X j1 , ...,X jc . For simplicity we assume that we have d detectable positions
with corresponding indices D = {1, ..., d}. For each i ∈ D, compute pˆi = bi/c, with
bi =
∑
j∈C X j,i the number of observed 1s.
2. Loop: For each k = 1, ..., d, do:
– Set yk = 0 and compute ζ0 =max j∈C
∑k
i=1 g(X j,i, yi, pˆi)
– Set yk = 1 and compute ζ1 =max j∈C
∑k
i=1 g(X j,i, yi, pˆi)
– If ζ0 < ζ1, then set yk = 0. If ζ0 > ζ1, set yk = 1. If ζ0 = ζ1, choose yk uniformly
at random.
3. Finalization: The final step loops through all indices in a random order. If a bit-flip
reduces the value Sˆ′′max = max j∈C
∑d
i=1 g(X j,i, yi, pˆi), the corresponding position yi
will be updated. This finalization step terminates when no bit-flip will further reduce
Sˆ′′max. The forged fingerprint y will be returned.
• Combinatorial Attack:
1. Initialization: Let C = { j1, ..., jc} denote a coalition of size c with corresponding
fingerprints X j1 , ...,X jc . For simplicity we assume that we have d detectable positions
with corresponding indices D = {1, ..., d}. Initialize U = ;.
2. Find complements: For each k = 1, ..., d and k /∈ U do:
– For l = k+1, ..., d and l /∈ U check if column l is a complement of column k, i.e.
X j,k 6= X j,l for all j ∈ C . If so, set yk = yl uniformly at random and add k, l to
the set U .
3. Find identical columns: For each k = 1, ..., d and k /∈ U do:
– For l = k+1, ..., d and l /∈ U check if column l and k are identical, i.e. X j,k = X j,l
for all j ∈ C . If so, set yk uniformly at random and set yl 6= yk. Add k, l to the
set U .
4. Finalization: For the remaining indices i ∈ D\U , use the greedy attack strategy from
above to finish generating y .
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This heuristic uses the symmetry of the score function. That is for example: Assuming the
colluders observe the following symbols on two positions i1 and i2:
1 0
0 1
0 1
1 0
0 1

Thus pˆi1 = 2/5 and pˆi2 = 3/5. By setting yi1 = yi2 , it holds g(X j,i1 , yi1 , pˆi1)+ g(X j,i2 , yi2 , pˆi2) = 0
for all colluders j ∈ C . Therefore, when assign these two positions in such a way, the value Sˆ′′max
remains the same.
The same applies to two identical columns, i.e. X j,k = X j,l for k 6= l and all j ∈ C . To find
yˆ∗, the following attack applies these two rules to find pairs of complementary and identical
columns. The previously described Greedy attack is used for the remaining positions where no
such match can be found.
For small collusion sizes, many matching columns can be found. Considering the actual pi
values, the probability that pi1 ≈ pi2 is the highest if pˆi1 = pˆi2 and pi1 ≈ 1− pi2 is the highest
for pˆi1 = 1− pˆi2 . Therefore, applying the Combinatorial attack strategy, it is expected that such
pairs increase the sum S′′max only marginal.
Note that in the real world, the attackers don’t know the actual symbols. However, for wa-
termarking schemes that embed binary watermarks position-wise there will be two groups of
colluders for each position, the one with embedded a ’1’ the other with embedded a ’0’. This
means, colluders from the one group have other media values than colluders from the other, and
throughout the whole media file and fingerprint, these constellation of groups and its inverse
constellation are likely to occur.
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C Regarding the 2-secure fingerprinting scheme
This section contains the analytical proofs that lead to the zero-false positive error rate of the
2-secure fingerprinting approach presented in chapter 6.1.
In general probabilistic fingerprinting schemes we have to consider two kinds of errors, the false
positive (FP) error and the false negative (FN) error, as elaborated in chapter 3. However, as
already mentioned, this approach of a 2-secure fingerprinting scheme is not typical for prob-
abilistic code as it provides a provable FP of zero. In other words, it will not occur that the
scheme accuses an innocent-fingerprint to have partaken in the collusion.
On the other side, there does exist the probability that the scheme arouses a FN, i.e. it is not
able to accuse any colluder at all. Note that since the FP is zero, the FN is equal to not being
able to accuse anyone (colluders-fingerprint or innocents-fingerprint) at all. To find out about
the amount of FN, more precisely, to find the appropriate upper bound "2 on the probability
of a FN, we have to consider every possible disadvantageous combination of how the colluder-
fingerprints look like, and which attacked fingerprint y they possibly can create.
According to the marking assumption described in chapter 4.4, the colluders are only able to
change positions in which their fingerprints differ from each other. Thus, the fingerprint y can
be divided into undetectable positions and detectable positions. In figure 18 these parts are
denoted as region B and region A respectively. Here the colluders are denoted as C1 and C2, u1
denotes an innocent-fingerprint that has a very disadvantageous constellation. This means its
Hamming Distance to y is very small.
c
1 
:
c
2 
:
y :
u1 :
4,31cm
HDmin-HDc
10,05cmHDc
10cmregion B13,5cmregion A
1 1...1 1 0 0...0 0 
0 0...0 0 1 1...1 1 
1 1...1 1 1 1...1 1 
1 1...1 1 1 1...1 1 
2
Figure 18: Example for a disadvantageous constellation of 2-secure fingerprints, for which an
innocent-fingerprint looks very similar to the manipulated fingerprint y
C.1 The false positive error
In the example of Figure 18 the Hamming Distance of the two colluder-fingerprints
HD(XC1 ,XC2) is exactly HDmax. This obviously is the most disadvantageous constellation for
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the content distributor, because the number of detectable positions is the highest possible, and
thereby the colluders have the opportunity for the strongest possible collusion attack.
Therefore, let us assume the colluders create the manipulated fingerprint y in a way, that the
detected positions show up the same to both. For simplicity we assume they create region
B consisting of only ’1’s. Their Hamming Distances to y thus will be exactly 12 HDmax. Now
there exists a probability that an innocent-fingerprint looks alike u1 in Figure 18, where u1
only differs from y in the white part of region A. This fingerprint’s Hamming Distance to y
is located as HDmin − HDc/2, where HDc denotes the actual Hamming Distance between the
two colluder-fingerprints. In case there is no appropriate tracing algorithm but only Hamming
Distance measurement for the accusation decision, this innocent-fingerprint would get accused
misleadingly.
In order to avoid false accusations, we have to consider the set G1 and G2:
G1 :=

X j; HD(X j, y)≤ 12HDmax ∀ j ∈ {1, ...,n}
	
G2 :=

X j;
1
2
HDmax < HD(X j, y)≤ 34HDmax ∀ j ∈ {1, ...,n}
	
We want G1 and G2 to count as many fingerprints as necessary in such a way that if there is
only one colluder-fingerprint appearing in G1 ∪ G2, this fingerprint always has the minimum
Hamming Distance to y .
Therefore, we need the following two Lemmas.
Lemma 1 If the Hamming Distance between two colluder-fingerprints is smaller than or equal to
HDmax, then at least one colluder-fingerprint is sorted into G1.
HD(XC1 ,XC2)≤ HDmax ⇒ G1 ∩ {XC1 ,XC2} 6= ; (16)
.
Lemma 2 If exactly one colluder-fingerprint belongs to G1 ∪ G2, then the Hamming Distance of
this colluder-fingerprint to y is smaller than every other fingerprints’ Hamming Distance to y .
∃XCk ∈ {XC1 ,XC2} : XCk /∈ G1 ∪ G2 ⇒ ∃XCl 6=k : HD(XCl , y)< HD(X j, y) ∀ j ∈ {1, ...,n} (17)
.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Because for all possible pairs of fingerprints (X j,X j′), j 6= j′, contained in X it holds
HD(X j,X j′) ≤ HDmax, see Definition 23. Thus it also holds for the colluder-fingerprints (the
left side of equation (16) is always true). For one index k ∈ {1,2} it must hold HD(XCk , y) ≤
0.5 HDc. Consequently, the Hamming Distance of this colluder-fingerprint must be smaller than
(or equal to) 0.5 HDmax, thus it is automatically sorted into G1. 
Proof of Lemma 2:
Let λ1 and λ2 be the parts of y (more precisely of region B) solely contributed by XC1 and XC2 ,
respectively, i.e. the part where XC1 and XC2 differ from each other. Thus it holds λk ∈ [0,1]
and λ1 +λ2 = 1.
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The left side of equation (17) means that there is one colluder-fingerprint not sorted into G1∪G2.
Thereby without loss of generality and with the definition of G2 we assume it is XC2 . Thus it
holds HD(XC2 , y) >
3
4HDmax. Consequently λ2HDc >
3
4HDmax ≥ 34HDc which means λ2 > 34 and
thus λ1 <
1
4 . Hence it holds
HD(XC1 , y) = λ1HDc <
1
4HDc (18)
Thereby we induce a reductio ad absurdum (proof by contradiction). Let us assume without loss
of generality:
∃X j, j ∈ {1, ...,n}, j 6= Ck : HD(X j, y)< HD(XC1 , y) (19)
We consider three different cases:
1. y and X j differ only in region A.
2. y and X j differ only in region B.
3. y and X j differ in both region A and region B.
For simplicity we write the parts of the fingerprint in which X j differs from y as λ jHDc with
λ j < λ1. Thereby HD(X j, y)< HD(XC1 , y) is ensured.
Proof of 1.: From the condition in 1. it follows
HD(X j,XC1) = λ jHDc +λ1HDc < 2λ1HDc < 2 · 14HDc =
1
2
HDc ≤ 12HDmax (20)
The Hamming Distance condition from definition 23 in chapter 6.1 prescribes that the Hamming
Distance between two feasible fingerprints of X is at least HDmin. But the same condition also
prescribes 12HDmax < HDmin. Thus we have a contradiction meaning that for this case there
cannot exist an innocent-fingerprint X j with a Hamming Distance to y smaller than XC1 .
Proof of 2.: From the condition in 2. it follows
HD(X j,XC1) = λ jHDc +λ1HDc < 2λ1HDc < 2 · 14HDc =
1
2
HDc ≤ 12HDmax
This is equal to equation (20), the only difference in this case is that both parts representing
the Hamming Distance to y , i.e. λ jHDc and λ1HDc, may overlap. However, this means their
distance to each other decreases and therefore (20) holds as well. Consequently, we get the
same contradiction as above saying that there cannot be an innocent-fingerprint X j with a
Hamming Distance to y smaller than XC1 .
Proof of 3.: Let a be the part of region A in which X j and y differ and let b be the corresponding
part of region B. Thus it holds a+ b = λ jHDc. In analogy to (20):
HD(X j,XC1) = a+λ1HDc + b = (λ1 +λ j)HDc < 2 · 14HDc ≤
1
2
HDmax
Again, the case for which b and λ1HDc overlap would even decrease HD(X j,XC1). Thus, there
is a contradiction also for this case.
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In summary, due to the contradictions above, the assumption HD(X j, y) < HD(XC1 , y) must be
wrong and Lemma 2 holds true. 
This allows us to prove theorem 1 from chapter 6.1 or equivalent:
Theorem 3 1. If there is associated exactly one pair of fingerprints as possible colluder pair,
and at the same time there is no fingerprint with a Hamming Distance to y smaller than
1
4HDmax, this possible colluder pair is the colluder-fingerprints.
2. If there is associated more than one pair of fingerprints as possible colluder pair and one
fingerprint appears in all possible colluder pairs and at the same time there is no different
fingerprint with a Hamming Distance to y smaller than 14HDmax, this fingerprint is a colluder-
fingerprint.
3. If no pair of fingerprints is assigned as possible colluder pair, the fingerprint with the mini-
mum Hamming Distance to y is a colluder fingerprint.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 From equation (18) from the proof of lemma 2 it follows, that if one
colluder-fingerprint was not sorted into G1 ∪ G2, the other colluder-fingerprint must have
a Hamming Distance to y smaller than 14HDmax. Thus the corresponding condition in
theorem 3.1 automatically ensures that both colluder-fingerprints must appear in G1∪G2.
Together with lemma 1 (one colluder-fingerprint must appear in G1) this means the one
found possible colluder pair is the colluder-fingerprints. 
Proof of Theorem 3.2 In analogy to the proof of 3.1, if no fingerprint has a Hamming Distance
to y smaller than 14HDmax, the colluder-fingerprints are found as a possible colluder pair.
In case there are several pairs of fingerprints identified as possible colluder pairs, the
one fingerprint that appears in all those pairs obviously appears as well in the pair of
colluder-fingerprints and thus must be one of the colluder-fingerprints. 
Proof of Theorem 3.3 This follows directly from Lemma 2. If there is not found a possible
colluder pair, one of the two colluders does not appear in G1 ∪ G2, hence the fingerprint
with the minimum Hamming Distance to y is a colluder-fingerprint. 
From theorem 3 we can directly reason the following corollaries:
Corollary 2 If there is associated exactly one pair of fingerprints as possible colluder pair, and at
the same time one fingerprint of this pair has the minimum Hamming Distance to y , this fingerprint
is a colluder-fingerprint.
Corollary 3 If there is only one colluder-fingerprint within G1 ∪ G2, he is closest to y , and thus,
only this colluder can get accused.
Otherwise, the searching algorithm sorts out the combinations of innocent-fingerprints that
come into consideration.
From this follows that the set of fingerprints to be considered for parent pair search does
not need to contain more suspects than claimed for G1 ∪ G2. In the case HD(XCk , y) ≈
HDc/2 for k ∈ {1,2} both colluders are within. If one colluder-fingerprint shows up to y
less than the other, he might fall out of G1 ∪ G2, but the other’s chance to be caught increases
decisively.
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Table 22: False negative error in different settings
fingerprints n code length m "strategy" FP FN (straight) FN (pair search)
102 50
0.1 0 0.0004 0.0004
0.3 0 0.0014 0.0014
0.4 0 0.0081 0.0051
0.5 0 0.0482 0.0117
103 100
0.01 0 0 0
0.1 0 0 0
0.3 0 0 0
0.4 0 0 0
0.5 0 0.0015 0
103 130
0.01 0 0 0
0.1 0 0 0
0.3 0 0 0
0.4 0 0 0
0.5 0 0 0
The parent pair searching algorithm then sifts the responsible fingerprints. Due to the prescribed
Hamming Distances this searching algorithm finds out the one combination which has been
necessary to create y . If there are more possible combinations found and the algorithm cannot
assign a definite responsible, no one gets accused. Therefore see about the false negative error
rate discussed below. It is not possible to accuse an innocent pair. Hence the false positive error
rate is zero.
C.2 The false negative error
Since we propose a scheme strongly avoiding false positives, i.e. wrong accusations, we have to
consider the probability that the scheme is not able to accuse anyone at all, i.e. the probability
for the false negative error (FN).
Note that for the cases in which the part from one colluder-fingerprint erratically exceeds the
one from the other, so that the second is not considered anymore in G1 or G2, the false negative
error rate is zero. This is because these cases – that will be associated to theorem 3.3 – fall
out of any calculations, as one (colluder-)fingerprint is always suspected. Results of attacks in
which the colluders do not partake equally are depicted in table 22.
Hence, the focus is on cases in which the colluders partake approximately equally in the creation
of y . These correspond to the results with a strategy of 0.5, mirroring that each colluder-
fingerprint contributes 1/2. A false negative error occurs, if we cannot accuse one possible
colluder pair because there are at least two disjoint possible colluder pairs found.
In practice, a relaxation of the tracing algorithm is capable to further improve the results for the
false negative error rate. In the cases where the group G1 contains only two fingerprints and
these two are as well the only possible colluder pair found, directly outputting these two further
reduces the events of false negative error significantly. At the same time we still meet the zero
false positive error rate. However, an analytical proof that the false positive error remains zero
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Table 23: False negative error in Nuida’s setting [79], both colluders participating equally (0.5)
fingerprints n code length m "strategy" FP FN (straight) FN (pair search)
102
61 0.5 0 0.0018 0 (1)
71 0.5 0 0.0044 0.0002
91 0.5 0 0.0004 0
103
74 0.5 0 0.033 0.0021
83 0.5 0 0.011 0.0005
93 0.5 0 0.0044 0.0001
102 0.5 0 0.0021 0.0001
at any time is not found yet. The results for the false negative error can be seen in table 22.
Those for the relaxation of the tracing algorithm are referred to as FN (parent pair) compared
to those for the straight version as described in chapter 6.1 denoted as FN (straight).
Besides the further reduced false negative error rates for the relaxed version of the tracing
algorithm, we also depict results with extremely short fingerprinting codes with lengths of 50
bits for a code of 100 fingerprints. As far as we know there are no comparable short code length
providing collusion security.
For reasons of comparison, table 23 again shows the results for Nuida’s setting [79] already
depicted in chapter 6.1, but now also with the relaxed version as described above.
C.3 Error probabilities for collusions larger than two
In practice, the question might arise about what happens in case there are three (or more) cus-
tomers collaborating to create the forgery with the manipulated fingerprint y . For the Tardos
codes [114] and its derivatives including the other approaches presented in this thesis a col-
lusion larger than the maximum expected collusion size c0 has only minor effect on the false
positive error rate. The major effect it has on the false negative error rate. This is acceptable,
because not being able to find any colluder is to be preferred over accusing an innocent. The 2-
secure fingerprinting approach presented in chapter 6.1 provides similar results, although, it is
not at all belonging to the class of Tardos codes. For the same test sets as mentioned above, but
with actual collusion sizes of c =3, 4, 5 we still never accused any innocent fingerprint (FP=0).
However, the false negative error rate was significantly increased. The highest false negative
error rate in each case was received with a collusion "strategy" of 0.5 (colluders partake equally
in the forgery) with a rate close to 1.0, i.e. in almost all attacks no fingerprint was output by the
tracing algorithm. We find two reasons for this behavior: First, for the Tardos codes, the opti-
mal functions g1 and g2 to create the accusation score, see chapter 4.5, for a collusion of two
(c0 = 2) are indeed represented by the Hamming Distance as proven in [103]. For this reason
our 2-secure fingerprinting approach, for which the Hamming Distance is taken as some kind
of scoring function as well, behaves similar to the Tardos codes. Second, to actually reason the
zero false positive error rate, we need to analyze step by step the decisions made by tracing al-
gorithm. In more than 95 percent of the setting from above, there were at most two fingerprints
sorted into G1. However, none those ever had a Hamming Distance to y smaller than
1
4HDmax.
In the further proceeding of the tracing algorithm, no possible colluder pair was found. Given
these observations, the tracing algorithm – assuming a collusion of two – concludes:
• at least one of the fingerprints in G1 must be a colluder-fingerprint (lemma 1)
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• as no possible colluder pair was found, only one of the fingerprints in G1 is a colluder-
fingerprint and its counterpart is not within the union set of G1 and G2.
• the one with the smallest Hamming Distance to y must be a colluder-fingerprint (3)
However, as no fingerprint provides a Hamming Distance to y that is smaller than 14HDmax
including the one with the smallest Hamming Distance to y , this is a contradiction to findings
from the proof of lemma 2. The consequence is that we rather not accuse any fingerprint at all.
In short, the false negative error rate increases decisively when the collusion exceeds two par-
ticipants, but – more important – the approach still provides a zero false positive error rate.
For continuing examples of the application of this approach see for instance [101].
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D Regarding the 3-secure fingerprinting scheme
The 3-secure tracing algorithm proposed in chapter 6.2 is very simple structured for reasons of
adaptivity. In this section we present some more possibilities for this tracing algorithm, more
precisely for the minority tracing strategy. Before that some more empirical test results are
given.
As the value which decides which tracing strategy to take is only a rough proposition, sometimes
the ’wrong’ tracing strategy is selected. This leads to imprecisenesses for the code, yet the impact
is very low. In table 24 one recognizes that the minority vote attack strategy nearly always
achieves the lowest false alarm (FP) rate. This is what we expected, because the minority vote
tracing strategy is special tailored for the minority vote attack and it is by construction more
sophisticated (and requires more computational effort) than the majority tracing strategy.
Compared to the other attack strategies, the random vote strategy achieves a higher false nega-
tive error rate (the percentage where no accusation is possible). This is because of the fact, that
both tracing strategies are especially focused on the corresponding attack strategy and strongly
try to avoid false positives whatever the attack. Hence, this goes ahead with an increased
false negative error rate. However, it remains far lower than the error bound selected in the
fingerprint generation process.
Note that the results posted in this table reflect a detect one scenario, i.e. only accusing the one
colluder suspected the most, in order to mirror the specified algorithm as presented in chapter
6.2.
Table 24: Comparison of the behavior of the code at different attack strategies
number of Attack Strategies
code length
fingerprints minority vote random majority vote
detection rate 250 100 99.998% >99.93% 100%
false negatives (FN) 250 100 <0.002% <0.07% 0%
false positives (FP) 250 100 < 10−6% 2 · 10−6% < 10−6%
detection rate 250 1000 >91% 88.25% >99,99%
false negatives (FN) 250 1000 <9% 11.75% <0.01%
false positives (FP) 250 1000 < 10−5 < 10−5% < 10−5%
The minority tracing algorithm stops after a colluder triple was found within one pair of PG l
and one pair of PG r or if each pair of PG l has been considered with each pair of PG r .
Instead of stopping the algorithm after a colluder triple was found, one could continue for
instance as follows to get a lower false alarm rate: First take the fingerprint of the fingerprint
appearing in both pairs PG l and PG r of the colluder triple and add a pair of PG l or PG r
(from first level upwards) with at least one different fingerprint than in the colluder triple.
Check for those if y also belongs to their envelope ε and thus they themselves form a colluder
triple. Continue this way for both PG l and PG r until a certain threshold (to be chosen by the
distributor) is reached, or a sufficient number of colluder triples are found, or all pairs have
been considered.
In case the results are still not satisfying, one could continue as follows: Take the those two
fingerprints of the colluder triple that appeared only once in the according pairs PG l and PG r
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and search within both groups G l and G r for a different third fingerprint and check if the
corresponding triple could have created y , and thus forms a further colluder triple. This is
continued for each fingerprints in G l and G r .
Finally we should have found one suspected colluder triple from the algorithm presented in
chapter 6.2 and possibly some other colluder triples during the two expansion steps just ex-
plained. Next we simply search for the fingerprints occurring in all colluder triples found.
These are assumed as having pertained in the collusion and are output by the tracing algo-
rithm.
Another possibility is to follow the idea of the majority tracing strategy and output the finger-
print appearing in most colluder triples, instead of the ones appearing in all colluder triples.
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E Regarding the fingerprint matrix generation
In chapters 7.2, 7.3 and 8.2 we proposed optimizations and adaption for the generation of the
fingerprint matrix X. In the following we expand the considerations and reasons for its necessity.
Analyzing the fingerprint generation process due to [65] it turns out, that some fingerprint
matrices result in much higher error rates than others, as explained in [88]. In chapter 7.2
we identified two major statistical imprecisenesses that cause these variations: the unfavorable
distribution of significant positions in the column generation and the asymmetric distribution
of ’1’s and ’0’ in the rows of the fingerprint matrix X. Both properties and the reason for their
appearance are analyzed in the following. We selected the detect one scenario (only the most
suspected fingerprint is output) for reasons of simplicity and because the detection scenarios do
not influence the statistical properties of the generation process nor the accusation scores to be
analyzed.
In [88] we observed that the error rate in the detect-one scenario varies heavily with different
underlying fingerprint matrices. Some are especially unfavorable leading to 50 times higher
error rates than other matrices. Figure 19 depicts the attack strategy that leads to the highest
(minority vote) and lowest (minimal mutual information attack) variances regarding the error
rates.
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Figure 19: Box plot of the error rates for (a) minority vote attack and (b) minimal mutual infor-
mation attack for the Tardos scheme with continuous arcsine-distribution. Based on
[88]
For the tests we chose the code length as m = ddmc20 ln(1/"1)e with a cutoff t = 1/(dt c0) ac-
cording to the recently published approach in [64] that proves to be optimal, see appendix A.
The values for the code length m and the cutoff t can be found in table 25. Note that setting
a threshold Z is not necessary for the detect-one scenario, as solely the fingerprint with the
highest accusation score is output.
We simulated different attacks for n = 1000 fingerprints and for c = c0 = 2, ..., 9 colluders. For
each new value of c0 and each attack strategy 100 different fingerprint matrices were generated.
For each matrix, 1000 attacks with a random set of colluders were executed. In summary this
results in 100.000 attacks per attack strategy and per collusion size for the detect one scenario.
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Table 25: Parameter selection according to [64] for n = 1000, "1 = 0.1 and "2 = 1/2 and the
code length as m= ddmc20 ln(1/"1)e.
c0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
dm 11.931 10.818 10.149 9.689 9.346 9.078 8.860 8.678
m 110 225 374 558 775 1025 1306 1619
dt 27.223 28.930 30.325 31.519 32.586 33.546 34.424 27.223
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
0.09
0.095
0.1
0.105
0.11
0.115
0.12
0.125
0.13
Error Rate
Symmetric Tardos − c=5, m=726 − Minority Vote
m
e
a
n
((p
i −
 
0.
5)2
)
(a)
0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05 0.055 0.06 0.065 0.07 0.075
0.09
0.095
0.1
0.105
0.11
0.115
0.12
0.125
0.13
Error Rate
Symmetric Tardos − c=5, m=726 − Greedy Attack
m
e
a
n
((p
i −
 
0.
5)2
)
(b)
Figure 20: Squared distance of the probability values pi from the center 0.5 in comparison to
the error rate. Detect one scenario with n = 1000 fingerprints, c = 5 colluders, and
m = 726 code length. (a) Minority vote attack, (b) Greedy attack. The red line is
the trend. Continuous arcsine-distribution with cutoff t = 1/(31.52c0) was selected.
Based on [88]
The highly variating variances of the errors are caused by statistical properties of weak finger-
print matrices. These are analyzed in the following. We generated 400 different fingerprint
matrices using the arcsine-distribution as explained in 4.5. The parameters were selected as
n = 1000 fingerprints, c0 = c = 5 colluders and a code length of m = 726. Each matrix was
attacked with the minority vote attack, as this attack leads to the highest variances. The at-
tacks were conducted by 20.000 collusions. We also conducted Greedy attack from the stateful
attacks, that was investigated in chapter 4.6.2.
Figure 20 mirrors the statement of chapter 7.3, saying that matrices with higher error rates are
usually more centric, i.e. usually have more probability values pi close to 0.5. A consequence
is that with probability values close to 0.5, the probability that the colluders may detect this
position (see definition 16 for detectable positions in chapter 4.4) is higher.
The second identified property is the difference between the expected number of ones in each
column and its actual number. Given pi, the expected number of ones in column i would be
npi. Let λi denote the actual number of ones in column i. We computed the Pearson correlation
(see for instance [89]) between the error rate and statistical properties of the fingerprint matrix
X in a minority vote attack and a Greedy attack, see chapter 4.6. The results are depicted in
table 26. Combining this results with the analysis above we get that if the difference between
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Table 26: Pearson correlation between the error rate and statistical properties of the finger-
print matrix X for the Minority Vote Attack and the Greedy Attack. The first statistical
property describes the centricity of the bias values. The second describes the differ-
ence between expected and empirical mean, where λi denotes the column sum for
column i.
Correlation calculation Minority Vote Greedy Attack
1
m
∑m
i=1(pi − 0.5)2 -0.778 -0.668
1
m
∑m
i=1(pi −λi/n)2 0.285 0.247
npi and λi increases, i.e. a column has a lot more or less ’1’s than expected, the observed error
rate also increases.
To avoid such weak matrices, a content distributor could generate a fingerprint matrix and
determine the empirical error rate. In case it exceeds a specific limit, the matrix will be neglected
and another matrix will be generated. However, this is not very practical. Therefore, chapters
7.2, 7.3 and 8.2 propose optimizations of the fingerprint generation process in order to a priori
avoid generation of weak matrices.
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F Regarding the discrete distribution
Chapter 7.3 proposed a new fingerprint generation process using discrete distributions. In the
following we will expand the explanations and its rationale and present some more evaluations.
F.1 Continuing explanations
Section 7.2 already discussed that some fingerprint matrices lead to particularly high error
rates. For the discrete distribution according to [65] this error rate is up to 50 times higher for
disadvantageously generated matrices than for other average matrices. Two statistical properties
were identified that these matrices had in common: The centricity of the probability values,
i.e. a lot of probability values pi are close to the center 0.5, and the difference between the
probability value pi and the empirical mean for this column λi/n, with λi denoting the number
of ones in the column i. Both properties give an advantage to colluders, for example the amount
of detectable positions increase when a lot of probability values are close to 0.5, see appendix
E.
The adaption presented in chapter 7.3 avoids the generation of weak fingerprint matrices and
thus reduces the average error rate, as shown in [88].
Explanations to the three steps of the fingerprint generation algorithm are given below.
1. Avoid centricity of the probability values
The discrete distribution according to [65] proposes T = dc0/2e different values, each
with the same probability 1/T . As a first step we ensured that each of these values occur
with the same frequency in the probability vector p = (p1, ..., pm), see chapter 4.3. For
T = 2, half of the probability values would be p1 and the other half p2 accordingly.
In case m is not divisible by T , it is ensured that each probability value occurs at least
bm/T c times and at most dm/T e times within p. A randomly shuffling of p hinders that a
collusion guesses a correct probability value pi.
2. Ensure column sums match expected column sums
In the classical fingerprint generation method according to Tardos [114], each position in
the fingerprint matrix is generated independently with Pr[X i, j = 1] = pi, see chapter 4.
As discussed in appendix E, this may lead to a variating number of ’1’s in a column,
differentiating much from the expected number. For example, if pi = 0.6, the number
of ’1’s in column i should be around 60%. If the number of ’1’s is around 55% only, the
matrix is likely to result to higher error rates.
Step 2. of the algorithm in chapter 7.3 tangles this instability by enforcing a ’1’ in bnpic
positions. With probability npi − bnpic an additional entry in the respective column is set
as ’1’. This ensures that the number of ’1’s in column i is npi. For obvious reasons these
’1’s are spread randomly over the different fingerprints and the remaining positions are
filled with ’0’.
3. Ensure row sums match expected row sums
The third optimization step ensures that the number of ’1’s in each row does not differen-
tiate too much from the expected number, which was identified as disadvantageously, see
appendix E.
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Figure 21: False positive error rates (left lines) for minority vote attacks and false negative error
rates (right lines) for the Combinatorial attack (appendix B) with dependence on the
threshold for (a) c0 = c = 5 colluders and code length m = 1.500 and (b) c0 = c = 8
colluders and code length m= 4.500. Based on [88]
For arbitrary sizes of T , this step can be formalized as follows. Be Ip = {i|1 ≤ i ≤ m, pi =
p} the index sets of the columns with probability value p. The sets Ip are comparably
large. This is because the discrete distribution according to [65] has only T = dc0/2e
different probability values and m  T . Let X j,Ip denote the positions Ip of fingerprint
X j. The number of expected ’1’s on these positions is p · |Ip|. Ensure, that each fingerprint
contains approximately dp · |Ip|e ’1’s and approximately d(1− p) · |Ip|e ’0’s in the different
sub-fingerprints X j,Ip for all p.
F.2 Continuing evaluations
Lots of empirical test were conducted to receive the results presented in chapter 7.3 and below.
The following only describes an excerpt of the results and evaluations examined in [88]. The
adapted fingerprint generation method is evaluated applying the symmetric score function of
[121] presented in chapter 4.5.
Here, we present tests for collusion sizes c = c0 = 2, ..., 9. For all attack strategies except
the minority vote attack, the false positive error rate for the adapted fingerprint generation
method of chapter 7.3 stayed much below the required bound "1. However, the minority vote
attack, which is the false positive maximizing attack strategy, see chapter 4.6, resulted in slightly
higher false positive error rates for c ≤ 6, while for c > 6 the approach of chapter 7.3 resulted
in significant smaller false positive error rates. For the false negative error rate, we observed no
significant differences for all attack strategies and all evaluated collusion sizes. In figure 21 is
illustrated the false positive and the false negative rate for c0 = c = 5 and c0 = c = 8 colluders.
The lines on the left hand side in each figure depict the probability that an innocent fingerprint’s
score exceeds the given threshold, i.e. the false positive rate for a single innocent fingerprint.
The lines on the right-hand side represent the probability that all colluder-fingerprints got a
score below the threshold, i.e. the false negative error rate.
The results depicted in table 10 in chapter 7.3 were received as follows. To determine the
required code length m with which we achieve certain false positive rates "ˆ1 and false negative
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Figure 22: Empirically measured false positive rate and the approximated Gaussian model with
a = 0.726, b = −39.96 and c = 65.52 with dependence on the threshold for c = 5
colluders and a code length of m= 1674. Based on [88]
rates "ˆ2, we first measured the empirical error rates for various collusion sizes and various code
lengths. The false negative rate was determined by averaging over two million attacks and the
false positive rate was measured generating 20 million innocent fingerprints, each time with
different probability values, and executing a collusion attack for each fingerprint.
Next, we determined the threshold with which we achieved a false negative rate of "ˆ2 = 10−3
for the Greedy attack. For this threshold, the false positive rate "ˆ1 is determined in the follow-
ing way. As the false positive rate might be extremely small, e.g. "ˆ1 = 10−10, it cannot directly
be derived from the results of 20 million executed attacks (because with a demanded error
probability of "ˆ1 = 10−10, there might not occur a false positive error at all within 20 million
attacks). Therefore, a Gaussian model with fˆ (Z) = a exp(−((Z− b)/c)2) and a, b, c ∈ R was de-
termined which approximates the false positive rate for any given threshold Z (for the Gaussian
model see for instance the corresponding explanations in [121]). The model was determined
for thresholds with which we received false positive rates between "ˆ1 = 10−1 and "ˆ1 = 10−6. An
example of such a derived Gaussian model is depicted in Figure 22.
The example above with c = c0 = 5 and m = 1674 and a threshold of approximately Z = 211
results in a false negative error of "ˆ2 = 10−3 for the adapted fingerprint generation method
of chapter 7.3. With this threshold, we constructed the function fˆ (Z) as described above and
thereby we approximated the false positive rate as "ˆ1 = f (211)≈ 3.09 · 10−7.
This way we tested for several collusion sizes and code lengths. Figure 12 depicts the resulting
false positive error rate for 4, 6, and 8 colluders, where the false negative rate is fixed as
"ˆ2 = 10−3. The figure tells, that the false positive error rate decreases nearly linear in ln(1/"ˆ1)
for the different code lengths tested. Thereby we can parameterize the code length as m =
dmc
2
0(ln(1/"ˆ1) + κ). The parametrization for the tested collusion sizes were listed in table 10.
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This means, a scheme with the adapted fingerprint generation method and code length of m =
3.93c20(ln(1/"ˆ1+0.09) will result in a false positive error rate of about "ˆ1, if the threshold is set
in a way that the false negative error rate is "ˆ2 = 10−3.
As figure 12 and table 10 report, the adapted fingerprint generation method investigated in
chapter 7.3 result in no improvement at all for c0 ≤ 6. However, for c0 > 6 the approach leads
to much lower error rates. Equivalent, lower error rates allow the content distributor to choose
shorter code lengths and still achieve the selected security level.
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G Regarding the dynamic threshold
This section expands the evaluations of the tracing algorithm with dynamic threshold calcula-
tion presented in chapter 7.4.
The interleaving score function proposed in [86] shows the potential to drastically reduce the
code length for a Tardos-based fingerprinting scheme. It was shown, that the interleaving score
function optimizes the performance indicator µ˜c/σ˜inn against arbitrary attack strategies for a
continuous arcsine-distribution with no cutoff. However, as examined in [88], if the cutoff t is
too small or even t = 0, the scheme results in comparably high false positive error rates. This is
the case if the skewness of the distribution of the innocent-fingerprints’ scores is positive. Also,
if it holds t → 0, the skewness converges towards infinity. Therefore, in practical scenarios the
cutoff must be selected sufficiently large.
A further downside of the interleaving score function is that the standard deviation σinn of the
innocent-fingerprints’ scores heavily depends on the collusion strategy. That is why accusing all
fingerprints with a score exceeding a predefined fixed threshold Z is no longer feasible.
Alternatively, we can compute σˆinn and accuse all those fingerprints, whose score exceeds an
adjusted threshold S j > Zσˆinn, for some predefined threshold Z . Equivalent we can normalize
the scores and accuse all fingerprints with S j/σˆinn > Z .
The effect of the positive skewness can be seen once more in figure 13 in chapter 7.4. It depicts,
that the false positive rate decreases slower than 1 − Φ(Z), with Φ(Z) the normal cumulative
distribution function representing the actual expected error rate, see [121] and [88].
Figure 13 (b) depicts the probability that all colluder-fingerprints get scores below the threshold,
i.e. the probability of a false negative error. The false negative error rate heavily depends on the
applied attack strategies. For c0 ≤ 4 the minority vote attack leads to the highest false negative
rate. For 4< c0 < 10 the minimal mutual information attack of Furon and Pérez-Freire [41], see
chapter 4.6, leads to the highest false negative rate. Though optimal in an asymptotic sense, for
the tested values of c0 the interleaving attack performed comparably bad.
In figure 23 we list the worst case attacks for the symmetric score function and for the inter-
leaving score function. The collusion size was selected as c0 = c = 5 and c0 = c = 9. For reasons
of comparison, the scores have been normalized, i.e. S j/σˆinn for the interleaving score function
and S j/
p
m for the symmetric score function.
One recognizes that for the symmetric score function the false positive rate decreases faster.
This matches our expectations, and is again reasoned by its negative skewness, compared to
the positive skewness of the interleaving score function. However, with the interleaving score
function the scores of the colluder-fingerprints are significant larger, enforcing the choice of a
larger threshold Z . For example, a threshold of Z = 4.4 results in false negative rates of about
10−3 and false positive rates of about 4.8 · 106 for the symmetric score function. Whereas a
threshold of Z = 5.8 achieves false negative error rates of about 10−3 and more than 60 times
smaller false positive error rates of about 7.9·10−8 for the interleaving score function. For c0 ≥ 9
the difference further increases, i.e. the interleaving score function results to much lower error
rates when applying the dynamic threshold computation presented in chapter 7.4.
Figure 24 gives an impression of the superiority of the interleaving score function compared to
the symmetric score function with respect to our dynamic threshold calculation of chapter 7.4.
With fixed false negative error rate of "ˆ2 = 10−3, it shows results for the false positive error
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Figure 23: Maximal observed false positive error rate and false negative error rate for the sym-
metric score function and the interleaving score function with dependence of the
threshold. (a) c0 = c = 5 and m = 1.300, (b) c0 = c = 9 and m = 5.000. The scores
are normalized. Taken from [88]
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Figure 24: False positive error rates for the symmetric score function and for the interleaving
score function with the proposed dynamic threshold calculation method for 4, 6, and
8 colluders. Taken from [88]
rate at various code lengths. Especially for larger collusion sizes, the interleaving score function
outperforms the symmetric score function significantly.
This gives reason for further considerations on the threshold calculation for the interleaving
score function. As a consequence, Ibrahimi et al. [55] recently published an adjusted threshold
calculation for the interleaving score function (However it was intended for very large collu-
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sions). Shortly afterwards, Laarhoven [62] published an approach proposing a modified version
of the interleaving score function, also proving to be optimal in an asymptotic sense and this
time no cutoff t (see for instance chapter 4.5) is needed any more. Though at the very end of this
thesis work, we took on those approaches and elaborated their performances in concordance
with the dynamic threshold calculation presented in chapter 8.3.
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H Regarding the joint decoding approach
Our joint decoding fingerprinting approach presented in chapter 8.1 outperforms comparable
approaches in terms of complexity by construction. We showed that it also performs well re-
garding the error rates and code length. More tests to other approaches confirm this statement.
In the following we present some more test and considerations regarding the joint decoding ap-
proach. Before that we give an explanation of the stateful attack – see chapter 4.6 – investigated
to challenge our and other approaches.
Worst case attack (wca): In this attack the colluders try to find out how the fingerprint
matrix X was generated. Therefore they build the so called colluder matrix XC out of their
fingerprints and calculate according probabilities piC for every column i. With these probabilities
they try to foresee their accusation score – they calculate assumed scores – and generate the
manipulated fingerprint y favorably. Finally they compare their assumed accusation scores and
further optimize y by changing bits at positions where the colluder fingerprint with highest
accusation score and the one with lowest differ from each other. At the end y is re-generated in
a way that the accusation scores of all colluders are approximately the same according to their
calculated probability piC . This way is proceeded until all of their assumed accusation scores are
alike.
Continuing tests: The Monte Carlo estimation is used to verify our tests. Therefore the
parameter for "1 = 10−3 is chosen as to be comparable to the results of [84] and [74], which
at that time were the best so far. Note that recently, Furon et al. intensified their work on joint
decoding fingerprinting codes and published a series of further improvements to the approach
in [74], for instance [73], [75], [40]. The results of our approach compared to [84] and [74]
are shown in table 27. One recognizes the shorter code length for every maximum collusion size
c0. The overall number of colluders caught in different attack scenarios can be seen in Figure
25. We admit that these percentages are slightly lower than those from [74], however, the code
complexity is reduced significantly: For the single decoder we worked with lookup tables, so
that we only have m× n summations which is negligible.
Figure 25: Percentage of colluder fingerprints caught in different attack scenarios
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Table 27: Code length comparison for small c0 with with chosen FP error bound "1 = 10−3 and
10.000 users
collusion size c0 Nuida et al. [84] Meerwald & Furon [74] Our approach [10]
single decoder joint decoder joint decoder
2 253 ∼ 304 ∼ 91
3 877 ∼ 584 ∼ 161
4 1454 ∼ 904 ∼ 333
6 3640 ∼ 1616 ∼ 837
8 6815 ∼ 2688 ∼ 1551
Table 28: Experimental results for code length m = 3671 with c0 = 12, "1 = 10−3 and number
of users n= 104
Strategy Random Minority vote Majority vote Interleaving Worst Case Attack
False positives 14 · 10−5 16 · 10−5 14 · 10−5 12 · 10−5 18 · 10−5
False negatives 34 · 10−5 30 · 10−5 20 · 10−5 38 · 10−5 204 · 10−5
Table 12 shows the code lengths of the scheme presented in chapter 8.1 for c0 ≥ 10. To the
best of our knowledge there are no joint decoding tracing strategies for these collusion sizes
that provide comparably less computational complexity. Because of this, table 12 shows our
results compared to the results of [121], which is the algorithm described in chapter 4.5, that
we already used for the single decoding step within our joint decoding approach. The table
shows the enormous reduction of the code length for the joint decoding strategy compared to
the single decoding in [121]. This means, the code length is reduced significantly, compared to
an acceptable increment of the effort for fixed error rates.
Tables 13 and 28 show the false positive and false negative errors for collusion sizes of c0 = c =
10 and c0 = c = 12. The experimental results yield error rates that are below the theoretical
range for which the parameters were chosen as "1 = 10−3 and ε2 = 1/2. Note: For reason of
comparison the false positive error rate was set to "1 = 10−3, instead of n ≤ "−11 as commonly
proposed in this work.
In total, this means our scheme provides low false alarm and almost zero no accusation rates
while the total number of identified colluders is about 25−55% depending on the tested collu-
sion strategies. A significant improvement, however, is the short code length with which these
error rates are achieved not requiring any information of the collusion size and attack strategy.
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I Regarding the correlative column generation II
This section contains a broader evaluation of the enhanced fingerprint generation process for
continuous distributions presented in chapter 8.2. Furthermore we will give the statistical ex-
planations regarding the rank correlation coefficients. The following computations and expla-
nations are an excerpt of the elaborations in [71].
Example of the columnwise generation of a correlated fingerprint matrix
The exemplary – and therefore very small – fingerprint matrix X′ is correlated.

1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1

The bold (and blue) entries represent those, that have been placed randomly in admitted po-
sitions of the corresponding column. The creation of the matrix is depicted below. The gray
bars denote rows that are locked for further significant positions. We set λ= 0.33 as correlation
bound with an epsilon-environment Bε(λ) of size ε = 0.01 and the ranked probability vector
pˆ = (0.90,0.88,0.17,0.19,0.75,0.28,0.70,0.34).

1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1

→

1 1
1 1
1 0
1 1
1 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1

→

1 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 0
1 1 0
0 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 1
1 1 0

→

1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0

→

1 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1

→

1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1

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→
1 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1

→

1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1

Once the matrix is completely correlated, as a last step of the algorithm, for reasons of unpre-
dictability, we suggest to permute the columns to finally receive the fingerprint matrix X.
The choice of the cutoff parameter t
Until now we have not considered the choice of the cutoff t that bounds the limits for values
of the probability vector p, see chapter 4.5. In the following we discuss the conditions required
for the choice of an optimal t.
As proven in [121], the cutoff needs to satisfy c0 t  1. As described in chapter 4.5, the
probabilities for the column generation of X prescribe the probability for a symbol ’1’ in the
respective column. It must hold pi ∈ [t, 1− t]. Within the algorithm presented in chapter 8.2
into each column i is spread exactly dpi · ne ’1’s.
A reasonable lower bound for t is 1n . This is because it enforces at least one symbol ’1’ in every
column (tn = 1nn = 1). On the other side, because of (1 − t)n = n − tn = n − 1nn = n − 1,
it enforces at least one symbol ’0’ as well. This prevents from columns carrying all the same
symbol, which would be simply no information at all for the distributor.
All pi lie within the interval [t, 1− t]. Hence, it must hold t ≤ 12 . In order to best experience
the advantage of a bias distribution function (whether discrete or continuous, see chapter 4.5)
the values in p should show a large variation. For this reason the interval [t, 1− t] should be as
large as possible.
To conclude, for a reasonable choice of the cutoff parameter t it should hold:
1
n
≤ t  1
2
for n> 2
A broader analysis of the choices for the cutoff can be found in [121] and recently [55] and
[62].
Analysis of the correlation
To analyze the correlation we inserted into the fingerprint matrix, we calculate the correlation
matrix
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C = (τBi, j ) =

τB1,1 τB1,2 · · · τB1,m
τB2,1 τB2,2 · · · τB2,m
...
...
. . .
...
τBm,1 τBm,1 · · · τBm,m
 ∈ [−1,1]m×m
where the parameter τBi, j denotes the rank correlation coefficient according to Kendall, see for
instance [47]:
Definition 27 Be X ,Y vectors of the same size with realizations of random variables. Then
Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient τB is defined as
τB =
Ns − Ndp
(Ns + Nd + TX )(Ns + Nd + TY )
,
and it holds −1≤ τB ≤ 1, where
• Ns denotes the number of concordant pairs in X and Y ,
• Nd denotes the number of different pairs in X and Y ,
• TX denotes the number of compounds in X,
• TY denotes the number of compounds in Y.
Kendall’s τB is a measurement for the correlation between two columns i and j. A more efficient
method for the calculation of τB with O (n logn) is given in [60].
Because of its symmetry and because the correlation of a column to itself is always 1, is is
sufficient to calculate the upper triangular matrix of C [47].
C ′ =

0 τB1,2 · · · τB1,m
...
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . τBm−1,m
0 · · · · · · 0

As an upper triangular matrix contains at most m(m+1)2 elements that are not zero, the number of
relevant elements in C ′ is exactly m′ := m(m+1)2 −m = m(m−1)2 . Note that the principal diagonal
solely contains zeros as well. We summarize the coefficients of the upper triangular matrix C ′,
i.e. the entries for which holds {τBi, j : j > i}, in a set
c¯= {c¯1, c¯2, . . . , c¯m′} (21)
Analysis of the correlation coefficients of correlated fingerprinting codes
To evaluate the impact of the correlation, we tested the eleven correlation bounds of Λ
Λ= {t, 0.05,0.10,0.15,0.20,0.25,0.30,0.35,0.40,0.45,0.50} (22)
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Figure 26: Analysis of the correlation coefficients: arithmetic mean and empirical variance. The
x-axis marks the correlation bound λ from 0 to 0.5. Based on [71]
against a set of 500 fingerprint matrices with exemplary parameters n = 1000, "1 =
1
n , "2 =
1
2 , t =
1
n and c0 = 7. Because the ranked probability vector pˆ is sorted, see chapter 8.2, a
correlation of at most 0.50 is sufficient. The choice of the parameters is rather insignificant, as
it has no effect on the correlation between the columns. Hence our choice is a very classical
parameter set.
For every fingerprint matrix X, the corresponding set of correlation coefficients c¯ is calculated
according to equation 21. Next the mean, the variance, the skewness and the excess are deter-
mined, and each average of the results for the 500 fingerprint matrices is calculated.
The results can be seen in figures 26 and 27. With increasing correlation, the mean and the
skewness are dispersed close to zero, whereas the variance and the excess increase as well.
The consequence is a broader spreading of the coefficients and its distribution is leptokurtic.
The reason for this an increment of the number of outliers, i.e. an increment of the number of
coefficients that are significant far away of zero.
In summary, with a correlation bound of λ = 0.10 the resulting correlation of a fingerprint
matrix X is hardly recognizable or verifiable. A broader explanation is to be found in [71]
Analysis of the impact of the Interleaving attack on correlated fingeprinting codes
A further test set of 50 fingerprinting codes with parameter sets of n = 1000, "1 =
1
n , "2 =
1
2 ,
t = 1n und c0 = 21 are tested against 100 runs of Interleaving attacks. The same correlation
bound as in equation 22 was chosen. The results are depicted in figures 28 and 29.
What we see is that with a correlation bound of λ= 0.10, the accusation of innocent-fingerprints
reduces by a factor of six, and at the same time the number of colluders caught is slightly higher
compared to a correlation bound of λ= 0.0 (original Tardos). In other words, the false negative
error is significantly reduced and at the same time, the false positive error is slightly reduced.
The figures also suggests, that results will no more improve significantly with correlation bound
of λ= 0.20 or larger.
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Figure 27: Analysis of the correlation coefficients: skewness and excess. The x-axis marks the
correlation bound λ from 0 to 0.5. Based on [71]
Figure 28: Interleaving attacks on correlated fingerprinting codes: Average number of innocent-
fingerprints that are accused (left) and average number of colluders caught (right).
Based on [71]
In the same test set, we considered the standard deviation of the scores of innocent-fingerprints
after Interleaving attacks. What we see is the expected: For an un-correlated fingerprint matrix
X (i.e. λ = 0.0), the standard deviation σinn equals one. This mirrors the pre-conditions on the
construction of the Tardos codes [114], see chapter 4.5. Theoretical proofs are given in [121]
for instance. With increasing correlation, the standard deviation of the scores of innocent-
fingerprints decreases. This effect has been largely discussed in chapters 7.2, 7.3 and in [11].
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Figure 29: Interleaving attacks on correlated fingerprinting codes: Maximum standard deviation
of the accusation scores of innocent-fingerprints. Based on [71]
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J Regarding the universal threshold calculation
This section gives derivations and widens the explanations and tests of the universal threshold
calculation via mixture models presented in chapter 8.3.
J.1 Derivations of the parameter calculations
The iterative expectation maximization algorithm (EM) is approved to find the maximum-
likelihood-estimator for a parameter set of a mixture model, even if the parameter set is not
completely known. The incomplete data set here is denoted as {S j} j=1,...,n, as it represents the
accusation scores for the fingerprinting scheme. The unknown information here represents the
mapping which component of the mixture model is associated to which accusation score.
As already mentioned in chapter 8.3, the initial parameter set Θ(0) needs to be selected man-
ually. Afterwards, the following two steps have to be conducted successively with increasing
k ∈ N.
1. Expectation step: The actual parameter set Θ(k) determines the auxiliary function
Q(Θ(k+1)|Θ(k)). All values but Θ(k+1) are given.
2. Maximization step: The function Q is maximized.
Θ(k+1) = argmax
Θ
Q(Θ|Θ(k))
Both steps are repeated iteratively until an abort criteria is reached.
Derivation of an EM for a Gaussian mixture model
We will only give a short sketch of the derivation, for more information see [4] and [18]. A
more general approach of equation (14) for a Gaussian mixture model with M components as
posted in [4] is as follows:
p(x |Θ) =
M∑
j=1
α jN (x |µ j,σ j), with
M∑
j=1
α j = 1
Here the parameter set we want to estimate is denoted as Θ = {α1,θ1, . . . ,αM ,θM} ={α1,µ1,σ1, . . . ,αM ,µM ,σM}. According to [4], we can derive the Q-function of the maximiza-
tion step as follows. For a given data set X = {x1, x2, . . . , xN} the uncomplete data probability
is given as
logL (Θ|X ) = log
N∏
i=1
ρ(x i|Θ) =
N∑
i=1
log
 M∑
j=1
α jN (x i|µ j,σ j)

.
Assuming there exists an unknown data set U = {u1,u2, . . . ,uN}, with ui telling which normal
distribution N (x |µ,σ) is responsible for x i and thereby clearly assigning each x i to one of the
M normal distributions. Also, let us assume that the values for Y are known. Thereby we get
the complete data probability as
logL (Θ|X ,U ) = logρ(X ,U |Θ) =
N∑
i=1
log

αuiN (x i|µui ,σui )

.
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Thereby and with the help of Bayes’ theorem
ρ(ui|x i,Θ(k)) =
α(k)ui N (x i|µui ,σui )
ρ(x i|Θ(k)) =
α(k)ui N (x i|µui ,σui )∑M
j=1α
(k)
j N (x i|µ j,σ j)
we can calculate ui for given x i and guessed Θ
k for the whole data set:
ρ(~y|X ,Θ(k)) =
N∏
i=1
p(ui|x i,Θ(k)) =
N∏
i=1
α(k)ui N (x i|µui ,σui )∑M
j=1α
(k)
j N (x i|µ j,σ j)
.
The expectation of the Q function can now be derived as
Q(Θ,Θ(k)) = E

logρ(X ,U |Θ)|X ,Θ′
With some complex calculation steps this ’reduces’ to
Q(Θ,Θ(k)) =
N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
log

αlN (x i|µl ,σl)

p(l|x i,Θ(k)) (23)
=
N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
log(αl)ρ(l|x i,Θ(k)) +
N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
log
N (x i|µl ,σl)ρ(l|x i,Θ(k)) (24)
Now the weight parameters αl are divided from the parameters θl . This allows maximizing
them independent of each other.
Finding the weight parameters αl
To find αl , we have to calculate the corresponding derivation of Q(Θ,Θ(k)). As the right sum
in equation (24) does not contain αl we need not consider this term. We insert a Lagrange
multiplier λ to ensure that the sum over all αl remains 1.
∂
∂ αl
 N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
log(αl)ρ(l|x i,Θ(k))

+λ
 M∑
l=1
αl − 1

!
= 0
⇒
 N∑
i=1
1
αl
ρ(l|x i,Θ(k))

+λ
!
= 0.
With some more math we receive
α
(k+1)
l =
1
N
N∑
i=1
α
(k)
l N (x i,µl ,σl)∑M
j=1α
(k)
j N (x i|µ j,σ j)
.
This is the guide for the calculation of the αl for equation (14) in chapter 8.3. It calculates and
maximizes the expectation value.
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Finding the means µl
In analogy to αl , to find the means we have to calculate the corresponding derivations of µl of
equation (24). Here the left term can be omitted.
∂
∂ µl
 N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
logN (x i|µl ,σl)ρ(l|x i,Θ(k))

=
1
σ2l
N∑
i=1
(x i −µl)ρ(l|x i,Θ(k))
Setting this equation to zero gives us
µl =
∑N
i=1 x iρ(l|x i,Θ(k))∑N
i=1ρ(l|x i,Θ(k))
.
Again with the help of Bayes’ theorem, we yield the formula for µ(k+1)l .
µ
(k+1)
l =
∑N
i=1 x i
α
(k)
l N (xi |µl ,σl )∑M
j=1 α
(k)
j N (xi |µ j ,σ j)∑N
i=1
α
(k)
l N (xi |µl ,σl )∑M
j=1 α
(k)
j N (xi |µ j ,σ j)
Finding the standard deviation
We calculate the derivation of Q(Θ,Θ(k)) for σl .
∂
∂ σl
 N∑
i=1
M∑
l=1
logN (x i|µl ,σl)ρ(l|x i,Θ(k))

!
= 0
⇒
N∑
i=1

− 1
σl
+
1
σl
 x i −µl
σl
2
ρ(l|x i,Θ(k)) != 0,
This gives us
σl =
√√√√∑Ni=1(x i −µl)2ρ(l|x l ,Θ(k))∑N
i=1ρ(l|x l ,Θ(k))
and finally with the help of Bayes’ theorem we recieve
σ
(k+1)
l =
√√√√√√√√
∑N
i=1
 
x i −µ(k+1)l
2 α(k)l N (xi |µl ,σl )∑M
j=1 α
(k)
j N (xi |µ j ,σ j)∑N
i=1
α
(k)
l N (xi |µl ,σl )∑M
j=1 α
(k)
j N (xi |µ j ,σ j)
allowing to estimate the standard deviation σl for step k+ 1.
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J.2 Test setup for the fitting of mixture models and backup threshold if the fitting fails
We estimate the initial parameter set Θ(0) = {α1,µ1,σ1,α2,µ2,σ2} for a Gaussian mixture
model as follows.
α1 =
n−c0
n µ1 = 0 σ1 = 1
α2 =
c
n µ2 =
1
2

Z∗ +max j∈{1,2,...,n}

S j
	
σ2 = 1
The initial values for µ1 and σ1 are due to the general requirements for the fingerprint gener-
ation process according to [114]. We expect the mean µ2 to lie between Z
∗ and the maximum
accusation score.
Backup threshold if Z∗ fails
As described in chapter 8.3 the threshold decision is given so that the output set of the tracing
algorithm is as:
T =

X j|∀ j = {1, ...,n} : S j > Z∗
	
What is left aside, the fitting of a mixture model may fail. This may happen for example if
there are too less accusation scores of colluder fingerprints. In that case both components of
the mixture model will be estimated as equal and the value for µ2 becomes disproportional
low. Therefore, for small values for c0, we propose to add a backup threshold. This way,
if the mixture models fail, we fall back to the threshold proposed by [121] for instance. This
means, if it holds Z∗ = µ2 < Z , we employ Z of equation (7) as threshold. Hence, the number of
innocent fingerprints output by the tracing algorithm cannot increase and the false positive error
remains bounded. However, during all tests with the universal threshold calculation method
from chapter 8.3 the fitting never failed. Hence, for collusion sizes c ≤ 13, see table 15 in
chapter 8.3, the empirically calculated probability that the fitting fails is less than 10−4. For
smaller collusion sizes, we already suggest other approaches, see chapter 10.
J.3 Tests for the minority and majority vote attack
In chapter 8.3 we only showed results for the interleaving attack (table 15). This section also
presents the results for the minority vote attack and majority vote attack.
Tables 29 and 30 carry the results obtained with the same parameter selection as for the results
listed in table 15 in chapter 8.3. That is the code length was set to m = 12,248, 22,912 and
47,556 for c0 = 15, 21 and 31 respectively. The error bounds were as "1 = 1/n and "2 = 1/2.
As mentioned in chapter 8.3, we ran 10,000 attacks for the symmetric score function [121] and
for the interleaving score function [86] as well as for the score function proposed in [62] and
per selection of c.
The results differ in that, on the one hand, the minority vote attack is the least violent for
the GMM, which means this choice of threshold calculation is much more reliable than the
ordinary threshold calculation Z∗. On the other hand, against the majority vote attack the
GMM provides no significant improvement at all, whereas the ordinary threshold calculation
competes very well with this kind of collusion strategy.
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Table 29: Results for FP and |C| with different threshold calculations (Z∗, GMM+, GMM−),
different score functions and varying collusion sizes c while c0 = 15, 21 and 31 after a
minority attack.
’Škoric´ ’ [121] ’Oosterwijk’ [86] ’Laarhoven’ [62]
c0 c Threshold FP |C | FP |C | FP |C |
c0 = 15
c = 13
Z∗ 0.26 12.75 0.00 12.35 0.00 4.02
GMM− 0.27 12.74 1.78 13.00 0.36 12.90
GMM+ 0.00 6.34 0.00 7.01 0.00 6.46
c = 15
Z∗ 0.25 13.49 0.00 12.91 0.00 1.69
GMM− 0.26 13.48 1.79 14.99 0.36 14.34
GMM+ 0.00 7.07 0.00 8.30 0.00 7.34
c = 18
Z∗ 0.25 12.21 0.00 12.17 0.00 0.39
GMM− 0.25 12.11 1.79 17.92 0.36 14.89
GMM+ 0.04 7.72 0.00 10.40 0.01 8.47
c0 = 21
c = 18
Z∗ 0.26 17.50 0.00 17.71 0.00 8.67
GMM− 0.27 17.50 1.09 18.00 0.34 17.95
GMM+ 0.00 8.80 0.00 8.87 0.00 8.98
c = 21
Z∗ 0.26 18.20 0.00 19.49 0.00 4.11
GMM− 0.27 18.17 1.08 21.00 0.34 20.52
GMM+ 0.00 9.89 0.00 10.49 0.00 10.39
c = 24
Z∗ 0.25 16.66 0.00 19.73 0.00 1.64
GMM− 0.25 16.52 1.09 23.98 0.34 22.03
GMM+ 0.04 10.68 0.00 12.22 0.00 11.67
c0 = 31
c = 24
Z∗ 0.26 23.71 0.00 23.99 0.00 20.70
GMM− 0.27 23.71 0.71 24.00 0.32 24.00
GMM+ 0.00 11.90 0.00 11.66 0.00 11.94
c = 31
Z∗ 0.27 25.28 0.00 30.15 0.00 10.51
GMM− 0.27 25.20 0.71 31.00 0.34 30.72
GMM+ 0.01 14.64 0.00 15.15 0.00 15.40
c = 38
Z∗ 0.27 19.79 0.00 32.03 0.00 2.93
GMM− 0.24 19.18 0.72 37.97 0.34 34.94
GMM+ 0.15 16.11 0.00 18.77 0.00 18.59
The reason for this is by design of the attacks. In the minority vote attack, the attackers have
a higher potential to stay below the ordinary threshold Z∗, because the number of amounts
added to their score is the least possible (minority vote). As for the GMM, the threshold is dy-
namic with the accusation scores and therefore adjusted for each attack. Hence, the chance
for the attackers to create a fingerprint for which their accusation scores stay below the thresh-
old, reduces decisively. The opposite is the case for the majority vote attack. In this attack
the colluder-fingerprints’ accusation scores consist of a significant large number of positive
amounts (majority vote), for which already calculating the Hamming Distance as accusation
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Table 30: Results for FP and |C| with different threshold calculations (Z∗, GMM+, GMM−),
different score functions and varying collusion sizes c while c0 = 15, 21 and 31 after a
majority attack.
’Škoric´ ’ [121] ’Oosterwijk’ [86] ’Laarhoven’ [62]
c0 c Threshold FP |C | FP |C | FP |C |
c0 = 15
c = 13
Z∗ 0.21 12.81 0.00 12.97 0.00 12.95
GMM− 0.21 12.80 0.26 13.00 0.26 13.00
GMM+ 0.00 6.36 0.00 6.50 0.00 6.51
c = 15
Z∗ 0.20 13.87 0.00 14.08 0.00 13.81
GMM− 0.21 13.86 0.25 15.00 0.25 15.00
GMM+ 0.00 7.04 0.00 7.50 0.00 7.50
c = 18
Z∗ 0.20 13.29 0.00 9.90 0.00 9.08
GMM− 0.20 13.19 0.26 18.00 0.26 18.00
GMM+ 0.01 7.72 0.00 9.02 0.00 9.01
c0 = 21
c = 18
Z∗ 0.24 17.68 0.00 17.97 0.00 17.96
GMM− 0.24 17.68 0.27 18.00 0.27 18.00
GMM+ 0.00 8.85 0.00 9.02 0.00 9.02
c = 21
Z∗ 0.23 19.07 0.00 19.86 0.00 19.62
GMM− 0.23 19.05 0.26 21.00 0.26 21.00
GMM+ 0.00 9.96 0.00 10.50 0.00 10.50
c = 24
Z∗ 0.22 18.43 0.00 16.89 0.00 16.18
GMM− 0.22 18.32 0.26 24.00 0.26 24.00
GMM+ 0.01 10.79 0.00 12.00 0.00 12.00
c0 = 31
c = 24
Z∗ 0.24 23.87 0.00 24.00 0.00 24.00
GMM− 0.24 23.87 0.26 24.00 0.26 24.00
GMM+ 0.00 11.92 0.00 12.04 0.00 12.04
c = 31
Z∗ 0.23 27.53 0.00 29.43 0.00 29.22
GMM− 0.23 27.47 0.25 31.00 0.25 31.00
GMM+ 0.00 14.82 0.00 15.53 0.00 15.53
c = 38
Z∗ 0.23 24.27 0.00 20.27 0.00 19.48
GMM− 0.22 23.84 0.27 37.99 0.26 37.99
GMM+ 0.05 16.86 0.00 19.02 0.00 19.01
score oftentimes suffices to catch the colluders. For this reason the colluders’ scores have very
high probability to stay above the ordinary threshold Z∗. This means there hardly is room for
improvement. Consequently, the dynamic threshold via GMM cannot improve those results.
Note that for the symmetric score function in [121] – by construction – the attack strategy has
only marginal influence on the scores for which the results via GMM are very alike the ordinary
threshold.
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Table 31: Results for correlated and uncorrelated X with n = 1.000 and symmetric threshold
calculation [121] compared to GMM for different attacks.
Symmetric Tardos Z GMM
Attack strategy c0 = c correlation bound λ FP |C | FP |C |
Interleaving
21
0.00 0.622 10.435 0.26 6.99
0.10 0.057 11.065 0.03 8.77
31
0.00 0.576 15.744 0.264 11.76
0.10 0.040 15.796 0.019 13.39
Minority vote
21
0.00 0.677 11.833 0.23 8.10
0.10 0.391 10.436 0.22 8.17
31
0.00 0.622 14.802 0.364 11.67
0.10 0.294 14.301 0.221 12.63
Majority vote
21
0.00 0.639 10.423 0.26 7.22
0.10 0.024 11.217 0.01 8.93
31
0.00 0.618 15.438 0.265 11.10
0.10 0.101 15.960 0.067 13.54
J.4 Combination of correlated matrix generation and GMM
We also tested the combination of the threshold calculation via Gaussian mixture models (GMM)
and the correlative fingerprint matrix generation we introduced in chapter 8.2. For this test set
each attack was run 100 times for each 10 different fingerprint matrices X. All matrices were
generated according to the original Tardos scheme [114]. Further parameter choices were
n = 1000, c0 = {21,31}, "1 = 1n , "2 = 12 und t = 1n . In table 31 the results for the symmetric
score function and the corresponding threshold Z according to [121] as described in chapter
4.5 are depicted.
Besides the average number of colluder-fingerprints output by the tracing algorithm |C |, we
again listed the average number of misleadingly output innocent-fingerprints. It is referred to
as FP, according to the false positive error.
The fingerprints were generated according as in the original Tardos scheme [114], i.e. with the
original parameter selection instead of the optimal parameter selection as described in appendix
A. This is because the original generation forms the basis for the approach with the correlated
fingerprint matrix and to be comparable to the corresponding results presented in chapter 8.2.
For table 31, we selected the initial parameters for the GMM according to section J.2.
We observe a significant decrement of the average number of innocent fingerprints output by the
tracing algorithm for the mixture model approach compared to the symmetric Tardos scheme.
The combination using the correlative matrix generation approach from chapter 8.2 and mixture
models further reduce the occurring errors. Note that the results in table 31 slightly differ from
the equivalent results in table 15 of chapter 8.3 and tables 29 and 30 in appendix J.3. This is
because of the different parameter selection mentioned above.
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